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The #MeToo movement has shaken corporate America in recent
months, leading to the departures of several high-proﬁle executives as
well as sharp stock price declines at a number of ﬁrms. Investors have
taken notice and taken action: Shareholders at more than a half dozen
publicly traded companies have ﬁled lawsuits since the start of 2017
alleging that corporate ﬁduciaries breached state law duties or violated
federal securities laws in connection with sexual harassment scandals.
Additional suits are likely in the coming months.
This Article examines the role of corporate and securities law in
regulating and remedying workplace sexual misconduct. We specify the
conditions under which corporate ﬁduciaries can be held liable under
state law for perpetrating sexual misconduct or allowing it to occur. We
also discuss the circumstances under which federal securities law
requires issuers to disclose allegations against top executives and to
reveal settlements of sexual misconduct claims. After building a doctrinal framework for analyzing potential liability, we consider the strategic
and normative implications of using corporate and securities law to
address workplace sexual misconduct. We conclude that corporate and
securities law can publicize the scope and severity of sexual harassment,
incentivize proactive and productive interventions by corporate ﬁduciaries, and punish individuals and entities that commit, conceal, and abet
sexual misconduct in the workplace. But we also address the potential
discursive and distributional implications of using laws designed to
protect shareholders as tools to regulate sexual harassment. We end by
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emphasizing the promise—as well as the pitfalls—of using corporate
law as a catalyst for organizational and social change.
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INTRODUCTION
The year 2017 marked an inﬂection point in the evolution of social
norms regarding sexual misconduct. While victims of workplace sexual
harassment and sexual assault had long suffered in silence, the surfacing
of serious sexual misconduct allegations against Hollywood producer
Harvey Weinstein in October 2017 encouraged many more victims to tell
their personal stories of abuse. Within months, a long list of celebrities
and public ﬁgures faced allegations of sexual misconduct, including
actors Ben Affleck, Dustin Hoffman, and Kevin Spacey; broadcasters Matt
Lauer and Charlie Rose; comedian Louis C.K.; journalists Ryan Lizza and
Mark Halperin; singer Nick Carter; radio personalities Garrison Keillor
and Tavis Smiley; and politicians such as Congressman John Conyers,
Senator Al Franken, and failed senatorial candidate Roy Moore.1 What
began as the “#MeToo moment” quickly grew into a #MeToo movement
that shows no signs of losing steam.2
It did not take long for sexual harassment allegations to reach
corporate boardrooms. Even before the Weinstein allegations emerged, a
number of high-proﬁle chief executives had resigned in recent years
amid allegations of sexual harassment, including Mark Hurd of Hewlett
Packard,3 Dov Charney of American Apparel,4 Roger Ailes of Fox News,5
Mark Light of Signet Jewelers,6 Kris Duggan of the enterprise software

1. See Samantha Cooney, Here Are All the Public Figures Who’ve Been Accused of
Sexual Misconduct After Harvey Weinstein, Time (Nov. 9, 2017), http://time.com/5015204/
harvey-weinstein-scandal (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Sept. 17,
2018).
2. See Monica Akhtar, #MeToo: A Movement or a Moment?, Wash. Post (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/11/09/metoo-a-movement-ora-moment/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
3. Ben Worthen & Pui-Wing Tam, H-P Chief Quits in Scandal, Wall St. J. (Aug. 7,
2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703309704575413663370670900
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
4. See Shane Ferro, American Apparel Lawsuit Is ‘Mother of All Sexual Harassment
Cases,’ Judge Says, HuffPost (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
american-apparel-lawsuit-dov-charney-sexual-harassment_us_5617c6dce4b0082030a2067d [https://
perma.cc/NF3V-CK6W].
5. Emily Steel & Michael S. Schmidt, More Trouble at Fox News: Ailes Faces New
Sexual Claims and O’Reilly Loses Two Advertisers, N.Y. Times (Apr. 3, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/business/media/fox-news-roger-ailes-harassment-suit.html
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
6. See Drew Harwell, Signet Jewelers CEO, at Center of Gender-Discrimination Case,
Retires for ‘Health Reasons,’ Wash. Post (July 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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company BetterWorks,7 and Mike Cagney of the online lender SoFi.8 And
since Weinstein’s departure from his ﬁlm production ﬁrm, the cascade of
CEO resignations and leaves of absence related to sexual misconduct has
continued.9 Meanwhile, several high-proﬁle executives below the CEO
level at ﬁrms such as Amazon Studios,10 Fidelity Investments,11 Morgan
Stanley,12 NPR,13 and the Walt Disney Company14 have left their jobs after
sexual harassment allegations against them surfaced.
These scandals have caught the attention of shareholders and
plaintiffs’ lawyers. From the start of 2017 through August 2018,
news/business/wp/2017/07/17/signet-jewelers-ceo-mark-light-at-the-center-of-a-sprawlinggender-discrimination-case-out-for-health-reasons (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
7. See Lizette Chapman, BetterWorks CEO Resigns Amid Sexual Harassment
Lawsuit, Bloomberg Tech. ( July 26, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-07-26/betterworks-ceo-duggan-resigns-amid-sexual-harassment-lawsuit (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
8. See Katie Benner & Nathaniel Popper, Chief Executive of Social Finance,
an Online Lending Start-Up, to Step Down, N.Y. Times (Sept. 11, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/technology/sofi-mike-cagney-sexual-harassment.html (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review). In addition, Uber founder Travis Kalanick resigned as CEO
of the ride-sharing service amid allegations that he tolerated a toxic work environment
and widespread sexual harassment at the company. See Mike Isaac, Uber Founder Travis
Kalanick Resigns as C.E.O., N.Y. Times ( June 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/06/21/technology/uber-ceo-travis-kalanick.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
9. See, e.g., Marco della Cava, Hyperloop Cofounder Pishevar Takes Leave After
Harassment Allegations, USA Today (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
tech/2017/12/05/hyperloop-cofounder-pishevar-takes-leaves-after-harassment-allegations/
923730001 [https://perma.cc/C2MJ-EA7M]; Fenway Health CEO Quits over Sexual
Harassment Claims Against Doctor, Modern Healthcare (Dec. 11, 2017), http://
www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20171211/NEWS/171219983 [https://perma.cc/34PG2J8T].
10. See John Koblin, Roy Price Quits Amazon Studios After Sexual Harassment
Claim, N.Y. Times (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/business/media/
roy-price-amazon-studios.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Olivia Zaleski, Two
Executives Depart Amazon’s Audible Unit After Harassment Probe, Seattle Times (Dec. 5,
2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/amazon/two-executives-depart-amazonsaudible-unit-after-harassment-probe (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
11. Kirsten Grind et al., Star Fidelity Manager Gavin Baker Fired over Sexual
Harassment Allegations, Wall St. J. (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/starfidelity-manager-gavin-baker-fired-over-sexual-harassment-allegations-1507841061 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
12. Marwa Eltagouri, Former Congressman Harold Ford Jr. Fired by Morgan Stanley
over Inappropriate Behavior, Company Says, Wash. Post (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/12/07/former-congressman-harold-ford-jrfired-by-morgan-stanley-over-inappropriate-behavior-company-says (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
13. David Folkenflik, NPR’s Sexual Harassment Scandal, NPR (Nov. 5, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/05/562188679/nprs-sexual-harassment-scandal (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
14. Brooks Barnes, John Lasseter, a Pixar Founder, Takes Leave After ‘Missteps,’ N.Y.
Times (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/business/media/johnlasseter-pixar-disney-leave.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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shareholders at eight publicly traded ﬁrms—Signet Jewelers, Twenty-First
Century Fox, Liberty Tax, Wynn Resorts, National Beverage, CBS, Papa
John’s, and Nike—ﬁled lawsuits against corporate directors and officers
on grounds related to reported sexual misconduct at those companies.15
First, in March and April 2017, shareholders at Signet Jewelers ﬁled a
series of class action lawsuits alleging that the company, its CEO, and
other current and former officers violated federal securities law by
misleading investors about a culture of sexual harassment at the ﬁrm.16
Those claims have since been consolidated in the federal district court
for the Southern District of New York, and a motion to dismiss the
consolidated class action complaint is now fully briefed and pending
decision.17 Second, after the departures of CEO Roger Ailes and
broadcaster Bill O’Reilly from Fox News, shareholders ﬁled a derivative
action against the late Ailes’s estate and against directors of parent
company Twenty-First Century Fox alleging that the defendants had
breached their ﬁduciary duties by allowing sexual harassment to run
rampant at the network.18 That suit settled on the same day it was ﬁled in
November 2017 for $90 million plus an agreement by the network to
establish a panel of advisors tasked with improving the work environment
at Fox News.19 Third, a Philadelphia-based pension fund ﬁled a derivative
lawsuit against Liberty Tax and its former CEO, John Hewitt, in
December 2017 after news reports revealed that Hewitt had carried on
15. See infra section II.A.
16. For the most recent complaint in the case as of this writing, see Fifth Amended
Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, In re Signet Jewelers
Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 1:16-cv-06728-JMF (S.D.N.Y. ﬁled Mar. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Signet
Jewelers Complaint]. For earlier pleadings, see Second Amended Class Action Complaint
for Violations of Federal Securities Law, Dube v. Signet Jewelers Ltd., No. 1:16-cv-06728JMF (S.D.N.Y. ﬁled Apr. 3, 2017); Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws,
Irving Firemen’s Relief & Ret. Sys. v. Signet Jewelers Ltd., No. 1:17-cv-02845 (S.D.N.Y. ﬁled
Mar. 28, 2017); Class Action Complaint for Violations of Federal Securities Laws,
Mikolchak v. Signet Jewelers Ltd., No. 3:17-cv-00923 (N.D. Tex. ﬁled Mar. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Mikolchak Complaint] (transferred to the Southern District of New York by Order
Granting Agreed Motion to Transfer Venue, Mikolchak, No. 3:17-cv-00923-B (ﬁled Apr. 17,
2017)).
17. See Order, In re Signet Jewelers, No. 1:16-cv-06728 (JMF) (ﬁled Mar. 20, 2018)
[hereinafter Signet Jewelers Order].
18. See Veriﬁed Derivative Complaint at 1–2, City of Monroe Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v.
Murdoch, No. 2017-0833 (Del. Ch. ﬁled Nov. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Murdoch Complaint].
19. See Stipulation & Agreement of Settlement, Compromise, & Release at 26–28,
Murdoch, No. 2017-0833-AGB (ﬁled Nov. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Murdoch Settlement]. After
Roger Ailes left Fox News, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York
also opened an investigation into whether the network’s parent company, Twenty-First
Century Fox, had violated federal securities law by misreporting settlement payments that
it made to Ailes’s accusers. See Joe Flint & Michael Rothfeld, Scope of Federal Probe into
Fox News Broadens, Wall St. J. (May 4, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/scope-offederal-probe-into-fox-news-broadens-1493938947 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
No charges have been ﬁled publicly in the several months since news of the investigation
emerged.
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sexual relationships with several female employees and diverted company
resources to his romantic liaisons.20 Fourth, three pension funds ﬁled
derivative actions against Wynn Resorts in Nevada state court alleging
breaches of ﬁduciary duty by the company’s directors and officers after a
Wall Street Journal report in January 2018 revealed a decades-long pattern
of sexual harassment by CEO Steve Wynn.21 Fifth, in July 2018, shareholders at National Beverage Corp., the maker of LaCroix sparkling water,
sued the company and its CEO, Nick Caporella, alleging that the ﬁrm
had made materially false and misleading statements that concealed
Caporella’s sexual harassment of pilots on a corporate jet.22 Sixth, in
August 2018, a CBS Corporation shareholder brought a class action
against the media company, CEO Leslie Moonves, and another corporate
officer in federal court in New York accusing the company of covering up
sexual misconduct allegations involving Moonves.23 Seventh, a shareholder sued pizza chain Papa John’s, its founder John Schnatter, and two
corporate officers in federal court in New York that same month for
allegedly violating federal securities laws by—among other things—
failing to disclose Schnatter’s reported pattern of sexual harassment
20. See Veriﬁed Stockholder Derivative Complaint at 1, Asbestos Workers’ Phila.
Pension Fund ex rel. Liberty Tax v. Hewitt, No. 2017-0883 (Del. Ch. ﬁled Dec. 11, 2017)
[hereinafter Liberty Tax Complaint]; Kimberly Pierceall, Ex-CEO of Liberty Tax Likely Had
Sex in His Office and Dated Employees, Report Says, Virginian-Pilot (Nov. 9, 2017), https://
pilotonline.com/business/consumer/article_90141e98-cf88-56a8-afcd-e1170fef68c6.html
[https://perma.cc/YLZ7-5M47] [hereinafter Pierceall, Ex-CEO of Liberty Tax].
21. Veriﬁed Stockholder Derivative Complaint at 5, DiNapoli ex rel. Wynn Resorts
Ltd. v. Wynn, No. A-18-770013-B (Nev. Dist. Ct. ﬁled Feb. 22, 2018); Veriﬁed Stockholder
Derivative Complaint at 1–3, Norfolk Cty. Ret. Sys. ex rel. Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v. Wynn, No.
A-18-769062-B (Nev. Dist. Ct. ﬁled Feb. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Wynn Complaint]; Veriﬁed
Stockholder’s Derivative Complaint for Damages & Equitable Relief at 3, Operating Eng’rs
Constr. Indus. & Miscellaneous Pension Fund ex rel. Wynn Resorts v. Wynn, No. A-18769630-B (Nev. Dist. Ct. ﬁled Feb. 15, 2018); see also Alexandra Berzon et al., Dozens of
People Recount Pattern of Sexual Misconduct by Las Vegas Mogul Steve Wynn, Wall St. J.
(Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dozens-of-people-recount-pattern-of-sexualmisconduct-by-las-vegas-mogul-steve-wynn-1516985953 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
22. See Class Action Complaint at 4, Luczak v. Nat’l Beverage Corp., No. 0:18-cv61631-KMM (S.D. Fla. ﬁled July 17, 2018) [hereinafter Luczak Complaint]; Press Release,
Bronstein, Gerwitz & Grossman, LLC, Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC Notiﬁes
Investors of Class Action Against National Beverage Corp. (FIZZ) and Lead Plaintiff
Deadline (July 18, 2018), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/shareholder-alert--bronstein-gewirtz--grossman-llc-notifies-investors-of-class-action-against-national-beverage-corpfizz-and-lead-plaintiff-deadline--september-17-2018-300682796.html [https://perma.cc/X5WDVLHH] [hereinafter Bronstein Press Release]; Press Release, Pomerantz LLP, Pomerantz
Law Firm Reminds Shareholders with Losses on Their Investment in National Beverage
Corp. of Class Action Lawsuit and Upcoming Deadline (Aug. 9, 2018), https://
www.marketwatch.com/press-release/shareholder-alert-pomerantz-law-firm-reminds-shareholderswith-losses-on-their-investment-in-national-beverage-corp-of-class-action-lawsuit-and-upcomingdeadline---fizz-2018-08-08 [https://perma.cc/LFU8-PN4E] [hereinafter Pomerantz Press Release].
23. Class Action Complaint at 1–3, Samit v. CBS Corp., No. 1:18-cv-07796 (S.D.N.Y.
ﬁled Aug. 27, 2018) [hereinafter Samit Complaint].
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while he was CEO.24 And as August 2018 drew to a close, Nike
shareholders ﬁled a derivative action in Oregon state court alleging that
directors and officers at the world’s largest supplier of athletic shoes and
apparel had breached their ﬁduciary duties and wasted corporate assets
by fostering a “‘boys’ club’ culture” that “resulted in the bullying, sexual
harassment, and gender discrimination of [Nike]’s female employees”
while impairing the company’s “reputation and goodwill.”25
These eight cases do not mark the ﬁrst time that publicly traded
corporations and their directors and officers have faced shareholder
lawsuits arising out of workplace sexual misconduct. Sex scandals at the
pharmaceutical company ICN (now Valeant),26 the tech giant HewlettPackard,27 the clothing brand American Apparel,28 and the executive
search ﬁrm CTPartners29 have led to shareholder suits in the past. The
#MeToo movement will likely lead to many more such claims, raising
important doctrinal questions for scholars and practitioners of corporate
and securities law that the existing academic literature has yet to address.
First, under what conditions will directors and officers be held liable to
shareholders under state corporate law for perpetrating sexual misconduct or allowing it to occur at their ﬁrms? And second, under what
conditions do federal securities laws require publicly traded companies
to disclose the fact that top executives have been accused of sexual
misconduct or that corporate funds have been used to settle harassment
claims? While we can glean some insights from the outcomes of past
cases, these questions remain fundamentally unresolved.
For scholars and activists focused on ﬁghting sexual misconduct, the
specter of ﬁduciary and securities fraud liability in cases of workplace
sexual misconduct also raises questions with strategic and normative
dimensions. Is it wise to utilize corporate and securities law as tools to
address sexual harassment, or would the #MeToo movement be better
advised to focus its energy on alternative legal and political mechanisms?
According to one view, any development that leads corporate directors
and officers to devote more attention to sexual misconduct at their ﬁrms
should be welcomed. At the same time, the use of corporate and
securities law to regulate workplace-based sexual misconduct has potential discursive and distributional implications that require careful consideration before these tools are widely deployed.30 And looming are
legitimate concerns about the potential for liability to backﬁre in ways
24. Class Action Complaint at 2, Danker v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-07927
(S.D.N.Y. ﬁled Aug. 30, 2018) [hereinafter Danker Complaint].
25. Complaint at 4, 60–61, Stein v. Knight, No. 18CV38553 (Or. Cir. Ct. ﬁled Aug. 31,
2018) [hereinafter Stein Complaint].
26. See infra section II.A.1.
27. See infra section II.A.2.
28. See infra section II.A.3.
29. See infra section II.A.4.
30. See discussion infra sections III.B–.C.
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that ultimately work to the disadvantage of the (primarily female)
employees who are most likely to be the victims of harassment.
Our observations regarding the legal merits as well as the strategic
and normative implications of these types of lawsuits are necessarily
tentative. Our primary aim in this Article is to advance a conversation
among scholars, practitioners, and activists regarding the legal duties of
corporate ﬁduciaries to prevent, respond to, and disclose the occurrence
of workplace-based sexual misconduct. To facilitate this conversation, we
provide the ﬁrst detailed analysis of how claims by shareholders against
corporate ﬁduciaries who have committed, tolerated, or concealed sexual
misconduct at their ﬁrms might ﬁt within existing legal frameworks. We
also analyze the beneﬁts and costs of using corporate and securities law
as tools in the ﬁght against workplace-based sexual misconduct. While
the viability and desirability of shareholder lawsuits in cases of sexual
misconduct will become clearer if and as more such cases arise, the one
claim we can make conﬁdently at this point is that corporate law will—as
it always has—continue to reﬂect evolving social norms.31 The social
transformation sparked by the #MeToo movement will be no exception.
Our Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains how areas of law
other than corporate and securities law—most signiﬁcantly, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964—have historically addressed workplace-based
sexual misconduct. We take stock of Title VII’s successes while highlighting
its shortcomings and identifying the voids that corporate and securities
law can potentially ﬁll.
Part II considers recent reports of sexual harassment from the
perspectives of corporate and securities law. (From now on, we will use
the term “corporate law” to refer to state laws addressing the ﬁduciary
duties of corporate directors and officers as well as federal laws regarding
the obligations of publicly traded corporations to disclose information to
existing shareholders and potential investors.32) We use the handful of
31. On the relationship between corporate law and social norms, see generally
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253, 1254–55
(1999) (asserting that “even social norms that do not impose obligations play important
roles in the law, and . . . belief-systems that result from new information and reasoned
persuasion play a fundamental role in the origin and adoption of social norms”); Edward
B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the SelfGoverning Corporation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1619, 1621–22 (2001) (arguing that corporate
law “should be understood as protecting and perfecting” the choice of replacing “legal
governance of relations with nonlegally enforceable governance mechanisms (what are
sometimes called ‘norms’)”).
32. We are cognizant that this space-saving construction entangles us in a debate over
whether federal securities law should be considered a species of corporate law. See James J.
Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law, 64 UCLA L. Rev.
116, 118 & nn.2–5 (2017) (collecting sources); id. at 120 (arguing that the “better way of
framing the difference between securities and corporate law” is to say that “securities law
protects the investor while he is a trader, and corporate law protects the investor while he
is an owner”). The deﬁnitional debate often has ideological overtones: As Professor James
Park notes, those who argue that “securities law is just a federal version of corporate law”
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already-ﬁled shareholder claims arising out of CEO sexual harassment as
jumping-off points to analyze the potential liability of corporations, as
well as their directors and officers, after sexual misconduct at a ﬁrm is
revealed.33 We identify various legal arguments available to shareholders
who seek to hold directors and officers responsible for sexual misconduct
at corporations where those directors and officers serve, and we conclude
that in some instances, corporate ﬁduciaries will be liable to shareholders
for committing, enabling, or failing to prevent workplace-based sexual
misconduct at their companies. While we do not believe that publicly
traded companies have an affirmative duty to disclose sexual harassment
claims in most cases, we specify the circumstances under which
companies might be held liable under federal securities statutes for
misleading statements regarding workplace sexual misconduct. We also
outline strategies for board members who seek to reduce the incidence
of sexual harassment at their ﬁrms and to contain the fallout when
harassment does occur. And ﬁnally, we describe other options available to
shareholders who seek to use their voice within portfolio companies to
catalyze lasting organizational change.
In Part III, we step back from the legal questions of whether and when
corporations and their ﬁduciaries will face liability in connection with
workplace-based sexual misconduct and consider why corporate law
should be invoked in these circumstances. We anticipate and address
several arguments against the use of corporate law as a tool to regulate
and remedy sexual harassment and sexual assault. One such argument is
that using corporate law to deter workplace-based sexual misconduct
distracts and detracts from the principal purposes of these areas of law: to

generally believe that federal regulation of corporate governance “should be expanded,”
while those who argue for a distinction between corporate and securities law generally
want to restrict the scope of federal intervention. Id. at 118. For present purposes, we take
no position in that debate. We clump corporate and securities law together for the entirely
nonideological purpose of avoiding awkward and cumbersome sentence constructions in
the pages that follow.
33. See infra section II.A.
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maximize shareholder value,34 protect investors,35 and promote the
efficient allocation of capital.36 A second objection is nearly the mirror
image of the ﬁrst: Focusing on the ways in which workplace-based sexual
misconduct harms shareholders will divert attention from much more
signiﬁcant harms to victims.37 A third concern is distributional: Reliance
on corporate law in the ﬁght against workplace-based sexual misconduct
will do more to protect potential victims in high-paying professional
positions—who are more likely to interact with the executives of publicly
traded companies—than to protect the millions of manufacturing and
service-industry workers who face harassment on a regular basis.38 A
fourth concern focuses on the potential for backlash, and in particular,
the possibility that high-ranking men will respond to the risk of litigation
by effectively excluding female employees from corporate inner circles.39
We take all of these objections seriously, though we nonetheless conclude
that corporate law can play a productive role in reducing the incidence
of sexual harassment and sexual assault at and beyond publicly traded
companies.
We end by situating the conversation over corporate law and
workplace-based sexual misconduct within the broader context of the
debate over corporate governance and social responsibility. From one
perspective, the use of corporate law to combat workplace-based sexual
misconduct is part and parcel of a broader phenomenon of extending
corporate law to reach the social concerns of the day—ranging from
gender diversity in the boardroom40 to genocide in the Democratic

34. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor
to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder
value.”).
35. See What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html [https://
perma.cc/C8MC-GYSY] (last visited July 26, 2018) (“Congress established the Securities
and Exchange Commission in 1934 to enforce the newly-passed securities laws, to promote
stability in the markets and, most importantly, to protect investors.”).
36. See Franklin Allen, Stock Markets and Resource Allocation, in Capital Markets
and Financial Intermediation 81, 81–108 (Colin Mayer & Xavier Vives eds., 1993); Jeffrey
Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 187, 188–89,
210–12 (2000).
37. See infra sections III.B–.C.
38. See, e.g., Danielle Paquette, The Industries with the Worst Sexual Harassment
Problem, Wash. Post (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2017/11/24/the-industries-with-the-worst-sexual-harassment-problem (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting that women who work in restaurants and clothing stores
tend to “encounter more predatory behavior than” those in “higher-paying ﬁelds”).
39. See, e.g., Melinda Newman, Why the #MeToo Movement Could Have Chilling
Effect for Women in Music Industry, Billboard (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.billboard.com/
articles/business/8070562/metoo-movement-women-music-industry-impact [https://perma.cc/
W8UQ-BHWR].
40. See David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Gender Diversity on Boards: The Future
Is Almost Here, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. Regulation (Mar.
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Republic of the Congo41 to global greenhouse gas emissions.42 From
another vantage point, corporate law concepts such as “shareholder
value” and “materiality” necessarily reﬂect changing perceptions among
corporate stakeholders and society at large.43 In this latter view, it is not
just that corporate law is being deployed to advance the aims of the
#MeToo movement; it is also that the #MeToo movement has revealed
(or reinforced our understanding) that widespread sexual harassment
stands as an obstacle to the efficient allocation of human and ﬁnancial
capital.
I. THE REGULATION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT BEFORE #METOO
Our analysis begins with a brief history of the concept of sexual
harassment in American law and an overview of the statutes and judicial
doctrines that address it. For the past several decades, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been the most important legal tool in the
ﬁght against sexual harassment, and it no doubt will continue to play a
central role in the #MeToo era. Yet as this Part illustrates, the size and
scope of remedies for sexual harassment under Title VII are limited in
signiﬁcant ways. These limits motivate the search for alternative mechanisms to regulate and redress sexual harassment.
A.

Deﬁning Terms

The concept of “sexual harassment” ﬁrst emerged in the legal and
lay lexicons relatively recently, though harassment on the basis of sex in
and beyond the workplace is, of course, not a new phenomenon. As
Figure 1 illustrates, the term only came into widespread use starting in
the 1970s, with a sharp increase in attention in the 1990s amid highproﬁle scandals involving Supreme Court nominee (later Justice)
Clarence Thomas and President Bill Clinton. (Presumably we would see
another abrupt uptick if the data extended to 2017.)

25, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/03/25/gender-diversity-on-boards-thefuture-is-almost-here/ [https://perma.cc/ND8L-Z73D].
41. See David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure:
Using the Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 327, 328
(2011).
42. See J. Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change: It’s Not Just a Policy Issue
for Corporate Counsel—It’s a Legal Problem, 29 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 89, 93 (2004).
43. Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare
Not Market Value 6 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No.
521/2017, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004794 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
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FIGURE 1: FREQUENCY OF THE PHRASE “SEXUAL HARASSMENT”
IN GOOGLE BOOKS ARCHIVE, 1900–200844

The feminist author and activist Lin Farley was one of the ﬁrst to
formulate a deﬁnition of “sexual harassment.” In a 1975 survey
distributed to women at Cornell University and to public employees in
Binghamton, New York, Farley deﬁned “sexual harassment” as “[a]ny
repeated and unwanted sexual comments, looks, suggestions, or physical
contact that you find objectionable or offensive and causes you discomfort
on your job.”45
Understandings of sexual harassment have evolved since Farley
coined the term forty years ago. First, while Farley’s focus was on the
harassment of women by men, the consensus view today is that individuals
of any gender can be victims or perpetrators of sexual harassment.46 This
Article generally uses masculine and feminine pronouns to describe the
perpetrator and victim roles, respectively, but our word usage is not
intended to ignore the experiences of male harassment victims or
harassment victims who identify as genderqueer.

44. Google Books Ngram Viewer, https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=
sexual+harassment&year_start=1900&year_end=2009&corpus=15&smoothing=0&share=
&direct_url=t1%3B%2Csexual%20harassment%3B%2Cc0 [https://perma.cc/UH45-AWF5]
(last visited Aug. 29, 2018) (graphing trends in the use of the phrase “sexual
harassment” between 1900 and 2008).
45. Lin Farley, Sexual Shakedown: The Sexual Harassment of Women on the Job 20
(1978).
46. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (holding
that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir.
2000) (“The law is well settled that sexual harassment of an employee by a supervisor is
not conﬁned to instances involving male supervisors and female subordinates; it can occur
in the female supervisor-male subordinate context. It can even occur in the same-sex context.”).
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Second, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)47
and two federal courts of appeals48 have taken the position that “sexual
harassment” includes harassment on the basis of sexual orientation. Several
other circuits,49 as well as the Trump Administration Justice Department,50
have adopted the opposite view. The Supreme Court so far has declined
to weigh in on the subject,51 but a petition for a writ of certiorari that presents this precise question remained pending as of this writing.52
Understandings of sexual harassment have broadened in other
respects as well. The consensus today is that objectionable or offensive
conduct need not be “repeated” to constitute sexual harassment.53 Moreover, courts have said that “sexual harassment” includes harassment on
the basis of sex even when it does not “take the form of sexual advances
or of other incidents with clearly sexual overtones.”54 What matters is that
the harassment is discriminatory on the basis of sex, not that it is sexual.55
Therefore, a physically aggressive but not explicitly sexual act by a male
supervisor against a female employee may be actionable under Title VII.
Two additional observations about the deﬁnition of sexual harassment are worth noting. First, Farley’s deﬁnition of sexual harassment is
limited to harassment “on the job.” As discussed below, the evolution of
the concept of sexual harassment in American law has occurred primarily
in the context of employment discrimination law, and so workplace
incidents have been the focus.56 Second, Farley’s deﬁnition of sexual
47. See Baldwin v. Foxx, Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6 (E.E.O.C.
July 15, 2015).
48. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc);
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
49. See, e.g., Zarda, 883 F.3d at 155 n.25 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (collecting cases from
various circuits holding that sexual orientation discrimination is not within the purview of
Title VII); Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255–57 (11th Cir. 2017).
50. See Alan Feuer, Justice Department Says Rights Law Doesn’t Protect Gays, N.Y.
Times (July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/nyregion/justice-departmentgays-workplace.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing the Justice
Department’s amicus brief in the Zarda case arguing that Title VII does not bar
discrimination based on sexual orientation).
51. See Evans, 850 F.3d 1248, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017) (mem.).
52. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623
(U.S. ﬁled May 29, 2018) (presenting the question of “[w]hether the prohibition in Title
VII . . . against discrimination ‘because of [] sex’ encompasses discrimination based on an
individual’s sexual orientation” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012))).
53. See Margaret A. Crouch, The “Social Etymology” of ‘Sexual Harassment,’ 29 J.
Soc. Phil. 19, 20 (1998) (noting that some instances of sexual behavior are “so severe that
one occurrence [is] sufficient to constitute sexual harassment”).
54. McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985); accord Hall v. Gus
Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting and following McKinney).
55. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (“[H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex.”).
56. See infra sections I.B–.C (discussing the evolution of sexual harassment as sex
discrimination and resulting employer liability).
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harassment includes objectionable or offensive physical contact—and
thus would encompass sexual assault as well. Sexual assault can thus be
considered an extreme form of sexual harassment rather than a separate
category.57 In the succeeding pages, we will use the phrase “sexual
harassment” with the understanding that some of the incidents described
also rise to the level of assault.
The feminist scholar and Professor Catharine MacKinnon further
articulated the concept of sexual harassment in her now-classic 1979 book
Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination. 58
MacKinnon drew a distinction between “quid pro quo” sexual harassment
and sexual harassment as a “persistent condition of work.”59 Quid pro quo
sexual harassment involves, as the name suggests, cases in which “sexual
compliance is exchanged, or proposed to be exchanged, for an employment
opportunity.”60 Sexual harassment as a condition of work is “[l]ess clear,
and undoubtedly more pervasive”: It encompasses harassment that “simply
makes the work environment unbearable.”61 As MacKinnon describes:
Unwanted sexual advances, made simply because she has a
woman’s body, can be a daily part of a woman’s work life. She
may be constantly felt or pinched, visually undressed and stared
at, surreptitiously kissed, commented upon, manipulated into
being found alone, and generally taken advantage of at work—
but never promised or denied anything explicitly connected
with her job.62
What MacKinnon referred to as “condition of work” sexual
harassment is today more commonly known as “hostile work environment” sexual harassment. Her taxonomy of harassment—and speciﬁcally,
the distinction between “quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment”
sexual harassment—has gained wide acceptance, including by the EEOC
and the Supreme Court.63 But the road to legal recognition has been
long and winding. The following section brieﬂy charts that path.

57. See Angie Andera, Here’s the Real Difference Between Sexual Harassment & Sexual
Assault, Women.com (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.women.com/angie/lists/what-is-thedifference-between-sexual-harassment-and-assault-assault [https://perma.cc/K6W8-LEPP].
58. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex
Discrimination (1979).
59. Id. at 32.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 40.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751–52 (1998); EEOC
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2017). MacKinnon’s
view that sexual harassment can occur only “in the context of a relationship of unequal
power” is not as uniformly accepted. Compare MacKinnon, supra note 58, at 1–2 (“Sexual
harassment, most broadly deﬁned, refers to the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power.”), with Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual
Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 333, 335
(1990) (“Incorporating abuse of power into the deﬁnition . . . seems unduly limiting.”).
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Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination

The primary legal mechanism for regulating and remedying sexual
harassment in the workplace is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
That statute provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin . . . .64
According to a persistent myth, the word “sex” was added to Title
VII at the last minute by a Virginia congressman who opposed civil rights
for African Americans and sought to scuttle the bill by broadening it to
cover gender.65 In fact, the addition of sex discrimination to the list of
prohibited practices was the result of a concerted lobbying effort by a
national women’s organization with the support of female lawmakers in
the House and Senate.66 The success of this effort did not, however,
translate immediately into the legal recognition of sexual harassment as a
proscribed behavior.
Beyond its prohibition on employment discrimination, the 1964 Act
also created a new administrative agency, the EEOC, which was tasked
with drafting regulations and enforcing the civil rights law.67 To bring a
claim under Title VII, an employee generally must ﬁle a charge with the
EEOC no more than 180 days after the time that the alleged
discrimination occurred.68 (The period for ﬁling a charge is extended to
300 days when a state or local agency enforces an overlapping employment
discrimination law.69) If the EEOC ﬁnds in favor of the employee, it ﬁrst
seeks to settle the charge with the employer,70 and if that fails, the
commission can sue the employer in federal court.71 If the commission
decides not to ﬁle a lawsuit, it will issue a “right-to-sue” letter indicating
that the employee has 90 days from receipt of the letter to bring a lawsuit
in federal court.72 Alternatively, if the EEOC makes a “no probable
cause” determination or dismisses the charge due to procedural
irregularities, it will also send the employee a “dismissal and notice of
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
65. Rachel Osterman, Origins of a Myth: Why Courts, Scholars, and the Public Think
Title VII’s Ban on Sex Discrimination Was an Accident, 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism 409, 412–
15 (2009).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 416.
68. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13.
69. Id. Note that if there is a continuous pattern of harassment, the statute of limitations period runs from the last incident. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536
U.S. 101, 113 (2002).
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24.
71. Id. §§ 1601.27, .29.
72. Id. § 1601.19.
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rights” that informs the employee of his or her right to sue within 90
days.73
From the outset, sex discrimination claims constituted a signiﬁcant
portion of the EEOC’s case load. In 1966, the ﬁrst year that records were
kept, 33.5% of charges ﬁled with the EEOC were sex discrimination
claims.74 (In 2016, the ﬁgure was a slightly lower but still substantial
29.4%.75) Yet, for the ﬁrst dozen years after the passage of Title VII,
neither the EEOC nor the federal courts recognized sexual harassment
as a form of actionable sex discrimination.
The experience of Adrienne Tomkins illustrates the attitudes toward
sexual harassment in the early years of Title VII. Tomkins was a secretary
at Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (PSE&G) in Newark, New Jersey, in
the early 1970s.76 In October 1973, her male supervisor suggested that
she should have lunch with him in a restaurant near their office to
discuss a potential promotion.77 At lunch, according to Tomkins, the
supervisor told her that she should have sex with him if she wanted to
continue their working relationship.78 When she sought to leave the
restaurant, the supervisor physically restrained her and told her that no
one at PSE&G would help her if she complained about the incident.79
Tomkins did complain—and was transferred to an inferior position in
another department before being ﬁred in January 1975.80
Tomkins ﬁled a charge with the EEOC, which found no probable
cause—thus allowing her to sue in federal court.81 The district court
dismissed Tomkins’s claim that her supervisor’s conduct was actionable
under Title VII (though it allowed her to pursue a claim against PSE&G
for her ﬁring). As the district court judge in Tomkins’s case wrote:
The abuse of authority by supervisors of either sex for personal
purposes is an unhappy and recurrent feature of our social
experience. . . . It is not, however, sex discrimination within the
meaning of Title VII even when the purpose is sexual. . . . “The
attraction of males to females and females to males is a natural
sex phenomenon and it is probable that this attraction plays at
least a subtle part in most personnel decisions.” . . . If the
plaintiff’s view were to prevail, no superior could, prudently,
attempt to open a social dialogue with any subordinate of either
73. Id. § 1601.18.
74. Shaping Employment Discrimination Law, EEOC, www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/
35th/1965-71/shaping.html [https://perma.cc/934J-SNH4] (last visited July 27, 2018).
75. Charge Statistics, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/YGA4-UMQB] (last visited July 27, 2018).
76. Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. (Tomkins I ), 422 F. Supp. 553, 555 (D.N.J.
1976), rev’d, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
77. Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. (Tomkins II ), 568 F.2d at 1045.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1046; Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 555.
81. Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 555.
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sex. An invitation to dinner could become an invitation to a
federal lawsuit if a once harmonious relationship turned sour at
some later time. And if an inebriated approach by a supervisor
to a subordinate at the office Christmas party could form the
basis of a federal lawsuit for sex discrimination if a promotion
or a raise is later denied to the subordinate, we would need
4,000 federal trial judges instead of some 400.82
The attitude toward sexual harassment expressed by the district
judge in Tomkins’s case will likely strike most modern readers as
antediluvian. Indeed, even by the time of the district court decision,
the tide was turning. Five months earlier, a federal district court in
Washington, D.C., held that “retaliatory actions of a male supervisor,
taken because a female employee denied his sexual advances, constitutes
sex discrimination within the deﬁnitional parameters of Title VII.”83 The
court explained that “the conduct of the plaintiff’s supervisor created an
artiﬁcial barrier to employment which was placed before one gender and
not the other, despite the fact that both genders were similarly situated.”84
The next year, the D.C. Circuit held in Barnes v. Costle that an employer
was liable for sex discrimination under Title VII when a supervisor ﬁred
an employee after she refused his sexual advances.85 And in 1980, the
EEOC, for the ﬁrst time, issued guidelines that deﬁned sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.86 Signiﬁcantly, the 1980 guidelines
recognized both quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work
environment sexual harassment as unlawful employment practices under
Title VII.87

82. Id. at 556–57 (quoting Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal.
1976)). For other early cases holding that sexual harassment did not constitute sex
discrimination, see Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev’d, 600 F.2d 211 (9th
Cir. 1979); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated,
562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
83. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated sub nom.
Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (reversing the district court for procedural
reasons).
84. Id. at 657–58.
85. 561 F.2d 983, 993–95 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
86. According to the EEOC guidelines:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to
or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.
Final Amendment to Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676,
74,677 (Nov. 10, 1980) (codiﬁed at 29 C.F.R § 16044.11(a) (2017)).
87. See id.
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Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment

While the EEOC guidelines were quickly embraced by lower federal
courts,88 it was not until 1986, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, that the
Supreme Court explicitly recognized sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination under Title VII.89 Vinson marked a victory for feminist
scholars and activists who had been arguing for years that sexual harassment is sex discrimination. At the same time, the decision dealt a setback
to efforts to hold employers liable for harassment of their employees.
The plaintiff in that case, Mechelle Vinson, worked as a teller and
later an assistant branch manager at a bank in Washington, D.C.
According to Vinson’s account, the bank’s male branch manager invited
her out to dinner relatively early in her four-year career at the bank and
suggested that they have sex at a nearby motel.90 Vinson said that she
initially refused but later acquiesced out of fear that she would otherwise
lose her job.91 According to Vinson’s account, the branch manager
“thereafter made repeated demands upon her for sexual favors, usually
at the branch, both during and after business hours,” and the two had
intercourse forty or ﬁfty times.92 Vinson also said that the branch
manager “fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into the
women’s restroom when she went there alone, exposed himself to her,
and even forcibly raped her on several occasions.”93 She said that she
broke off the relationship when she “started going with a steady
boyfriend,” and she was ﬁred the following year.94 She subsequently sued
the bank and the branch manager under Title VII, lost in district court,95
but prevailed upon the D.C. Circuit to reverse the district court’s
decision.96 Hers was the ﬁrst sexual harassment claim to reach the
Supreme Court after the EEOC issued its 1980 guidelines.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that hostile work environment
sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII.97 It
added that such conduct is actionable if the harassment is “sufficiently
severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment

88. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254–55 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942–44 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
89. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson (Vinson III ), 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
90. Id. at 60.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Vinson v. Taylor (Vinson I ), No. 78-1793, 1980 WL 100, at *8–9 (D.D.C. Feb. 26,
1980).
96. Vinson v. Taylor (Vinson II ), 753 F.2d 141, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
97. Vinson III, 477 U.S. at 66.
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and create an abusive working environment.’”98 And it said that Vinson’s
allegations—“which include not only pervasive harassment but also criminal conduct of the most serious nature—are plainly sufficient to state a
claim for ‘hostile environment’ sexual harassment.”99 The Court also
rejected the notion that Vinson’s “voluntary” submission to intercourse
with the branch manager vitiated her sexual harassment claim.100 “The
correct inquiry,” according to the Court, “is whether [the victim] by her
conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not
whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.”101
The Justices were sharply divided, however, on the question of when
an employer can be held liable for hostile work environment sexual
harassment. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and
Stevens, said that employers should be strictly liable when a supervisor
sexually harasses an employee under his supervision.102 As Justice
Marshall argued, “[I]t is the authority vested in the supervisor by the
employer that enables him to commit the wrong: it is precisely because
the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the employer’s authority
that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates.”103
Compelling as that argument may be, it failed to win the day. A ﬁvemember majority concluded instead that employers are not “always
automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors.”104 At the
same time, the majority rejected the bank’s argument that an employer
should be immune from liability whenever it has a policy against
discrimination and the victim fails to invoke an available grievance
procedure.105
In the dozen years that followed Meritor, federal courts adopted conﬂicting standards for determining employer liability when sexual harassment was perpetrated by a supervisor,106 prompting the Supreme Court
to take up the question again in two companion cases decided in 1998.
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
the Supreme Court held that employers are automatically liable “[w]hen
a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a refusal
to submit to a supervisor’s sexual demands.”107 A tangible employment
action, the Court said, is one that “constitutes a signiﬁcant change in
98. Id. at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 68.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 78 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
103. Id. at 76–77.
104. Id. at 72 (majority opinion).
105. Id.
106. Scott B. Goldberg, Comment, Discrimination by Managers and Supervisors:
Recognizing Agent Liability Under Title VII, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 571, 572–74 (1994).
107. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753 (1998); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
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employment status, such as hiring, ﬁring, failing to promote, reassignment with signiﬁcantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
signiﬁcant change in beneﬁts.”108 In the absence of a tangible employment action, employers may assert a two-prong affirmative defense, which
operates as a bar to liability or damages. The Court explained (using
identical language in both decisions):
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending
employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or
damages . . . . The defense comprises two necessary elements:
(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise. . . . No affirmative
defense is available, however, when the supervisor’s harassment
culminates in a tangible employment action . . . .109
This affirmative defense—now known as the Faragher–Ellerth
defense—is tailored to cases of harassment by supervisors, whereas
employers can more easily escape liability when the harasser is a
coworker. In such cases, employer liability is governed by a negligence
standard, which means that employers can be held liable only when they
knew or should have known of the harassment but failed to take prompt
and effective remedial action.110
At the same time as it limited the range of circumstances under which
supervisor and coworker harassment would be imputed to an employer,
the Court in Faragher preserved an island of strict liability for a “class of
an employer organization’s officials who may be treated as the organization’s proxy.”111 The Court did not fully deﬁne the contours of that
class, but it said that a company’s president was “indisputably” within the
category.112 It also approvingly cited lower court decisions recognizing
strict liability when the harasser is an owner, proprietor, partner, or
corporate officer,113 or a supervisor “hold[ing] a sufficiently high position
‘in the management hierarchy of the company for his actions to be

108. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
109. Id. at 765; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08.
110. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799 (noting that lower courts have “uniformly judg[ed]
employer liability for coworker harassment under a negligence standard”); see also 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2017).
111. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789; see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758 (recognizing that
under agency law principles, a corporation is liable for torts committed by an employee
outside the scope of employment “where the agent’s high rank in the company makes him
or her the employer’s alter ego”).
112. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 19
(1993)).
113. See id. at 790 (citing Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983)).
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imputed automatically to the employer.’”114 Lower courts have applied
this last rule—known as the alter ego doctrine—in cases involving highranking corporate officials below the officer level.115 Beyond evidence of
high rank, the key to proving that strict liability is appropriate is to show
that the employee exercised “exceptional authority and control” within
the organization.116
In sum, companies can expect to be held strictly liable for
harassment by high-ranking corporate officials with substantial control
over corporate affairs. For supervisory harassment at lower levels, the
employer will escape liability if it can successfully invoke the Faragher–
Ellerth defense. And for harassment by employees that lack supervisory
authority, the employer will be liable only if it was negligent in responding to such harassment.
D. Title VII’s Shortcomings
The Title VII regime has advanced the effort to eradicate sexual
harassment from the workplace, though it falls far short of achieving that
end goal. On the one hand, Title VII provides a path for victims to seek
redress, as well as incentives for companies to create policies and
procedures designed to root out and respond to harassment. On the
other hand, the regime has features that limit its effectiveness as a tool
for vindicating the rights of harassed employees. This section considers
some of these limitations.
1. Capped Damages. — The Civil Rights Act of 1964 allowed victims of
discrimination to recover only injunctive relief and restitution for
economic injuries, such as lost wages.117 Twenty-ﬁve years later, Congress
gave courts the power to award both compensatory and punitive damages
to victims of employment discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of
1991.118 The availability of such damages was not unlimited, however.
Proponents of tort reform insisted on statutory caps on damage awards

114. Id. at 789–90 (quoting Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 634–35 & n.11 (2d Cir.
1997)).
115. See Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., 679 F.3d 41, 53–55 (2d Cir. 2012) (leaving for
the jury the question of whether alter ego liability applies in the case of a vice president
who “exercised a signiﬁcant degree of control over corporate affairs” and whose family
held all corporate shares); Mallinson-Montague v. Pocrnick, 224 F.3d 1224, 1232–33 (10th
Cir. 2000) (holding an alter ego liability jury instruction appropriate in the case of a senior
vice president of consumer lending who had hiring, ﬁring, and supervisory authority over
employees in one department, retained ultimate authority to disapprove all consumer
loans, and reported directly to the president).
116. Helm v. Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1286 (10th Cir. 2011).
117. Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3
Yale J.L. & Feminism 299, 299 (1991).
118. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (1991) (codiﬁed as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012)).
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based on the size of the company.119 The level of these caps has not been
altered since the 1991 Act went into effect, which means that today, the
largest companies—those that have more than 500 employees—cannot
be obligated to pay amounts greater than $300,000 to a victim of sexual
harassment, no matter how egregious the violation.120
These caps have been subject to much criticism. In fact, less than a
week after President Bush signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 into law,
Democratic and Republican Senators introduced bills to lift the damages
caps.121 Critics argue that the caps pose a deterrence problem, in addition
to a compensation problem. The caps fail to incentivize action by
employers because employers understand that employees are unlikely to
report harassment, and when employees do report, they will be able to
recover only limited damages. As for the undercompensation concern,
the caps are too low to capture the full vocational, reputational, and
emotional harms suffered by victims in the most severe cases. Nonetheless,
efforts to raise the caps since 1991 have proven unsuccessful.122
2. 180-Day Limitation Period. — In addition to capped damages, Title
VII provides that victims of sexual harassment must ﬁle charges
containing their allegations with the EEOC within 180 days from the date
of the alleged harm, or 300 days if the victim also ﬁles a charge with a
state or local agency.123 This period of limitations is shorter than that
which governs most civil actions, including torts and breach of
contract,124 and also much shorter than the limitations period for other
antidiscrimination laws.125

119. See Statement of President Bush upon Signing S. 1745, reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 768, 769 (Nov. 21, 1991). The President stated that the Civil Rights Act of
1991 “adopts a compromise under which ‘caps’ have been placed on the amount [of compensatory and punitive damages] that juries may award.” Id.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D).
121. On November 26, 1991, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced the Employee Equity
and Job Preservation Act of 1991, which would have lifted the cap for all but the smallest
employers. 137 Cong. Rec. 35,060 (1991). On that same day, Senator Ted Kennedy introduced the Equal Remedies Act of 1991, which would have done away with all damages caps
for victims of discrimination. Id. at 35,098.
122. See Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, Twenty Years of Compromise: How the Caps on
Damages in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Codiﬁed Sex Discrimination, 25 Yale J.L. &
Feminism 249, 250–51 (2014).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
124. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213 (McKinney 2018) (providing that the statute of limitations for breach of contract is six years); Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 306 F.R.D. 112, 117
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (relying on the one-year statute of limitations for intentional torts).
125. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Jones v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382
(2004) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1658’s four-year statute of limitations governs § 1981
claims of racial discrimination). In 1990, Congress tried to expand the limitations period
to two years in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, but the bill was vetoed by the ﬁrst President
Bush. See Donald R. Livingston, ABA Section of Labor & Employment Law, 10th Annual
Conference: The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Twenty-Five Years After (Nov. 9, 2016), https://
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For victims of supervisory harassment, the Faragher–Ellerth defense
imposes even more stringent reporting obligations. Recall that employers
satisfy the second prong of that defense by showing that the plaintiffemployee “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer.”126 And some courts
consider even relatively minor delays in reporting to be “unreasonabl[e].”127 For example, one court found a delay as short as seven days to
be unreasonable.128
This truncated reporting period imposes substantial hurdles for
victims of harassment, many of whom may not realize right away that they
have suffered harassment. Even when victims are fully aware of the
nature of the harm, victims are often reluctant to ﬁle a complaint.
Indeed, as the #MeToo movement has made clear, many victims of sexual
harassment do not go public with their claims for months or even years.
There are a few explanations as to why: Harassed employees may fear
that their claim will not be believed or taken seriously,129 may worry about
social and professional retaliation,130 or may harbor doubts about the
conﬁdentiality of internal grievance procedures.131 In addition, the
consequences of an investigation may be unknown or unsatisfactory to

www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2016/11/annual/papers/16b.
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/AK7Y-RDH8].
126. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); see also Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998).
127. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765.
128. See Marsicano v. Am. Soc’y of Safety Eng’rs, No. 97-C7819, 1998 WL 603128, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1998). Other courts have found delays of about two months unreasonable.
See Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1063 (10th Cir. 2009) (ﬁnding a
reporting delay of approximately two months unreasonable); Thornton v. Fed. Express
Corp., 530 F.3d 451, 458 (6th Cir. 2008) (same); Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc.,
347 F.3d 1272, 1277, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2003) (ﬁnding a reporting delay of approximately
two and a half months unreasonable). Notably, although longer than seven days, two
months is still signiﬁcantly shorter than the 180-day limit set out in the statute.
129. Mindy E. Bergman et al., The (Un)Reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents
and Consequences of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. Applied Psych. 230, 234 (2002)
(discussing the prevalence of “organizational minimization,” which occurs when employee
complaints are minimized or not taken seriously); Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn’t
She Just Report Him? The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to
Sexual Harassment, 51 J. Soc. Issues, Winter 1995, at 117, 122 (1995) (discussing reasons
women don’t report harassers, including fear of retaliation, of not being believed, or of
hurting one’s career).
130. Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising Voice, Risking Retaliation: Events
Following Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace, 8 J. Occupational Health Psych.
247, 255 (2003) (ﬁnding that 75% of employees who spoke out against workplace sexual
assault faced some form of retaliation).
131. Victims frequently identify the lack of conﬁdentiality as a justiﬁcation for forgoing an internal grievance procedure. Edward J. Costello Jr., The Mediation Alternative in
Sex Harassment Cases, Arb. J., Mar. 1992, at 16, 17 (“[N]o matter how stringent the
‘conﬁdentiality’ requirements are, some co-workers will learn about the complaint as part
of their jobs.”).
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employees, further discouraging reporting.132 Regardless of the reason,
the fact remains that victims of harassment only rarely report harassment.
For those who do, the window on a Title VII claim often will have closed
already.133
3. No Individual Liability. — The text of Title VII generated
uncertainty as to whether supervisors could be held liable for sexual
harassment in an individual capacity. The statute makes it “an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex,”134 and it deﬁnes
“employer” to mean “a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has ﬁfteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a
person.”135 A few federal courts interpreted that language to mean that a
supervisor who commits sexual harassment can be held liable in his
individual capacity so long as he is an agent of an employer with at least
ﬁfteen employees.136 The consensus view among the circuits today,
however, is that Title VII does not impose individual liability on

132. Zoe Ridolﬁ-Starr, Transformation Requires Transparency: Critical Policy Reforms
to Advance Campus Sexual Violence Response, 125 Yale L.J. 2156, 2160–61 (2016); see
also Select Task Force Meeting of June 15, 2015—Workplace Harassment: Examining the
Scope of the Problem and Potential Solutions, Written Testimony of Mindy Bergman,
EEOC (June 15, 2015), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/testimony_
bergman.cfm [https://perma.cc/V27L-P5C4] (making the point that “reporting is a gamble that is not worth taking in terms of individual well-being” in part because “remediating
the situation [does] not make the person whole—that is, [does] not overcome the damage
caused by harassment”). Psychological research conﬁrms that victims view reporting sexual
harassment as the least desirable response available to them. Fitzgerald et al., supra note
129, at 121. One study identiﬁes the most common internally focused responses as
endurance (ignoring the harassment), denial (pretending it is not happening), reattribution (reinterpreting the situation so it is not defined as harassment), illusory control
(blaming oneself), and detachment (separating from the harasser or situation). Id. at 120.
Common externally focused responses include avoidance of the harasser or situation,
appeasement (putting off the harasser without direct confrontation), and social support
(talking to friends or coworkers about the harassment). Id. The most infrequent response
“is to seek institutional/organizational relief,” since “[v]ictims apparently turn to such
strategies as a last resort when all other efforts have failed.” Id. at 121.
133. See Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of
Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 Harv. Women’s L.J. 3, 21–22 (2003)
(describing how courts are generally unsympathetic to reporting delays). One study found
that gender-harassing conduct was almost never reported, unwanted physical touching was
formally reported only 8.3% of the time, and sexually coercive behavior was reported by
only 33.3% of victims who experienced it. Kimberly A. Lonsway et al., Sexual Harassment
in Law Enforcement: Incidence, Impact, and Perception, 16 Police Q. 177, 185–86 tbl.1
(2012).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
135. Id. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added).
136. See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989), rev’d in part on
other grounds, aff’d in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Ruffino v. State St.
Bank & Tr. Co., 908 F. Supp. 1019, 1047–48 (D. Mass. 1995).
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supervisors.137 These courts have emphasized that Congress exempted
employers with fewer than ﬁfteen employees from the statute and
imposed a sliding scale of damages based on the employer’s size, with no
reference to damages awarded against an individual supervisor. Whatever
the merits of that view, individuals who commit sexual harassment
generally will be immune from personal liability under Title VII.
The fact that individual harassers cannot be held liable under Title
VII no doubt weakens the statute’s deterrent effect. Yet for two reasons, it
would be a mistake to place too much emphasis on the lack of individual
liability. First, even if individual supervisors were exposed to Title VII
liability, they would in many cases be shielded by insurance or
indemniﬁcation arrangements and so might never pay a judgment out of
pocket. Second, even in the absence of individual liability under Title
VII, employers can shift liability to individual supervisors by contract.
Indeed, Harvey Weinstein’s contract with the Weinstein Company
reportedly did just that: It required Weinstein himself to reimburse the
company for settlements or judgments arising out of sexual harassment
and other misconduct.138
4. Class Certiﬁcation. — Class action lawsuits have always played an
important role in the employment discrimination context. In many cases,
employees cannot afford to ﬁle individual cases or may fear retaliation
for doing so. Resolving instances of discrimination on an incident-byincident basis also makes it less likely that employees will come forward
because it isolates individual victims rather than facilitating the sort of
collective action that has been the hallmark feature of “#MeToo.”139 By
contrast, the class action vehicle permits employees to band together,
which not only encourages participation but also provides ﬁnancial
incentives for lawyers to represent them. Moreover, class plaintiffs may be
able to seek injunctive or declaratory relief—relief that may be
unavailable in individual cases—which may in turn serve to transform
corporate practices.

137. See Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 28–31 (1st Cir. 2009); Smith v.
Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 448–49 (5th Cir. 2002); Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d
177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998); Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997);
Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077–78 (3d Cir. 1996) (en
banc); Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 901 (10th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d
552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314–15 (2d Cir. 1995); Gary
v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Smith v. St. Bernards Reg’l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d
1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993);
Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991).
138. See Harvey Weinstein’s Contract Allowed for Sexual Harassment, TMZ (Oct.
12, 2017), http://www.tmz.com/2017/10/12/weinstein-contract-the-weinstein-companysexual-harassment-firing-illegal [https://perma.cc/Q6J8-4RDP].
139. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 395, 418–22 (2011) (describing the beneﬁts of conceptualizing
discrimination collectively versus focusing on the “insular individual”).
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Despite the potential beneﬁts of the class action mechanism, recent
judicial decisions have made it much more difficult for employees to
bring class action lawsuits alleging workplace discrimination. The most
signiﬁcant of these cases is the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, which involved a class of 1.5 million Walmart
employees who claimed that the company’s pay practices discriminated
against women in violation of Title VII.140 In a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme
Court held that the Walmart employees could not pursue their claims as
a class action.141 According to Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority,
class claims “must depend upon a common contention . . . of such a
nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to
the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”142 Because the
plaintiff-employees’ allegations involved different sets of facts surrounding
their individual employment decisions, the majority reasoned that it could
not say whether examining the claims would produce a common answer
to the discrimination question.143
The Dukes decision inspired outrage from commentators who
predicted that the ruling would hinder, or even foreclose, employees’ use
of the class action as a tool for redress.144 And in some ways, these
concerns have been realized: In the past few years, courts have used the
decision to subject plaintiffs to heightened scrutiny at the class
certiﬁcation stage, requiring them to develop a detailed and nuanced
factual record as a prerequisite to certiﬁcation.145 The Dukes decision
does not, however, put the class action mechanism out of reach for all
victims of sexual harassment. Some district courts have allowed plaintiffs
to proceed as a class with respect to some common issues—such as
whether an employer’s practices create a hostile work environment for
female employees—while deferring damages questions to individual
trials.146 In other cases, employees have been able to surmount the new
140. 564 U.S. 338, 343 (2011).
141. Id. at 367.
142. Id. at 350.
143. Id. at 352.
144. See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications
of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 34, 37 (2011), https://
scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=nulr_
online [https://perma.cc/6ASC-ZUGX] (“The Dukes class certiﬁcation standard
jeopardizes potentially meritorious challenges to systemic discrimination. By redeﬁning
the class certiﬁcation requirements for employment discrimination cases . . . the Court
compromises employees’ access to justice.”).
145. Katherine E. Lamm, Work in Progress: Civil Rights Class Actions After Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, 50 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 153, 166 (2015).
146. See, e.g., Sellars v. CRST Expedited, Inc., 321 F.R.D. 578, 609 (N.D. Iowa 2017);
see also Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., John S. Marrese & Christopher M. Cascino, Court Uses
Novel Issue Certiﬁcation Device to Sidestep Individualized Issues Otherwise Precluding
Class Certification, Seyfarth Shaw: Workplace Class Action Blog (Apr. 9, 2017), https://
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certiﬁcation threshold.147 And even when the class action mechanism is
unavailable, harassment victims may use nonclass joinder procedures so
that they can litigate their claims collectively.148
5. Arbitration. — A ﬁnal obstacle facing employees who seek to sue
their employers for sexual harassment is the frequent presence of
arbitration clauses in employment contracts. By 2017, more than half of
nonunion private-sector employees were subject to contractual provisions
that require them to bring workplace-related claims in arbitration
proceedings rather than in court.149 And in 2018, a sharply divided
Supreme Court held in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis that the Federal
Arbitration Act requires lower courts to enforce individual arbitration
provisions in employment agreements.150 While the Epic Systems case
involved claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court’s decision
applies squarely to employment discrimination claims as well. According
to Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion, the Epic Systems decision applies to
“any disputes” between employers and employees.151
In practice, the decision in Epic Systems means that employers can
require workers—as a condition of employment—to waive their right to
sue and to agree that any employment-related claims will be pursued in
one-on-one arbitration. While some employees will still prevail in the
arbitral forum, their prospects are rather bleak: Employee win rates and
damages awards are signiﬁcantly lower in arbitral proceedings than in
federal and state court.152 And arbitration clauses not only complicate
employees’ ability to vindicate their rights in court but also make it more
difficult for others to learn about employee harassment, as most
arbitration proceedings are subject to conﬁdentiality requirements.153
www.workplaceclassaction.com/2017/04/court-uses-novel-issue-certification-device-to-sidestepindividualized-issues-otherwise-precluding-class-certification [https://perma.cc/8X2P-S52D]
(describing how Sellars “is part of a trend”).
147. See, e.g., Leyva v. Medline Indus., 716 F.3d 510, 514–16 (9th Cir. 2013) (certifying
a class of employees bringing wage and hour claims even though each class member’s
damages were different, because the evidence suggested that the employer could calculate
the information in a computer database).
148. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1) (permitting joinder if: “(A) [plaintiffs] assert any
right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action”).
149. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Econ. Policy Inst., The Growing Use of Mandatory
Arbitration 1–2 (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/135056.pdf [https://
perma.cc/HSR8-793J].
150. 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018).
151. Id.
152. Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, Econ. Policy Inst., The Arbitration
Epidemic 20 tbl.1 (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P539-FU5E].
153. Myriam Gilles, Pound Civil Justice Inst., The Demise of Deterrence: Mandatory
Arbitration and the “Litigation Reform” Movement, Forced Arbitration and the Fate of the 7th
Amendment: The Core of America’s Legal System at Stake? 17, 31–33 (2015), http://www.
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While the Supreme Court has held that an arbitration clause in an
employment contract does not affect the EEOC’s right to seek remedies
for job discrimination,154 the spread of arbitration provisions has the
potential to substantially reduce the efficacy of private enforcement of
employment discrimination laws.
E.

Beyond Title VII

To summarize so far, Title VII allows victims of sexual harassment to
seek injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages, but
such relief is limited by damages caps, and the lack of individual liability
dulls the deterrence effect of Title VII. Meanwhile, strict statutes of
limitations, constraints on the class action mechanism in federal court,
and the increasing prevalence of arbitration clauses make it harder for
employees to have their claims heard. Partly as a result, victims of sexual
harassment have turned to other areas of law—including state human
rights and tort law—as potential avenues for redress.
Several jurisdictions—including California, the District of Columbia,
New Jersey, New York City, and West Virginia—have enacted human
rights laws that allow for uncapped compensatory and punitive damages
as well as individual liability in cases of sexual harassment and other
forms of employment discrimination.155 Many state and local human
rights statutes also allow for more generous limitations periods than
federal law does. New York, for example, does not require employees to
ﬁle a claim with the state human rights agency before bringing a
lawsuit,156 and the statute of limitations under the New York state and city
human rights laws is three years from the date of harassment.157 Thus,
anchor Gretchen Carlson could (and did158) sue Roger Ailes for violating
the New York City Human Rights Law without ﬁrst ﬁling a claim with an
administrative agency, ultimately obtaining a settlement from Fox News

poundinstitute.org/sites/default/files/2014PoundReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/F54S-QND4]
(noting that arbitral proceedings normally require “the promise of complete
confidentiality”).
154. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295–96 (2002).
155. See Barry A. Hartstein, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, 50 Ways from Sunday—
Can a Corporation Have a Successful Nationwide Policy that Is Consistent with State and
Local Laws? 14, 31, 88, 144 (2009), http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/eeocomm/mw/
Papers/2009/data/papers/19.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R7N-8DD6].
156. See id. at 97.
157. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214 (McKinney 2018); see also Eric M. Baum, Statute of Limitations
for Sexual Harassment Claims, Eisenberg & Baum, LLP (Apr. 17, 2016), https://www.
eandblaw.com/employment-discrimination-blog/2016/04/07/statute-limitations-sexualharassment-claims [https://perma.cc/8ZHX-4DAD].
158. See Complaint at 7, Carlson v. Ailes, No. L-5016-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. ﬁled July 6,
2016).
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for $20 million159 that far exceeded what would have been available
under Title VII.160
Sexual harassment victims have also registered some victories in tort
law actions against perpetrators—speciﬁcally on claims of assault, battery,
and intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress.161 However, assault and
battery claims require either reasonable apprehension of immediate
harmful or offensive conduct (assault)162 or actual contact (battery),163
thus providing no remedy in cases in which harassment takes a
nonphysical form. Moreover, emotional distress claims tend to succeed
only in the most egregious circumstances.164 As two practitioners note,
“Most courts recognize that ordinary employment suits involving sexual
discrimination will not establish a cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.”165 Even when tort law claims against perpetrators
of sexual harassment succeed, courts will often hold that the perpetrator’s
“purely personal” motives place his actions outside the scope of employment, thus preventing the plaintiff from holding the employer liable on
a respondeat superior theory.166

159. See Michael M. Grynbaum & John Koblin, Fox Settles with Gretchen Carlson over
Roger Ailes Sexual Harassment Claims, N.Y. Times (Sept. 6, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/business/media/fox-news-roger-ailes-gretchen-carlsonsexual-harassment-lawsuit-settlement.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
160. Compare with supra section I.D.1, which discusses the damages caps that limit
recovery under Title VII.
161. See, e.g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1019 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that the jury found in favor of the plaintiff on battery and intentional inﬂiction of
emotional distress claims). When harassment takes the form of assault or battery, victims
also may be able to seek redress under criminal law. But despite decades of reform, the
criminal justice system often fails victims of sexual assault. See Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law 17 (1998) (“The legislative changes inspired by the feminist antirape movement accomplished very little.”);
Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 1259, 1305–06 (2011) (“The simple fact is
that rape reforms over the last thirty years have not had the effect feminists desired.”).
162. Assault, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
163. Battery, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 162.
164. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 611,
613–14 (5th Cir. 1999). In Skidmore, the court found sufficient evidence to support a verdict against the supervisor for intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress when the
employee testiﬁed that the supervisor harassed her with constant sexual remarks, invited
her to his house for a “hot body oil massage,” told her to undress so he could lick her
from head to toe, asked her to leave her husband and have his child, followed her after
work, asked her to go to Las Vegas with him, and sometimes came up behind her and
licked or kissed her face or neck. Id.
165. Jessica Stender & Roberta Steele, ABA Section Labor & Employment Law—2009
Labor and Employment Law CLE Conference: Employment Torts 2 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
166. See, e.g., Cornwall v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, No. 0026078/1994, 1996 NYLJ
LEXIS 2505, at *24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 1996) (“Where, as here, a tort is committed by
an employee for purely personal motives unrelated to the furtherance of the employer’s
business there is no basis for respondeat superior liability.”).
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Notably, none of these regimes—Title VII,167 state human rights law,
or tort law—provides a remedy to the shareholders who are (at least
arguably) indirect victims of sexual harassment in the corporate setting.
And yet persistent harassment at a ﬁrm may impair proﬁtability in a
number of ways. Most obviously, expenses associated with litigation—
including legal fees, settlements, and judgments—damage a company’s
bottom line.168 Second, negative publicity associated with sexual
harassment scandals may harm a company’s reputation.169 Third, sexual
harassment potentially interferes with a company’s ability to hire and
retain talented employees who are repelled by the hostile work environment.170 Fourth, harassment may impede the productivity of employees—
both victims and those who try to steer clear of settings where they might
be victimized.171 In a handful of cases, shareholders have turned to state
corporate law and federal securities law to redress these indirect harms.
The next Part discusses those efforts.
II. LIABILITY FOR HARASSMENT UNDER CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAWS
The ﬁrst shareholder lawsuit arising out of workplace sexual misconduct came long before the Harvey Weinstein scandal made “#MeToo”
a household hashtag. In November 1998, a shareholder of the pharmaceutical manufacturer ICN ﬁled a derivative action in Delaware court
asserting breach of ﬁduciary duty claims against the ﬁrm’s CEO and
other directors stemming from the CEO’s harassment of female employees.172 That suit ultimately failed (for reasons we discuss in this Part), but
it was a harbinger of things to come. Since the ICN suit, at least eleven
more companies—American Apparel, Hewlett-Packard, CTPartners,
Signet Jewelers, Twenty-First Century Fox, Liberty Tax, Wynn Resorts,
National Beverage, CBS, Papa John’s, and Nike—have faced shareholder
lawsuits linked to sexual harassment by top executives. We expect this list
to grow in the coming months and years. In this Part, we rely on the facts
of these suits to develop a general framework for evaluating future claims
under state corporate law and federal securities statutes arising out of
workplace sexual misconduct.

167. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 176–77 (2011) (“If any person injured . . . by a Title VII violation could sue, absurd consequences would follow . . . .
[A] shareholder would be able to sue a company for ﬁring a valuable employee for racially
discriminatory reasons, so long as he could show that the value of his stock decreased as a
consequence.”).
168. See infra notes 490–492 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 500–501 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 415, 493–495 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 471, 502–503 and accompanying text.
172. See White v. Panic (Panic I ), 793 A.2d 356, 358–59 (Del. Ch. 2000), aff’d, 783
A.2d 543 (Del. 2001).

2018]
A.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND CORPORATE LAW

1613

Canaries in the Coal Mine?

1. ICN. — Valeant Pharmaceuticals International made headlines—
and enemies—in 2015 when the ﬁrm more than quadrupled, overnight,
the per-tablet price of a drug that treats liver disease.173 But this was not
the ﬁrst time that the company became enmeshed in controversy. In July
1998, when Valeant still went by the name ICN Pharmaceuticals, the ﬁrm
was the focus of a U.S. News & World Report cover story that detailed
allegations of sexual harassment against then-CEO Milan Panic.174 Six
women told U.S. News of repeated incidents in which Panic propositioned them, groped them, or forcibly kissed them.175 The board, according to one member, “knew nothing of [the] alleged harassment” for
years, until one of Panic’s victims ﬁled suit.176 Even after learning that
Panic was accused of sexual harassment, they kept him on at the
company and continued to compensate him handsomely.177
The U.S. News story prompted an ICN shareholder, Andrew White,
to ﬁle a derivative action against the company, Panic, and fourteen other
board members.178 According to White’s complaint, ICN board members
made a concerted effort to cover up Panic’s misconduct by requiring
employees to submit grievances to conﬁdential arbitration.179 The
company guaranteed a $3.5 million loan to Panic so that he could settle a
paternity suit, and the only collateral that Panic posted was out-of-themoney stock options.180 The complaint also suggested that the board had
made additional payments to settle harassment claims against Panic,
though the complaint lacked any further details regarding the amount or
nature of these settlements.181
The Delaware Chancery Court dismissed White’s complaint on the
grounds that White had not made out a case for “demand excusal.”182 We
discuss the criteria for demand excusal at greater detail below,183 but for

173. See Andrew Pollack & Sabrina Tavernise, Valeant’s Drug Price Strategy Enriches It,
but Infuriates Patients and Lawmakers, N.Y. Times (Oct. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/10/05/business/valeants-drug-price-strategy-enriches-it-but-infuriates-patients-andlawmakers.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
174. Miriam Horn, Sex and the CEO, U.S. News & World Rep., July 6, 1998, at 32. ICN
Pharmaceuticals Inc. changed its name to Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc. in
2003. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Valeant Pharmaceuticals to Change Its Name to Bausch
Health, Wall St. J. (May 8, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/valeant-pharmaceuticalsto-change-its-name-to-bausch-health-1525752878 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
175. Horn, supra note 174, at 32, 34.
176. Id. at 32, 35.
177. Id. at 32.
178. Panic I, 793 A.2d 356, 359 (Del. Ch. 2000).
179. Id. at 363.
180. White v. Panic (Panic II ), 783 A.2d 543, 548 (Del. 2001).
181. Panic I, 793 A.2d at 368–69.
182. Id. at 368.
183. See infra notes 332–361 and accompanying text.
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now, the key point is that the court considered the board to be capable of
deciding whether to sue Panic on the corporation’s behalf.184 The
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, noting the “sparse” nature of the
allegations against the board.185 But despite that outcome, the shareholder suit served as a warning that corporate directors and officers
could face ﬁduciary duty liability for engaging in or abetting workplacebased sexual misconduct.
2. Hewlett-Packard. — In the years following Panic, several corporate
boards took action against CEOs accused of sexual harassment or other
questionable sexual conduct. Boeing’s board asked CEO Harry
Stonecipher to step down in 2005 after learning that he had an affair
with a subordinate.186 Sara Lee Corp.’s chairman and CEO, Steven
McMillan, resigned that same year after allegations that he offered a
woman a job at the company on the condition that she have sex with him
led to a settlement.187 The board of the hotel chain Starwood ousted its
CEO in 2007 after he sent sexually suggestive emails and text messages to
a female employee.188 The board of Hewlett-Packard ﬁred CEO Mark
Hurd in 2010, reportedly because board members believed that Hurd
had lied to them about an affair with a former Hewlett-Packard
contractor.189 The CEO of the medical device manufacturer Stryker,
Stephen MacMillan (not to be confused with the Sara Lee chief of a
similar name), was reportedly “forced out partly because certain board
members became bothered by his handling of a relationship” with a
former female employee.190 The insurance company Highmark ﬁred
CEO Kenneth Melani in April 2012 after he got into a ﬁght with the
husband of a female employee with whom Melani had carried on an
affair.191 That same month, Best Buy forced out CEO Brian Dunn

184. See id. at 367–71.
185. Panic II, 783 A.2d at 552.
186. Renae Merle, Boeing CEO Resigns over Affair with Subordinate, Wash. Post (Mar. 8,
2005), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/03/08/boeing-ceo-resigns-overaffair-with-subordinate/199b6a6b-9883-457d-991b-ea23840b1fe2 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
187. Susan Chandler, CEO Indiscretions No Longer Overlooked by Boards, Chi. Trib.
(Mar. 8, 2005), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-03-08/business/0503080224_1_
harry-stonecipher-female-boeing-executive-philip-condit (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
188. Marcus Baram, Misconduct in the Corner Office, ABC News (Apr. 11, 2007), http://
abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=3027563&page=1 [https://perma.cc/XN5D-Q892].
189. Robert A. Guth, Ben Worthen & Justin Scheck, Accuser Said Hurd Leaked an H-P
Deal, Wall St. J. (Nov. 6, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870380570
4575594343622319312 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
190. Joann S. Lublin & Christopher Weaver, CEO Sought Nod for Romance, Wall
St. J. (May 23, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304791704577420
681311173856 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
191. Paula Reed Ward, Former Highmark CEO Sues for $32 Million over Firing,
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/healthcare-
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because of what an audit committee report later described as “an
extremely close personal relationship with a female employee that
negatively impacted the work environment.”192
The Best Buy incident demonstrated that the fallout from a CEO’s
workplace misconduct could extend to board members as well. Following
Dunn’s departure as CEO, the chairman of the company’s board,
Richard Schulze, resigned when an internal investigation revealed that
he knew about Dunn’s relationship with the female employee but did not
report it to the rest of the board.193 Schulze did, however, return to the
company the following year as “chairman emeritus,”194 raising questions
as to whether board members who abet sexual misconduct by corporate
executives would in fact bear signiﬁcant costs.
Most of the CEO departures listed above did not result in
shareholder lawsuits. At least one, however, did: In 2012, a pension fund
for cement and concrete workers ﬁled a class action complaint in the
federal district court for the Northern District of California against
Hewlett-Packard and Hurd for violating section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934195 (and speciﬁcally, the SEC’s Rule 10b-5, which
applies to untrue statements of material fact and material omissions196).
The complaint alleged that Hewlett-Packard’s “Standards of Business
Conduct”—which emphasized, among other elements, that the company
“refus[ed] to tolerate harassment”—was itself materially misleading, and
that the company’s failure to disclose Hurd’s misconduct constituted a
material omission.197
The district court dismissed the shareholders’ complaint, and a Ninth
Circuit panel unanimously affirmed.198 In the panel’s view, HewlettPackard’s business conduct policy was “transparently aspirational” and
“did not reasonably suggest that there would be no violations of the

business/2015/09/03/Former-Highmark-CEO-sues-insurer-for-32-million/stories/2015090
30183 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
192. Erin Carlyle, Best Buy CEO Brian Dunn Gets $6.6 Million Severance Package After
“Friendship” with 29-Year-Old Employee, Forbes (May 14, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/erincarlyle/2012/05/14/best-buy-ceo-brian-dunn-gets-6-6-million-severance-package-afterfriendship-with-29-year-old-employee/#11bca5615924 [https://perma.cc/5Y6W-HDMM].
193. Stephanie Clifford, Chairman of Best Buy Resigns After an Internal Audit, N.Y.
Times (May 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/15/business/chairman-of-bestbuy-to-step-down.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
194. Schulze Returns to Best Buy as Chairman Emeritus, Omaha World-Herald (Mar. 25,
2013), http://www.omaha.com/money/schulze-returns-to-best-buy-as-chairman-emeritus/
article_c6cfaeee-4317-517f-86ea-f03b9139ad0e.html [https://perma.cc/LT4E-3YVT].
195. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2012).
196. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2018).
197. Retail Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union Local 338 Ret. Fund v. Hewlett-Packard Co.
(H-P II ), 845 F.3d 1268, 1273–75 (9th Cir. 2017).
198. Retail Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union Local 338 Ret. Fund v. Hewlett-Packard Co.
(H-P I ), 52 F. Supp. 3d 961, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d, 845 F.3d 1268.
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[policy] by the CEO or anyone else.”199 The Ninth Circuit also remarked
in a footnote that it was “somewhat perplexed” by the shareholders’
theory of the case.200 According to the court: “It appears that HP’s ethics
and compliance policies worked. Hurd did not live up to HP’s standards;
HP became aware of Hurd’s ostensible misconduct; HP quickly launched
an investigation, conﬁrming the misconduct; and Hurd resigned.”201
Not only did Hewlett-Packard avoid liability, but Hurd escaped from
the episode largely unscathed. Hurd left Hewlett-Packard with a $40
million severance package202 and now makes roughly that amount each
year as CEO of Oracle.203 If Hurd’s ouster suggested that the heads of
publicly traded companies would face serious reputational consequences
for inappropriate sexual behavior, the long-term outcome sent precisely
the opposite message.
3. American Apparel. — Even as other prominent executives lost their
jobs over sexual harassment, American Apparel’s Dov Charney, who
founded the clothing company in 1989,204 managed to hold onto his
CEO title notwithstanding a well-publicized record of sexual harassment
allegations. In 2004, Charney reportedly masturbated in front of a reporter
for Jane magazine who was writing a proﬁle of him.205 In 2005, three
female former employees sued him for sexual harassment,206 with another
female employee ﬁling a complaint with the EEOC against Charney the

199. H-P II, 845 F.3d at 1278.
200. Id. at 1277 n.3.
201. Id.
202. See Julie Bort, A Rare Glimpse Inside the Life and Mind of Oracle CEO Mark
Hurd, Bus. Insider (Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/inside-the-mind-oforacle-ceo-mark-hurd-2015-1 [https://perma.cc/3YUV-TVVR]. Hurd’s generous severance
package itself became the subject of a shareholder suit; two years after Hurd’s termination,
a group of shareholders sued the board, alleging that the voluntary decision to award
Hurd a severance package constituted corporate waste. See Zucker v. Andreessen, No.
6014-VCP, 2012 WL 2366448, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2012). Even though Hurd’s employment contract did not entitle him to any severance payment upon termination, the Court
of Chancery concluded that the plaintiffs had not met the high bar for pleading waste
because Hurd provided some consideration for the severance payment, including a commitment to participate in succession planning. Id. at *8.
203. See Adam Lashinsky, The Redemption of Oracle’s Mark Hurd, Fortune (June 8,
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/06/08/redemption-of-mark-hurd-oracle [https://perma.cc/
5P5D-KNAY]; Gabrielle Solomon, 10 Top-Paid CEOs, CNN Money (May 31, 2017), http://
money.cnn.com/gallery/news/companies/2017/05/31/top-paid-ceos/6.html [https://
perma.cc/PP4E-7F9P].
204. Bourree Lam, Goodbye, American Apparel, Atlantic (Jan. 14, 2017), https://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/01/american-apparel-gildan/513128/ [https://
perma.cc/88VZ-FFUP].
205. Jaime Wolf, And You Thought Abercrombie & Fitch Was Pushing It?, N.Y. Times
Mag. (Apr. 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/magazine/and-you-thoughtabercrombie-ﬁtch-was-pushing-it.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
206. Id.
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following year.207 In 2010, the EEOC found the company liable for
discriminating against women “as a class” by “subjecting them to sexual
harassment.”208 Five more female employees ﬁled harassment lawsuits
against Charney the following year.209 All the while, American Apparel’s
board left Charney in charge.
In 2010, shareholders of American Apparel ﬁled a derivative action
against Charney, the company, its chief ﬁnancial officer, and several
current and former directors alleging (among other claims) breaches of
ﬁduciary duties related to sexual harassment at the company.210 A federal
district court in the Central District of California dismissed the
complaint, relying heavily on the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in
White v. Panic.211 The court acknowledged that “[t]he complaint here is
more speciﬁc than the pleading in White,” and that “the reports
documenting Charney’s sexual proclivities and the company’s unconventional work environment support an inference that the directors knew
or should have known that there was possible cause for concern.”212 The
court further noted that the EEOC’s ﬁnding of sexual harassment at the
company “lends some credibility to plaintiffs’ claims.”213 Nonetheless, the
court concluded that the “plaintiffs have not pled particularized facts
indicating that the board failed to act despite actual or constructive
knowledge of problems with the company’s work environment.”214 As in
Panic, the plaintiffs’ failure to disqualify the directors meant that the
decision whether to sue Charney was left to the board.215
Charney’s remarkable run at American Apparel ﬁnally ended in
June 2014, when the board ousted him as CEO after an internal investigation revealed that he had—among other infractions—allowed an
employee to post naked photos on the internet of a former American
Apparel employee who had sued Charney for sexual harassment.216 One
month later, two American Apparel shareholders ﬁled fresh derivative
207. Laura M. Holson, He’s Only Just Begun to Fight, N.Y. Times (Apr. 13, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/fashion/14CHARNEY.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. In re Am. Apparel S’holder Derivative Litig., No. CV 10-06576 MMM (RCx), 2012
WL 9506072, at *1, *25 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012).
211. Id. at *28–29 (discussing Panic II, 783 A.2d 543 (Del. 2001)).
212. Id. at *29.
213. Id. at *30.
214. Id. at *29.
215. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing Panic I ); infra section
II.B.1 (describing why plaintiffs must disqualify directors to have standing to bring a derivative suit).
216. Elizabeth A. Harris, American Apparel Ousts Its Founder, Dov Charney, over Nude
Photos, N.Y. Times (June 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/business/
in-firing-dov-charney-american-apparel-cites-posting-of-naked-pictures.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).

1618

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:1583

actions against the company, Charney, and former and current directors,
but these claims were also unsuccessful.217 According to the district court,
the cascade of sexual harassment claims against Charney abated after
2011 and so “the Board may reasonably have believed that Charney’s
alleged sexual proclivities were no longer a signiﬁcant issue for the
Company.”218 Once the new allegations regarding the posting of naked
photos emerged, the directors “did take action for precisely the reasons
Plaintiffs assert they should have.”219
The Ninth Circuit again affirmed the district court’s decision, this
time without a published decision.220 American Apparel, meanwhile,
continued to suffer reputationally and ﬁnancially. The company has twice
ﬁled for bankruptcy since Charney’s departure.221
4. CTPartners. — Around the same time American Apparel tumbled
toward bankruptcy, the executive search ﬁrm CTPartners saw a sexual
harassment scandal spell its ultimate demise. In December 2014, the New
York Post accused CTPartners of being “a den of discrimination where
women are stripped of proﬁtable accounts, held to a higher standard
than their male colleagues and subjected to lewd behavior.”222 According
to the New York Post article, which cited a conﬁdential EEOC complaint,
one male partner in the ﬁrm’s hedge fund practice “called himself
‘daddy’” and told a female employee that “he wanted to spank her.”223
When the female employee complained to the vice chairman, the vice
chairman allegedly “dismissed the matter due to a ‘language barrier,’
even though [the hedge fund partner]’s ﬁrst language is English.”224 The
New York Post article also said that the company’s chairman and CEO
“ripped off his clothes . . . during a drunken party at his Florida home”
in front of other employees of the ﬁrm in 2012 and that employees had
lodged at least a dozen separate sexual harassment complaints the same
year.225

217. In re Am. Apparel, Inc. 2014 Derivative S’holder Litig., No. CV-14-05230-MWF
(JEMx), 2015 WL 12724070, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2015), aff’d, 696 F. App’x 848 (9th
Cir. 2017).
218. Id. at *20.
219. Id. at *17.
220. In re Am. Apparel, 696 F. App’x at 848.
221. Nathan Boomey, American Apparel Topples into Bankruptcy Again, USA Today
(Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/11/14/american-apparelchapter-11-bankruptcy/93788450 [https://perma.cc/YJQ3-FAK9].
222. Kevin Dugan, Wall Street Recruiters Had Boozy Naked Romps: Complaint, N.Y.
Post (Dec. 8, 2014), https://nypost.com/2014/12/08/complaint-claims-executives-heldboozy-naked-boys-club-romps [https://perma.cc/Z7WQ-PW8B].
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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On the day that the New York Post published its report, CTPartners’s
stock price dropped nearly 25%.226 The following year, two shareholders
ﬁled class action complaints alleging that the company had violated
federal securities laws in connection with the sexual harassment
scandal.227 Speciﬁcally, the plaintiffs argued that the company’s statements about its culture of honest and ethical conduct and its commitment to diversity and inclusiveness were inaccurate, that its statements
trumpeting its low voluntary turnover rate among employees were
misleading, and that the company’s failure to disclose the “true nature” of
its work environment ran afoul of its affirmative disclosure obligations.228
In March 2016, a federal district court in the Southern District of
New York granted CTPartners’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’
complaint.229 According to the court, the company’s statements regarding
its corporate culture amounted to “immaterial puffery,” and its statements
regarding its low turnover rate were neither false nor misleading.230 The
court also concluded that the company had no affirmative duty to disclose
sexual harassment claims under federal securities laws.231 But even
though it escaped liability, the consequences for CTPartners were devastating: Just over six months after the New York Post article, the ﬁrm ceased
its operations232 and was set to ﬁle for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.233 A Chicago-based rival purchased some of the company’s assets,
but the company’s shareholders emerged emptyhanded.234
5. Signet Jewelers. — Before 2017, Signet Jewelers was best known for
its various diamond jewelry retail brands—Jared, Kay, Sterling, and
Zales—which dotted malls across the world. In February 2017, however,
the company captured headlines for less resplendent reasons: The
226. Lawrence Delevingne, Headhunter Stock Drops 24% on Sex Bias Complaint,
CNBC (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/12/10/headhunter-ctpartners-stockdrops-24-on-sex-bias-complaint.html [https://perma.cc/X4YC-FLBT].
227. Complaint, Zinno v. CTPartners Exec. Search Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 12 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (No. 15 CV 1476); Amended Complaint, Lopez v. CTPartners Exec. Search Inc., 173
F. Supp. 3d 12 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:15-cv-1476-PAE).
228. Lopez, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 26–38.
229. Id. at 44.
230. Id. at 25.
231. Id. at 33–34.
232. Press Release, CTPartners Exec. Search Inc., CTPartners Executive Search (CTP)
Announces Notice of Default Receipts from JPMogan [sic], Phoenix Life Insurance (June
29, 2015), https://www.streetinsider.com/Corporate+News/CTPartners+Executive+Search+
(CTP)+Announces+Notice+of+Default+Receipts+from+JPMogan,+Phoenix+Life+Insurance/
10686419.html [https://perma.cc/2TG2-5FS9].
233. Kevin Dugan, Troubled CTPartners Set to File for Bankruptcy, N.Y. Post (June 28,
2015), https://nypost.com/2015/06/28/troubled-ctpartners-set-to-file-for-bankruptcy/
[https://perma.cc/6B9A-A2E6].
234. See Claire Bushey, DHR International Sweeps Up Parts of Scandal-Plagued Rival,
Crain’s Chi. Bus. (June 23, 2015), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150623/
NEWS04/150629945/dhr-international-sweeps-up-parts-of-scandal-plagued-rival [https://
perma.cc/MG8G-S9A5].
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company—according to a Washington Post exposé based on arbitration
documents obtained by the newspaper—had developed “a corporate
culture that fostered rampant sexual harassment and discrimination.”235
The documents included declarations from approximately 250
employees who said that women at the company “were routinely groped,
demeaned and urged to sexually cater to their bosses to stay employed.”236
The Washington Post further reported allegations that “top male managers . . . dispatched scouting parties to stores to ﬁnd female employees
they wanted to sleep with, laughed about women’s bodies in the workplace, and pushed female subordinates into sex by pledging better jobs,
higher pay or protection from punishment.”237 The list of executives
included the company’s CEO, Mark Light.238
Sexual harassment claims against Signet had been pending for
nearly a decade by the time that the Washington Post story broke, but
because these claims were pursued through a conﬁdential arbitration
process, shareholders did not know about the nature or the extent of the
allegations.239 The Washington Post story changed all of that, and—unsurprisingly—Signet’s share price plummeted: The stock dropped more than
12% in a single day.240 The company criticized the Washington Post report
as “distorted and inaccurate,”241 but that did little to mitigate the damage.
The stock continued to decline throughout the 2017 calendar year.242
Litigation soon ensued. Several groups of shareholders brought lawsuits against the company under federal securities laws, and those lawsuits have since been transferred to the Southern District of New York and
consolidated into a single class action.243 The ﬁrst suit—a class action
235. Drew Harwell, Hundreds Allege Sex Harassment, Discrimination at Kay and Jared
Jewelry Company, Wash. Post (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/hundreds-allege-sex-harassment-discrimination-at-kay-and-jared-jewelry-company/
2017/02/27/8dcc9574-f6b7-11e6-bf01-d47f8cf9b643_story.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Lauren Thomas, This Jewelry Brand’s Stock Plummets After Sexual Harassment
Allegations Surface, CNBC (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/28/signetjewelers-stock-drops-as-sexual-harassment-allegations-surface.html [https://perma.cc/3XX69T36].
241. Press Release, Signet Jewelers Ltd., Sterling Jewelers Statement on Ongoing
Arbitration (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.signetjewelers.com/investors/news-releases/newsrelease-details/2017/Sterling-Jewelers-Statement-on-Ongoing-Arbitration/default.aspx [https://
perma.cc/5AF8-PYNZ].
242. Ezequiel Minaya & Joann S. Lublin, Signet Jewelers CEO to Retire, Citing Health
Reasons, Wall St. J. ( July 17, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/signet-jewelers-ceo-toretire-citing-health-reasons-1500331835?mod=mktw (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(noting that Signet Jewelers stock had declined “35% over the past 12 months”).
243. See, e.g., Signet Jewelers Order, supra note 17 (consolidating three of the lawsuits);
see also Signet Jewelers Complaint, supra note 16.
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complaint ﬁled in federal district court at the end of March 2017—seized
on statements made by the company between 2013 and 2016
acknowledging the existence of employment discrimination claims but
denying all allegations.244 The complaint also quoted a press release
announcing Light’s appointment as CEO that trumpeted his “meticulous
approach to operational details,” his “valuable attributes,” and the
board’s “conﬁden[ce] that Mark is the right person to lead the Company
forward.”245 The complaint asserted violations of section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act as well as section 20(a),246 which imposes joint
and several liability on controlling persons who aid and abet securities
law violations.247
The ﬁfth and most recent amended class action complaint in the
Signet litigation ﬂeshes out the federal securities fraud claims against
Signet and its current and former senior executives in much greater
detail. According to the complaint, “a pervasive culture of sexual harassment existed at Signet,” which the company’s senior executives
undoubtedly knew about because they “actively participated in it.”248 The
complaint goes on to allege that this “culture of sexual harassment” poses
an especially severe risk to Signet’s business “because Signet’s key product—diamond bridal jewelry—was meant for women,” and because
“‘trust’ was essential to its sales model.”249 The consolidated case has not
yet been resolved; however, a motion to dismiss has been fully briefed,
with a decision expected in the coming months.250
6. Fox News. — While the Signet shareholder litigation slowly moves
forward, one subsequently ﬁled shareholder lawsuit related to workplace
sexual misconduct has already produced a favorable outcome for plaintiffs. In November 2017, a pension fund for public employees of the City
of Monroe, Michigan, and several other shareholders of Twenty-First
Century Fox, Inc., ﬁled a derivate action in Delaware court arising out of
a sexual harassment scandal at Fox News.251 The defendants include the
estate of the late Fox News CEO Roger Ailes, Twenty-First Century Fox’s
controlling shareholder Rupert Murdoch, and several members of the

244. Mikolchak Complaint, supra note 16, at 6–17.
245. Id. at 8–9 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Press Release, Signet Jewelers Ltd., Signet
Announces New CEO (Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.signetjewelers.com/investors/newsreleases/news-release-details/2014/Signet-Announces-New-CEO/default.aspx [https://
perma.cc/NNK2-3N4Z]).
246. Id. at 25–28.
247. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78t(a) (2012).
248. Signet Jewelers Complaint, supra note 16, at 8.
249. Id.
250. See Defendant’s Notice of Motion to Dismiss the Fifth Amended Class Action
Complaint at 1, In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 1:16-cv-06728-JMF (S.D.N.Y. ﬁled
Mar. 30, 2018); Signet Jewelers Order, supra note 17, at 1–2.
251. Murdoch Complaint, supra note 18.
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Twenty-First Century Fox board.252 The complaint alleged that Ailes had
“sexually harassed female employees and contributors with impunity for
at least a decade” before his July 2016 departure from the company,253
that Murdoch and others at Twenty-First Century Fox allowed Fox News
anchor Bill O’Reilly to harass several female employees,254 and that the
company paid over $55 million to settle claims of sexual harassment and
racial discrimination.255 Beyond the costs incurred in defending and
settling sexual harassment claims, the complaint cited multiple other
harms to the company arising out of its failure to restrain Ailes and
O’Reilly, among them: the possibility that U.K. regulators would block a
proposed acquisition of the pay-TV platform Sky;256 a drop in advertising
revenue and ratings;257 and the “loss of high proﬁle talent,” including
anchors Megyn Kelly, Greta Van Susteren, and Gretchen Carlson, who
left the network in the wake of the harassment scandal.258
Twenty-First Century Fox did not contest the plaintiffs’ claims.
Instead, it promptly entered into a settlement in which it agreed to trigger a $90 million payment from its insurers, as well as insurers representing Ailes’s estate.259 The settlement also provided for a payment of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs’ counsel,260 as well as the establishment of a
“Workplace Professionalism and Inclusion Council” tasked with
strengthening reporting, bolstering sexual harassment–related training,
and helping to recruit and promote the advancement of women and
minorities.261
The Twenty-First Century Fox settlement led one corporate governance expert to predict that “[w]e’ll see a lot more derivative lawsuits and
share price lawsuits over sexual harassment cases in coming months.”262
We share that expectation, though the failure of the earlier suits against
ICN, Hewlett-Packard, and American Apparel also suggests that such
252. Id. at 1.
253. Id. at 3.
254. Id. at 3–4.
255. Id. at 5.
256. Id. at 47–48.
257. Id. at 49.
258. Id. at 50.
259. Emily Steel, Fox Establishes Workplace Culture Panel After Harassment Scandal,
N.Y. Times (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/business/media/foxnews-sexual-harassment.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
260. Murdoch Settlement, supra note 19, at 27–28.
261. Exhibit A to Stipulation & Agreement of Settlement, Compromise, & Release at
3, 10–11, City of Monroe Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Murdoch, No. 2017-0833-AGB (Del. Ch. ﬁled
Nov. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Murdoch Settlement Exhibit A].
262. Anousha Sakoui & Christie Smythe, Fox News Creates Workplace Council to
Settle Harassment Suit, Bloomberg (Nov. 20, 2017) (quoting Kirk O. Hanson, Executive
Director of the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics at Santa Clara University), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-20/fox-agrees-to-workplace-council-to-settleharassment-litigation (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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claims face substantial hurdles. What the Twenty-First Century Fox settlement certainly illustrates is that shareholder lawsuits against corporations and their directors and officers arising out of workplace sexual misconduct deserve serious attention and, despite the failure of earlier
actions, are potentially viable under certain circumstances.
7. Liberty Tax. — The ink on the Twenty-First Century Fox settlement
had barely dried when Liberty Tax became the next company caught up
in a derivative action arising out of CEO sexual misconduct. In
December 2017, a Philadelphia-based pension fund ﬁled a derivative
action against Liberty Tax and its controlling shareholder and former
CEO, John Hewitt, alleging that Hewitt had breached his duty of loyalty
to the company in his capacity as officer and director.263 “Even by the
standards of the recent deluge of sexual misconduct revelations, the situation at Liberty is shocking,” the complaint charged.264 By February 2018,
a second CEO would be ousted from the company as Liberty Tax’s stock
price continued to tumble amid scandal.265
The problems at Liberty Tax started long before 2017, though they
only came to light in the second half of that year.266 In July, the company’s ethics hotline reportedly received a call from employees who said
they overheard then-CEO Hewitt having sex in his office.267 This was not
the ﬁrst complaint against the CEO: The company paid $500,000 to three
former employees in December 2015 to settle a hostile work
environment claim apparently arising out of Hewitt’s noisy sexual activity.268 This time, though, the complaint prompted the company’s audit
committee to hire an outside law ﬁrm, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP, to conduct an investigation of the claim.269 According to news
reports, Skadden’s probe revealed that Hewitt had engaged in a romantic
relationship with at least one employee—and possibly as many as ten
others—and had used company resources to provide favors to several of
his romantic partners.270 In one case, Hewitt apparently allowed a female
sales associate whom he was dating to buy a Liberty Tax franchise with no
money down and then—when the relationship ended—arranged for the
company to buy back the franchise for nearly double the purchase price,
in addition to paying the woman a total of $220,000 in cash and stock.271
263. See Liberty Tax Complaint, supra note 20, at 1–4.
264. Id. at 1.
265. See Kimberly Pierceall, Liberty Tax Fires CEO Mid-Tax Season, 6 Months After Firing
Founder John Hewitt, Virginian-Pilot (Feb. 19, 2018), https://pilotonline.com/business/
consumer/article_aca42b52-4d4e-5a22-88ed-bddaa49a22e0.html [https://perma.cc/N2SQTE36] [hereinafter Pierceall, Liberty Tax Fires CEO Mid-Tax Season].
266. See Pierceall, Ex-CEO of Liberty Tax, supra note 20.
267. Liberty Tax Complaint, supra note 20, at 11.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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Remarkably, according to a Liberty Tax board member who subsequently
resigned, Hewitt continued to engage in the same behavior even while
the Skadden investigation was ongoing.272 In September, the board voted
to terminate Hewitt, paid him more than $800,000 in severance, and
began to negotiate to repurchase his controlling stake in the company.273
When news of this dramatic turmoil became public, Liberty Tax’s stock
price dropped by over 15%.274
Notwithstanding his ﬁring and the fall in Liberty Tax’s share price,
Hewitt was not prepared to cede control of the company that he founded
without a ﬁght. As a result of the company’s dual-class structure, Hewitt
retained the power to choose ﬁve of the company’s nine directors, and
he has made himself one of the ﬁve.275 His majority control over the
board effectively allowed him to choose the company’s CEO, and in
February 2018, he caused the new CEO to be replaced by one of his own
hand-picked board members.276
Meanwhile, the Philadelphia-based pension fund’s derivative action
against Hewitt moved forward in the Delaware Court of Chancery. The
complaint alleged, among other things, that Hewitt breached his ﬁduciary duty to Liberty Tax by “direct[ing] the Company to expend resources
and assets to . . . further his sexual relations with employees and/or franchisees of the Company at the expense of the Company.”277 While
Chancellor Andre Bouchard declined to order accelerated discovery at a
January hearing, he reportedly said at the hearing that “[t]he complaint
clearly, in my view, states a sufficiently colorable claim that Hewitt
breached his ﬁduciary duty by engaging in conduct that led to his termination,” and “neither Hewitt nor Liberty argues to the contrary in their
papers in any meaningful sense, nor do [I] think they could do so.”278
As of this writing, the pension fund action against Hewitt was still
pending in the Delaware Chancery Court,279 but Hewitt’s tenure at
Liberty Tax had come to an inglorious end. In July 2018, Hewitt agreed
272. Letter from John Garel to Board of Directors, Liberty Tax, Inc. 1 (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1528930/000117184317006901/exh_991.htm
[https://perma.cc/2V8H-WYVV].
273. Id.; see also, Pierceall, Ex-CEO of Liberty Tax, supra note 20.
274. See Liberty Tax Complaint, supra note 20, at 15.
275. See Kimberly Pierceall, “Mr. Hewitt’s Conduct . . . Has Left Me in a Very Difficult
Position”: 4th Liberty Board Member Leaves, Virginian-Pilot (Nov. 13, 2017), https://
pilotonline.com/business/stocks/article_0abfca83-01b5-5798-8d1b-2811fbfca720.html
[https://perma.cc/BY7Y-ZUFC] [hereinafter, Pierceall, Mr. Hewitt’s Conduct].
276. See Pierceall, Liberty Tax Fires CEO Mid-Tax Season, supra note 265.
277. Liberty Tax Complaint, supra note 20, at 25–26.
278. Jeff Montgomery, Chancellor Won’t Expedite Liberty CEO Misconduct Suit,
Law360 ( Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1002175/chancellor-won-texpedite-liberty-ceo-misconduct-suit (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
279. See Docket for Asbestos Workers’ Phila. Pension Fund ex rel. Liberty Tax v. Hewitt,
No. 2017-0883 (Del. Ch. ﬁled Dec. 11, 2017) (last updated Aug. 2, 2018) (Bloomberg,
Docket Search, Del. Ch.).
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to sell all of his shares and sever ties with the ﬁrm after its auditor quit
and the Nasdaq exchange moved to delist Liberty Tax.280 Liberty Tax’s
stock price rose by more than 25% at the news of Hewitt’s departure.281
The episode serves as one more illustration that in the era of #MeToo,
even controlling shareholders are no longer invincible.
8. Wynn Resorts. — One of the latest publicly traded companies to
emerge as the subject of a serious sexual harassment scandal is Wynn
Resorts, a developer and operator of high-end hotels and casinos.282 In
late January 2018, the Wall Street Journal published a report corroborated
by “dozens” of sources who described a “decades-long pattern of sexual
misconduct” by the company’s founder and longtime CEO, Steve Wynn.283
One massage therapist who worked at Wynn’s Las Vegas spa told the
Journal that Wynn regularly instructed her to touch his genitals and at
one point asked her to perform oral sex.284 Several other female employees said that Wynn frequently wore such short shorts that he would
expose himself to them when he sat down.285 Another said that Wynn
grabbed her waist and told her to kiss him.286 A former manicurist at a
Wynn-owned hotel said that Wynn forced her to have sex with him.287
The manicurist reportedly complained to the company’s human resources
department and later settled claims against Wynn for $7.5 million.288
News of the allegations against Wynn caused the company’s share
price to plunge, dropping 10% in one day.289 In response, the Wynn
Resorts board formed a special committee to investigate the allegations.290
Gambling authorities in Macau and Nevada also opened investigations.291
Two weeks later, Wynn resigned.292

280. See Anders Melin, Liberty Tax Soars After Founder Involved in Sex Scandal
Agrees to Leave Firm, Bloomberg News: Accounting Today (July 24, 2018), https://
www.accountingtoday.com/articles/liberty-tax-soars-after-founder-john-hewitt-involved-in-sexscandal-agrees-to-leave-ﬁrm (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
281. Id.
282. See Berzon et al., supra note 21.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Wynn Complaint, supra note 21, at 20.
290. Id. at 20–22; Todd Prince, Wynn Resorts Finishes Sexual Harassment Investigation
of Steve Wynn, Las Vegas Rev.-J. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.reviewjournal.com/
business/casinos-gaming/wynn-resorts-finishes-sexual-harassment-investigation-of-steve-wynn/
[https://perma.cc/UA64-NCMP].
291. Prince, supra note 290.
292. Maggie Astor & Julie Creswell, Steve Wynn Resigns from Company amid Sexual
Misconduct Allegations, N.Y. Times (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/
06/business/steve-wynn-resigns.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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The same day as Wynn’s resignation, the Norfolk County Retirement
System, a Massachusetts pension plan that owns shares in Wynn Resorts,
ﬁled a derivative suit in Nevada state court against Wynn, the company’s
general counsel, and the board of directors.293 The suit alleges that
Wynn’s ex-wife, herself a former board member, told “a representative of
the Board” in 2009 about the settlement with the manicurist,294 and that
the board knew about the settlement and other allegations against Wynn
by 2015.295 Nonetheless, board members “failed to act and continued to
support and recommend to the stockholders Mr. Wynn’s continued leadership and compensation,” according to the complaint.296 The pensionplan plaintiff asserted claims of breach of ﬁduciary duty and unjust
enrichment against Wynn himself, the general counsel, and the nine
members of the board.297
Despite the seriousness of the allegations against Wynn and the
board, shareholders face a particularly high hurdle—unlike ICN,
American Apparel, Twenty-First Century Fox, and Liberty Tax, which are
incorporated in Delaware, Wynn Resorts is a Nevada corporation.298
Nevada law is generally considered to be less friendly to shareholderplaintiffs than Delaware law.299 In Nevada, the default rule is that directors and officers of Nevada corporations may be held liable to shareholders only if their behavior was so egregious that it involved both a breach
of ﬁduciary duty and “intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of law.”300 While Wynn’s alleged conduct appears to be both inten293. Wynn Complaint, supra note 21.
294. Id. at 15.
295. Id. at 12.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 34–39. The same law ﬁrm that represents the Norfolk County Retirement
System ﬁled a second derivative action a week later on behalf of a Pennsylvania-based fund
that manages pension plans of construction industry workers. Press Release, Eglet Prince,
Eglet Prince Has Filed a Second Stockholder Derivative Complaint in Las Vegas
Against Steve Wynn and Wynn Resorts Board of Directors (Feb. 16, 2018), https://
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/eglet-prince-has-ﬁled-a-second-stockholder-derivativecomplaint-in-las-vegas-against-steve-wynn-and-wynn-resorts-board-of-directors-300600198.html
[https://perma.cc/A93E-PAZ2].
298. See Wynn Complaint, supra note 21, at 3. Signet Jewelers is incorporated in
Bermuda, which presumably is the reason the plaintiffs in the Signet Jewelers case are
suing under federal securities law (which applies to U.S.-listed companies regardless of
legal domicile) and not bringing a derivative action. See Delian Naydenov, 3 Companies
Calling Bermuda Home, Seeking Alpha (Oct. 17, 2013), https://seekingalpha.com/
article/1751872-3-companies-calling-bermuda-home [https://perma.cc/WAG8-GYKU].
299. See, e.g., Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a LiabilityFree Jurisdiction, 98 Va. L. Rev. 935, 941 (2012); Jens Dammann, How Lax Is Nevada
Corporate Law? A Response to Professor Barzuza, 99 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 1, 10
(2013), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/files/Dammann_
BarzuzaResponse.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZN49-86DV] (disagreeing with Barzuza’s claim
that Nevada is a “liability-free jurisdiction” but acknowledging that Delaware’s approach to
director and officer liability is “more stringent” than Nevada’s).
300. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.138(7) (2017).
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tional and a knowing violation of law, shareholders may have difficulty
establishing the liability of board members who ignored Wynn’s pattern
of harassment or allowed it to continue.
9. Additional Cases. — While this Article was in the late phase of the
editing process, shareholders at four more ﬁrms ﬁled lawsuits alleging
violations of federal securities law and state corporate law in connection
with workplace sexual misconduct. In July 2018, after the Wall Street
Journal reported that former pilots employed by National Beverage Corp.
had accused CEO Nick Caporella of inappropriately touching them on
multiple trips in the cockpit of a corporate jet,301 shareholders sued the
company and Caporella for allegedly making materially false and misleading statements that concealed Caporella’s pattern of harassment.302
The next month, after the New Yorker magazine revealed that six women
had accused CBS Corp. CEO Leslie Moonves of sexual harassment and
intimidation,303 the media conglomerate was hit with a lawsuit in federal
court in New York for securities fraud.304 Days later, a shareholder at the
pizza chain Papa John’s ﬁled a class action against the company, its
founder John Schnatter, and two of its current officers in federal court in
New York alleging similar securities law violations.305 That class action
followed a report in Forbes revealing conﬁdential settlements of at least
two sexual harassment lawsuits ﬁled against Schnatter while he was the
Papa John’s CEO.306 Finally, shareholders at Nike sued the shoemaker
and more than a dozen of its directors and officers in Oregon state court
301. See Jennifer Maloney & Mark Maremont, Billionaire Behind LaCroix Accused of
Improper Touching by Two Pilots, Wall St. J. ( July 3, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/billionaire-behind-lacroix-accused-of-improper-touching-by-two-pilots-1530648681
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
302. See Luczak Complaint, supra note 22 at 3–4, 6–9; Bronstein Press Release, supra
note 22; Pomerantz Press Release, supra note 22.
303. Ronan Farrow, Les Moonves and CBS Face Allegations of Sexual Misconduct,
New Yorker (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/08/06/lesmoonves-and-cbs-face-allegations-of-sexual-misconduct (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review). Moonves resigned a few weeks later. Keach Hagey & Joe Flint, CBS Chief Leslie
Moonves Steps Down Amid Sexual Misconduct Allegations, Wall St. J. (Sept. 9, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cbs-ceo-leslie-moonves-expected-to-resign-1536525335 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
304. See Samit Complaint, supra note 23, at 1–2 (alleging that CBS failed to disclose
that Moonves engaged in sexual harassment despite “purport[ing] to maintain ‘standards
for ethical conduct that are expected of all directors and employees of the Company’” in
its SEC ﬁlings (emphasis omitted)).
305. See Danker Complaint, supra note 24, at 1–2. The complaint alleges that “Papa
John’s executives, including Defendant Schnatter, [] engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment and other inappropriate workplace conduct at the Company” and that, because
the company’s “Code of Ethics” was inadequate to prevent sexual misconduct that would
foreseeably harm the business, “Papa John’s public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.” Id. at 2.
306. Noah Kirsch, The Inside Story of Papa John’s Toxic Culture, Forbes (July 19,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesdigitalcovers/2018/07/19/the-inside-story-ofpapa-johns-toxic-culture [https://perma.cc/6UUM-JE9g].
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for allegedly breaching their ﬁduciary duties by allowing rampant sexual
harassment at the company.307
The early stage of these cases makes any predictions as to their outcomes perilous. What we can say with considerable conﬁdence is that the
National Beverage, CBS, Papa John’s, and Nike lawsuits are unlikely to be
the last of the shareholder actions arising from workplace sexual misconduct at publicly traded companies. In the following section, we turn from
the facts of these already-ﬁled claims to the legal framework that will
determine whether and when shareholder-plaintiffs can prevail.
B.

The Legal Framework

What remedies are available to investors in the wake of sexual misconduct at the ﬁrms in which they own shares? This section takes stock of
the legal tools that shareholder-plaintiffs potentially can utilize. We focus
in particular on the corporate law of Delaware, where more than 66% of
Fortune 500 ﬁrms are incorporated,308 and on federal securities laws
applicable to publicly traded companies.
1. Fiduciary Duties Under Corporate Law. — Corporate ﬁduciaries—the
officers who manage company operations, as well as directors who wield
ﬁnal decisionmaking authority—exercise control over the company on
behalf of the shareholders who are its owners. To protect the owners,
corporate law subjects officers and directors to the ﬁduciary duties of
care and loyalty. If those ﬁduciary duties are violated, shareholders may
band together to bring a derivative suit against the corporation.309
The duty of care mandates that corporate ﬁduciaries exercise
informed business judgment in their stewardship of the company.310
Essentially, the duty of care requires directors and officers to act with
information that is “reasonably available” to them and to “proceed with a
critical eye” in assessing such information in order to protect the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.311 The duty of care does not,
307. See Stein Complaint, supra note 25, at 60–63 (alleging breach of the duty of loyalty, corporate waste, and unjust enrichment due to Nike’s directors’ perpetuation of a
hostile work environment and approval of excessive executive compensation packages).
308. Jeffrey W. Bullock, Sec’y of State, Delaware Division of Corporations 2015
Annual Report 1 (2015), https://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2015%20Annual%
20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2TK-SBCD].
309. Because a derivative suit alleges a harm to the corporation, it belongs to the corporation. As such, the shareholders must ﬁrst make a demand on the directors to take on
the litigation, unless such actions would be futile because of a conﬂict of interest. See
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984). If the shareholders are permitted to
proceed with their action, they will be entitled to reimbursement for the expenses associated with the claim. See Ralph C. Ferrara, Kevin T. Abikoff & Laura Leedy Gansler,
Shareholder Derivative Litigation: Besieging the Board § 14.06 (2005). However, any proceeds from the action will be remitted to the corporation. See id.
310. See Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Deﬁning Role of Good
Faith in Corporation Law, 98 Geo. L.J. 629, 654 & n.76 (2010).
311. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–74 (Del. 1985).
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however, mean that Delaware courts will second-guess every business
decision that directors or officers make. Under the “business judgment
rule,” Delaware courts will defer to any decision that can be attributed to
some rational corporate purpose unless that decision was grossly negligent or made in bad faith.312
In addition, corporations can indemnify directors or officers for
expenses incurred in defending against allegations of the breach of the
duty of care, so long as the director or officer “acted in good faith and in
a manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the
best interests of the corporation.”313 Finally, Delaware (like most other
states314) allows corporations to adopt a charter provision that exculpates
directors from liability for breaches of the duty of care, though Delaware’s
exculpation does not apply to officers.315
The duty of loyalty, by contrast, has traditionally been immutable
under Delaware law.316 The duty of loyalty requires ﬁduciaries to “exercise their authority in a good-faith attempt to advance corporate
purposes.”317 At its core, the duty of loyalty prohibits ﬁduciaries from putting their own interests ahead of those of the shareholders. Decisions
regulated by the duty of loyalty—such as transactions between the company and directors—do not receive business judgment protection.318

312. The business judgment rule is a “presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Aronson, 473 A.2d at
812.
313. Del. Code tit. 8, § 145(a) (2018).
314. See William T. Allen & Reinier Kraakman, Commentaries and Cases on the Law
of Business Organization 229, 246 (5th ed. 2016).
315. See Del. Code tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (empowering corporations to eliminate “the
personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages
for breach of ﬁduciary duty as a director”). Likewise, a corporate officer who is also a
director would not be eligible for exculpation for duty breaches committed as an officer.
Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 686 (Del. Ch. 2014).
316. Two caveats are necessary. First, since 2000, Delaware has granted corporations a
statutory right to waive a crucial part of the duty of loyalty: the corporate opportunities
doctrine. Other states have since followed Delaware’s lead, similarly permitting ﬁrms to
execute “corporate opportunity waivers.” Since inception, hundreds of corporations have
adopted waivers. See Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary
Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 Colum. L.
Rev. 1075, 1079 (2017).
Second, this analysis does not apply to the limited liability corporation (LLC),
which is able to restrict or eliminate officer ﬁduciary duties in its LLC agreement, including the duty of loyalty. See Del. Code tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2018); Auriga Capital Corp. v.
Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 856 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“LLC agreements may displace ﬁduciary duties altogether or tailor their application, by substituting a different form of
review.”).
317. Allen & Kraakman, supra note 314, at 229.
318. See Continuing Creditors’ Comm. of Star Telecomm., Inc. v. Edgecomb, 385 F.
Supp. 2d 449, 462 (D. Del. 2004) (“If a defendant does not breach his duty of loyalty to
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Moreover, the Delaware statute that enables corporations to adopt charter provisions that limit the liability of directors explicitly excludes the
duty of loyalty from its reach.319
Two types of duty of loyalty violations are especially relevant to board
members in cases of corporate sexual misconduct. First, Delaware courts
have explained that “[i]llegal corporate conduct is not loyal corporate
conduct.”320 Thus, a director who “consciously caus[es] the corporation
to violate the law”—say, by enabling sexual harassment that violates Title
VII—thereby breaches the duty of loyalty and “could be forced to answer
for the harm he has caused.”321 To be sure, even this seemingly straightforward rule is uncertain at the edges. The American Law Institute’s
Principles of Corporate Governance suggests that “noncompliance with law
may be justiﬁed under the concept of necessity in extraordinary situations where compliance would inﬂict substantial harm on third parties,
and noncompliance would not.”322 Moreover, a “de minimis” principle
may apply:323 Professor Stephen Bainbridge has observed that “[i]f a
package delivery ﬁrm told its drivers to illegally double-park, so as to
speed up the delivery process, for example, it is hardly clear that liability
should follow.”324
Second, directors can be held liable for breach of the duty of loyalty
when they fail to exercise oversight of a corporation—but only when
their failure is “sustained or systematic.”325 This line of precedent originated from the Delaware Chancery Court’s 1996 decision, In re Caremark

the company, he is permitted to rely on the business judgment rule . . . .” (citing Emerald
Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001))).
319. See Del. Code tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (precluding a corporate charter from eliminating or limiting director liability “[f]or any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the
corporation or its stockholders”). However, a small number of states have departed from
this rule. Nevada, for example, holds itself out as a “liability-free” jurisdiction for managers. See Barzuza, supra note 299, at 947–58. Under Nevada law, the default rule provides
for no liability for a breach of the duty of loyalty absent “intentional misconduct, fraud or
a knowing violation of law.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.138(7) (2017).
320. In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104,
at *20 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011); see also Guttman v. Jen-Hsun Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506
n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[O]ne cannot act loyally as a corporate director by causing the
corporation to violate the positive laws it is obliged to obey.”).
321. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934 (Del. Ch. 2007).
322. Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 2.01 (Am.
Law Inst. 2018).
323. Id.
324. Stephen Bainbridge, Can Directors of Corporations Be Held Liable to Shareholders
when the Corporation Breaks the Law?, ProfessorBainbridge.com (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2015/10/can-directors-ofcorporations-be-held-liable-to-shareholders-when-the-corporation-breaks-the-law.html [https://
perma.cc/VS9J-8H46].
325. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006)
(quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)).
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International Inc. Derivative Litigation.326 In that case, Caremark, a
healthcare corporation, was indicted on various federal charges related
to illegal kickbacks.327 Caremark ultimately pleaded guilty to mail fraud
and paid more than $250 million to settle civil claims arising out of its
alleged kickback scheme.328 Following that litigation, shareholders ﬁled
ﬁve derivative suits against Caremark’s board of directors, seeking to hold
the directors liable for Caremark’s losses. The parties eventually settled,
but in approving the settlement, Chancellor William Allen expounded
on the responsibility of corporate boards: “[L]iability to the corporation
for a loss may be said to arise from an unconsidered failure of the board
to act in circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss.”329 Chancellor Allen concluded that the board of directors has “a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate,
exists,” and furthermore, a “failure [to maintain such a system] under
some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for
losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.”330
Although the ﬁduciary duty at issue in the original Caremark decision
was the duty of care, the Caremark doctrine has since been recast under
the duty of loyalty,331 meaning that such claims are safe from exculpation
under section 102(b)(7).332 This does not mean, however, that it is easy
for plaintiffs to prevail on a Caremark theory: As Chancellor Allen put it, a
claim that directors are subject to personal liability for oversight failures
is “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a
plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”333 To prevail on a Caremark
claim, the plaintiffs must either show “that the directors ‘utterly failed to
implement any reporting or information system or controls,’”334 or “that
the board knew of evidence of corporate misconduct—the proverbial
‘red ﬂag’—yet acted in bad faith by consciously disregarding its duty to
address that misconduct.”335

326. 698 A.2d 959.
327. Id. at 960.
328. Id. at 960–61.
329. Id. at 967 (emphasis omitted).
330. Id. at 970.
331. Guttman v. Jen-Hsun Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“Although the
Caremark decision is rightly seen as a prod towards the greater exercise of care . . . , the
opinion articulates a standard for liability for failures of oversight that requires a showing
that the directors breached their duty of loyalty by failing to attend to their duties in good
faith.”).
332. Del. Code tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2018).
333. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
334. Horman v. Abney, No. 12290-VCS, 2017 WL 242571, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2017)
(quoting Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)).
335. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reiter ex rel. Capital One Fin.
Corp. v. Fairbank, No. 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2016)).
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In addition to problems of proof, a potential plaintiff faces limitations related to standing. Regardless of the form that a derivative action
takes, the suit always must allege a harm to the corporation. As such, the
lawsuit belongs to the corporation. This means that a shareholder will
lack standing to bring a derivative suit unless the shareholder has
demanded that the directors pursue the corporate claim or shows that
demand would be futile.336 The latter path is the most likely to be successful for shareholders, as the board’s decision to litigate the case or let
it fall by the wayside will be respected “[e]xcept in extraordinary cases.”337
Delaware case law provides two different frameworks for assessing
when a plaintiff alleging “demand futility” has standing to assert a derivative claim. The ﬁrst (the Aronson test)338 applies when the derivative suit
challenges a decision made by the same board that would be asked to
consider the plaintiff’s demand.339 The second—announced in Rales v.
Blasband—applies “where the board that would be considering the
demand did not make a business decision which is being challenged in
the derivative suit.”340 This could be the case if: (1) a majority of the
board has been replaced since the time of the decision under attack, (2)
the suit does not attack a speciﬁc decision, or (3) the decision under
attack was made by the board of a different company (for example, prior
to an acquisition).341
To illustrate: Imagine that the board approves the use of corporate
funds to settle a sexual harassment claim against the CEO and that a
majority of the current directors were board members at the time of the
original decision. In this case, Aronson would supply the applicable test
for demand futility. That test is two-pronged, and establishing one prong
will suffice for demand futility.342 The ﬁrst prong asks whether the shareholders’ complaint creates a “reasonable doubt” that “the directors are
disinterested and independent.”343 Delaware courts consult a range of
factors when considering whether directors meet this standard.344 Close

336. See Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 773 (Del. 1990) (citing Del. Ch. Ct. R.
23.1).
337. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990) (summarizing Delaware’s demand doctrine), rev’d on other grounds, 500 U.S. 90 (1991).
338. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814–15 (Del. 1984).
339. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933 (Del. 1993) (“The essential predicate for
the Aronson test is the fact that a decision of the board of directors is being challenged in
the derivative suit.” (emphasis omitted)).
340. Id. at 933–34.
341. Id. at 934.
342. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814–15.
343. Id. at 814.
344. See Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 229 (Del. Ch. 1990) (“[N]o single factor—
such as receipt of directorial compensation; family or social relationships; approval of the
transaction attacked; or other relationships with the corporation (e.g., attorney or
banker)—may itself be dispositive in any particular case.”).
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family connections are generally disqualifying.345 Other ties—including
ﬁnancial entanglements and social relationships—are also relevant to the
judicial inquiry into disinterestedness and independence.346
Aronson’s second prong, as originally articulated, asks whether the
“particularized facts alleged” by the shareholder-plaintiffs create a reasonable doubt that “the challenged transaction was . . . the product of a
valid exercise of business judgment.”347 “In simple terms,” according to
then-Vice Chancellor Strine, this “second prong of Aronson can be said to
fulﬁll two important integrity-assuring functions.”348 One is the concern
that even a “putatively independent” board will exhibit bias against
shareholder-plaintiffs.349 Thus, Aronson allows a derivative action to go
forward if the plaintiff can show “that the board’s decision was so egregious or irrational that it could not have been based on a valid assessment of the corporation’s best interests.”350 This might occur if the board
“intentionally breaks the law,” or “intentionally acts with a purpose other
than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation,” or “intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act.”351 The other concern addressed by Aronson’s second prong is one that arises when “a
derivative suit demand asks directors to authorize a suit against themselves.”352 Thus, the Aronson framework excuses demand when the derivative complaint alleges claims against the directors and “the threat of liability to the directors . . . is sufficiently substantial to cast a reasonable
doubt over their impartiality.”353 When the corporation has adopted a
charter provision pursuant to section 102(b)(7) that exculpates directors
from duty of care liability, demand will be excused if the plaintiffs can
show that a majority of the board “faces a substantial likelihood of liability” for “non-exculpated” (or, duty of loyalty) claims.354
To sum up so far: Aronson asks (1) whether a majority of the directors are “disinterested and independent,” and if so, (2) whether a majority of the directors might nonetheless be disqualiﬁed (a) because the
decision under attack in the derivative suit was especially “egregious or
345. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 937–38 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(Strine, V.C.) (noting that “if two brothers were on a corporate board” and a “derivative
action is ﬁled targeting a transaction involving one of the brothers,” then it is “easy” to
conclude that the other brother would not be “disinterested and independent”).
346. See id. at 938–39.
347. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
348. Guttman v. Jen-Hsun Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 500 (Del. Ch. 2003).
349. See id.
350. Lenois v. Lawal, No. 11963-VCMR, 2017 WL 5289611, at *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7,
2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Panic II, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del.
2001)).
351. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc.
S’holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011)).
352. Guttman, 823 A.2d at 500.
353. Id.
354. See Lenois, 2017 WL 5289611, at *2, *14 (collecting cases).
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irrational,” or (b) because a majority of the directors themselves face a
“substantial likelihood” of liability for nonexculpated claims. But Aronson
applies only when a majority of the current board participated in the
decision being challenged. Thus, if the board approves the use of corporate funds to settle a sexual harassment claim against the CEO but a
majority of the board turns over before a derivative action is ﬁled, Rales
rather than Aronson would govern the question of demand excusal. Likewise, if the derivative complaint alleged a Caremark violation (that is, a
failure to act in the face of red ﬂags), then there would be no speciﬁc
decision under attack, so Rales rather than Aronson would apply.355 The
Rales test involves a “singular inquiry”:356 whether the allegations “create
a reasonable doubt that, as of the time the complaint is ﬁled, the board
of directors could have properly exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand.”357 As a practical
matter, this ends up looking a lot like prongs (1) and (2)(b) of Aronson.
Courts applying the Rales test ask whether a majority of the directors “can
act independently” of the defendants in the derivative action or whether
a majority of the directors “face a ‘substantial likelihood’ of personal
liability.”358 Again, demand will be excused if a majority of the board is
biased by factors such as familial, ﬁnancial, professional, and social ties or
faces a real risk of personal liability for nonexculpated claims.
Finally, even if demand would be excused under the Aronson or Rales
tests, a board nonetheless can cause a derivative action to be dismissed by
using a so-called special litigation committee (SLC) composed of disinterested and independent directors who make up a minority of the
board.359 The SLC must make “an objective and thorough investigation
of the derivative suit,” and if it concludes that the suit should be dismissed, the committee can ﬁle a motion supported by a “thorough written record of the investigation and its ﬁndings and recommendations.”360
If that decision is challenged, the court will engage in a two-step review of
the SLC’s recommendation. At the ﬁrst step, the court will consider
whether the committee “was independent and showed reasonable bases
for good faith ﬁndings and recommendations.”361 While boards generally
enjoy a presumption of independence in the demand-excusal context,
the Delaware Supreme Court has said that “the SLC has the burden of
establishing its own independence by a yardstick that must be ‘like
355. City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Sys. v. Good, 177 A.3d 47, 55 (Del. 2017); Okla.
Fireﬁghters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Corbat, No. 12151-VCG, 2018 WL 1254958, at *2 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 12, 2018).
356. Guttman, 823 A.2d at 501.
357. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993).
358. Guttman, 823 A.2d at 501 (quoting Rales, 634 A.2d at 936).
359. Minor Myers, The Decisions of the Corporate Special Litigation Committees: An
Empirical Investigation, 84 Ind. L.J. 1309, 1310 (2009).
360. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981).
361. Id. at 788–89.
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Caesar’s wife’—‘above reproach.’”362 If the SLC can satisfy this high standard and show that it carried out the required investigation, then the
court will proceed to the second step and decide whether the SLC’s
motion to dismiss should be granted.363 The question for the court at this
second step is “whether the SLC’s recommended result falls within a range
of reasonable outcomes” that a disinterested, independent, and informed
director could accept.364 This second step provides an opportunity for
the court to conduct a substantive review of the SLC’s conclusion and to
keep alive a meritorious derivative suit over the objections of even an
independent SLC.365
2. Securities Law. — Aside from the corporate law of a company’s
state of incorporation, publicly traded companies are governed by federal (as well as state366) securities law. In some instances, federal securities
laws saddle public companies with affirmative duties to disclose certain
information to shareholders.367 Perhaps most signiﬁcantly, section 13(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that every issuer of a
security on a national securities exchange must ﬁle annual reports with
the SEC in accordance with the Commission’s rules and regulations, as
well as ﬁle “such information and documents . . . as the Commission shall
require” in order to keep the issuer’s registration statement “reasonably
current.”368 For present purposes, the most important set of SEC rules
deﬁning the affirmative disclosure duties of public companies is found in
Regulation S-K.369
Even when there is no affirmative duty to disclose, Rule 10b-5 under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it unlawful for a company to
utter “any untrue statement of material fact” in connection with a securities transaction and “to omit to state a material fact” that is necessary to
render another statement “not misleading.”370 An omission is “material,”

362. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040,
1055 (Del. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985)).
363. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 789.
364. In re Primedia, Inc., 67 A.3d 455, 468 (Del. Ch. 2013).
365. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 789.
366. In addition to the SEC, which regulates and enforces the federal securities laws,
each state has its own securities regulator who enforces “blue sky” laws that govern securities sold within each state. See State Securities Regulators, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/answersstatesecreghtm.html [https://perma.cc/7D5M-D26K] (last visited July 27,
2018). Although this Article focuses on federal securities law, we note that states may have
the power to bring actions against securities violators under their own laws. Id.
367. As just one example, Regulation FD requires companies to disclose material information to the public at the same time as it is disclosed to investors. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100
(2018).
368. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012); cf. id. § 78l(a) (requiring a registration for securities to
be traded on national securities exchange).
369. 17 C.F.R. pt. 229.
370. Id. § 240.10b-5 (emphasis added).
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according to the Supreme Court, if “the omitted fact would have assumed
actual signiﬁcance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.”371
The distinction between a Regulation S-K violation and a Rule 10b-5
violation is meaningful for enforcement purposes. The SEC can bring an
enforcement action under either Regulation S-K or Rule 10b-5, but circuits are split as to whether there is a private right of action for a
Regulation S-K violation.372 By contrast, the Supreme Court has recognized a private right of action under Rule 10b-5,373 meaning that
investors can recover damages from public companies and individual
officers for violations of the rule.374 To be sure, there are still high hurdles to recovery under Rule 10b-5: Among others, a Rule 10b-5 plaintiff
will always have to prove that the defendant acted “with a wrongful state
of mind,”375 and in her complaint must “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind.”376 As we shall see, there may be circumstances in which a
Regulation S-K violation also gives rise to a Rule 10b-5 violation, though
it is clear that not every Regulation S-K violation can support a private
action.
A number of affirmative disclosure obligations under Regulation S-K
are conceivably relevant to companies facing sexual harassment claims.
For example, Item 103 of Regulation S-K mandates disclosure of “any
material legal proceedings” currently pending against a company, as well
as “any such proceedings known to be contemplated by governmental
authorities.”377 However, several courts have held that Item 103 does not
371. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 50 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). The materiality
standard is often assessed relative to the size of the ﬁrm. See George S. Georgiev, Too Big
to Disclose: Firm Size and Materiality Blindspots in Securities Regulation, 64 UCLA L. Rev.
602, 625–27 (2017). Thus, for large ﬁrms, the materiality threshold is much higher. Id.
This standard therefore provides a safety net for companies that fail to disclose information that would certainly rise to the level of materiality at smaller ﬁrms, leading to
“materiality blindspots.” Id.
372. See Srebnik v. Dean, No. 05-cv-01086-WYD-MJW, 2006 WL 2790408, at *2–3 (D.
Colo. Sept. 26, 2006) (collecting cases); Linda L. Griggs, John J. Huber & Christian J. Mixter,
When Rules Collide—Leidos, the Supreme Court, and the Risk to the MD&A, Bloomberg L.
(Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.bna.com/rules-collideleidos-supreme-n73014470276 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (overviewing the statutory and regulatory scheme).
373. Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971).
374. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientiﬁc-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165 (2008)
(reaffirming the private right of action).
375. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005).
376. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012).
377. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2018). Relatedly, accounting rules require the disclosure of
any “loss contingency”—“an existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible gain (gain contingency) or loss (loss contingency) to an
entity that will ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur or fail to
occur.” See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Contingencies (Topic 450): Disclosure of
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require a company to disclose the mere fact that it is under investigation
by federal and state authorities,378 although misleading statements about
the investigation are of course actionable under Rule 10b-5.379 Moreover,
Regulation S-K speciﬁcally states that “[n]o information need be given
with respect to any proceeding that involves primarily a claim for damages if the amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs, does not
exceed 10[%] of the current assets” of the company and its subsidiaries.380
An aggregation rule requires companies to count all proceedings that
“present[] in large degree the same legal and factual issues” toward that
10% threshold,381 but even so, the 10% rule means that most damages
claims against large publicly traded companies will not need to be
disclosed under Item 103.
Item 303 of Regulation S-K imposes a broader—and more amorphous—disclosure duty on public companies. It requires disclosure of,
among other information, “any known trends or uncertainties that have
had or that the [company] reasonably expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations.”382 This expansive disclosure mandate has been the
source of much litigation and is now the subject of an important circuit
split. The Second Circuit has held that a public company’s failure to
make an Item 303 disclosure of a material fact can give rise to liability
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,383 because “[d]ue to the obligatory
nature” of Regulation S-K, “a reasonable investor would interpret the
absence of an Item 303 disclosure to imply the nonexistence of ‘known
trends or uncertainties . . . that the registrant reasonably expects will
have a material . . . unfavorable impact on . . . revenues or income from
continuing operations.’”384 On this view, the omission of material trends
Certain Loss Contingencies 52 (2010), https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_
C/DocumentPage?cid=1176157116458&acceptedDisclaimer=true [https://perma.cc/B6VUHEM8]. Pending or threatened litigation is one example and must be disclosed if it can
result in a “material loss.” Id. at 50–54.
378. See City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. MetLife, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 2d 705,
718 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (ﬁnding no obligation to disclose the fact that authorities in approximately thirty states are investigating an insurance company for violating unclaimed property laws); Richman v. Goldman Sachs Grp., 868 F. Supp. 2d 261, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding no obligation to disclose an SEC “Wells Notice” informing a company that the agency
may bring a civil action); see also David M. Stuart & David A. Wilson, Disclosure Obligations
Under the Federal Securities Laws in Government Investigations, 64 Bus. Law. 973, 982
(2009) (“An investigation on its own is not a ‘pending legal proceeding’ until it reaches a
stage when the agency or prosecutorial authority makes known that it is contemplating
ﬁling suit or bringing charges.”).
379. See Menaldi v. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp., 164 F. Supp. 3d 568, 584 (S.D.N.Y.
2016).
380. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103.
381. Id.
382. Id. § 229.303.
383. Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 101–04 (2d Cir. 2015).
384. Id. at 102 (alterations in original) (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii)).
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or uncertainties from an Item 303 disclosure makes the rest of the company’s annual report misleading. The Ninth Circuit has rejected this view
and held that a company’s failure to comply with Item 303 is not actionable under Rule 10b-5.385 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
March 2017 to resolve this split,386 but dismissed the case after the parties
informed the Court they had reached a settlement.387 In the meantime,
uncertainty regarding the consequences of Item 303 noncompliance
lingers.
Finally, Item 402 under Regulation S-K requires each public company to publish details on compensation paid to its CEO, CFO, and the
three other most highly paid individuals.388 The required disclosure
includes “perquisites,”389 and the SEC has a history of investigating and
charging companies that fail to disclose perquisites and beneﬁts for top
executives. For example, in 2004, General Electric (GE) settled SEC
charges after divorce papers revealed that GE’s former CEO Jack Welch
had received perquisites and beneﬁts—including a luxury Manhattan
apartment, a chauffeured limousine, and unlimited access to a GE aircraft for personal use—far in excess of those disclosed to GE’s shareholders.390 In April 2005, the SEC sued Tyson Foods, as well as the company’s CEO Don Tyson, for its failure to disclose various perquisites
Tyson received, including the personal use of company-owned homes in
the English countryside and on the western coast of Mexico as well as
oriental rugs, expensive antiques, and free lawn care.391 In settling those
charges, the SEC required Don Tyson to reimburse the company for over
$1 million in expenses.392 A year later, in April 2006, Tyco International
reached a settlement with the SEC for, among other things, its failure to
disclose lavish perquisites it had given to its CEO, Dennis Kozlowski,
including a $6,000 shower curtain and a $15,000 “dog umbrella stand.”393

385. In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1054–56 (9th Cir. 2014).
386. Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017) (mem.).
387. Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 138 S. Ct. 2670 (2018) (mem.); see also Andrew
Chung, U.S. Top Court Drops Leidos Contracting Fraud Case After Settlement, Reuters
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-securities/u-s-top-courtdrops-leidos-contracting-fraud-case-after-settlement-idUSKBN1CM2C0 [https://perma.cc/
CY6J-HBNG].
388. Executive Compensation, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2018).
389. Id.
390. Press Release, SEC, General Electric Settles SEC Action for Disclosure Failures in
Connection with Its Former CEO’s Benefits Under His Employment and Retirement
Agreement (Sept. 23, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-135.htm [https://
perma.cc/QMK5-LZTB].
391. Deborah Solomon, In SEC Complaint, Tale of Chicken Mogul Feathering His
Nest, Wall St. J. (Apr. 29, 2005), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB111470683583119695
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
392. Id.
393. Press Release, SEC, SEC Brings Settled Charges Against Tyco International Ltd.
Alleging Billion Dollar Accounting Fraud (Apr. 17, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/

2018]

SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND CORPORATE LAW

1639

In response to these and other high-proﬁle enforcement actions, the
SEC signiﬁcantly expanded the perquisite disclosure requirement by
lowering the threshold that triggers disclosure from $50,000 to
$10,000.394 The SEC also mandated a new table to identify and quantify
any perquisite exceeding $10,000.395 But while a failure to disclose a perquisite in excess of $10,000 would violate Item 402, it is not clear that this
would lead to liability under Rule 10b-5 (and thus, a private right of
action for investors). Recall that Rule 10b-5 applies to material facts and
omissions.396 Thus, the fact that a company gave its CEO a $20,000 oriental rug would need to be disclosed under Item 402, but without other
damning facts, it would be difficult to show that the company’s failure to
reveal that fact would be material to shareholders and potential investors.
However, Rule 10b-5 also governs other types of public statements,
even those that are voluntary. For example, Apple became the subject of
an SEC investigation after its then-CEO, Steve Jobs, told the public in
January 2009 that his gaunt appearance was the result of a hormone
imbalance, whose remedy would be “relatively simple and straightforward.”397 That disclosure, which most likely was not mandated by SEC
rules,398 drove Apple’s stock price up by 4%. Nine days later, Jobs characterized his health problem as “more complex” and publicly announced
that he would take ﬁve months off to recover,399 and in April 2009, Jobs
underwent a liver transplant that he initially kept secret.400 These events
prompted the SEC to open an investigation to determine whether the
January 5 statements were misleading.401 The SEC probe did not yield
charges against Apple or against Jobs, who died of cancer in 2011,402 and
press/2006/2006-58.htm [https://perma.cc/2Z6Q-LQCY]; Tyco Int’l, Current Report (Form
8-K) (Sept. 10, 2002).
394. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158,
53,176 (Nov. 7, 2006) (codiﬁed at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228–229).
395. Id.
396. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
397. Nicholas Carlson, Steve Jobs’ Health Likely Caused Him to Skip Macworld, Bus.
Insider ( Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.businessinsider.com/2009/1/steve-jobs-addresses-hishealth-in-open-letter-aapl [https://perma.cc/ZR9S-GV8K].
398. See Patricia Sánchez Abril & Ann M. Olazábal, The Celebrity CEO: Corporate
Disclosure at the Intersection of Privacy and Securities Law, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 1545, 1590–
604 (2010) (examining whether securities law requires CEOs to disclose personal information and concluding that “securities law does not operate to require most personal
CEO disclosures”).
399. Nicholas Carlson, SEC Investigates Apple, Jobs, Bus. Insider (July 8, 2009), http://
www.businessinsider.com/apple-steve-jobs-undergo-sec-investigation-2009-7 [https://perma.cc/
8TMV-ZSXK].
400. Yukari Iwatani Kane & Joann S. Lublin, Jobs Had Liver Transplant, Wall St. J.
(June 20, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124546193182433491 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
401. See Carlson, supra note 399.
402. See Walter Isaacson, Steve Jobs 481 (2015) (noting that “[t]he SEC investigation
ended up going nowhere”).
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it is not clear whether Apple or Jobs was fully aware of Jobs’s health problems at the time of his initial statement. The episode nonetheless illustrates that a public company puts itself at risk of liability under federal
securities laws if it makes untrue or incomplete statements about its CEO
that mislead investors into thinking that the CEO will remain in that post
much longer than is indeed likely.
In some circuits, courts interpret Rule 10b-5 to impose liability not
only for statements that are false and misleading at the time that they are
made but also for those that have become misleading over time. For
example, the Second Circuit has said that a “duty to update opinions and
projections may arise” under Rule 10b-5 “if the original opinions or projections have become misleading as the result of intervening events,”
though that court cautioned that the duty depends upon whether the
prior statements are “deﬁnite” or merely aspirational.403 In one Second
Circuit case, a company that had contracted with the U.S. Postal Service
announced that it had reached an “agreement in principle” with the
Postal Service to amend its contract, but the company did not correct
that disclosure once it became clear that the Postal Service would not
accede to the amendment.404 The Second Circuit held that the company
could be held liable under Rule 10b-5 and allowed a shareholder lawsuit
to proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage.405
Other courts have acknowledged a duty to update under limited
conditions. For example, the Third Circuit has held that the duty to
update applies in “narrow circumstances” involving “fundamental corporate changes such as mergers, takeovers, or liquidations, as well as when
subsequent events produce an ‘extreme’ or ‘radical change’ in the continuing validity of the original statement.”406 By contrast, the Seventh
Circuit maintains that there is no “duty to update” a “forward-looking
statement” that “because of subsequent events becomes untrue.”407
To sum up so far: Publicly traded companies can be held liable to
investors for untrue statements of material fact and for material omissions. These companies also face affirmative duties to disclose under
Regulation S-K, but the failure to comply with that regulation will not
always lead to liability to investors. Publicly traded companies are also
subject to a “duty to update” in some—but not all—jurisdictions. The
following section discusses how these obligations and principles of state
corporate law intersect with sexual harassment cases.

403. In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993).
404. Ill. State Bd. of Inv. v. Authentidate Holding Corp., 369 F. App’x 260, 263 (2d Cir.
2010).
405. Id. at 263, 265.
406. City of Edinburgh Council v. Pﬁzer, Inc., 754 F.3d 159, 176 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 170 (3d Cir. 2010)).
407. Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1995).
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The Potential for Liability

Under what circumstances will the legal framework outlined above
support successful shareholder actions against corporations and corporate ﬁduciaries following revelations of sexual misconduct? The answer
varies across four categories of shareholder claims. First and most
straightforwardly, ﬁduciaries violate the duty of loyalty when they engage
in harassment themselves.408 Second, corporate ﬁduciaries who fail to
monitor harassment at their ﬁrms may be liable in certain circumstances
under a Caremark theory.409 Third, corporate ﬁduciaries who are aware of
harassment but fail to react—or who affirmatively enable harassment to
continue—may be sued for breach of the duties of care and loyalty,
though this is perhaps the category in which the doctrinal case for liability is weakest.410 Fourth and ﬁnally, corporations and their officers and
directors face potential liability under the federal securities statutes when
they make inaccurate or misleading statements regarding workplace
sexual misconduct.411 In this section, we discuss the factors that determine whether courts will find defendants liable under each of these
theories.
1. Corporate Fiduciary as Harasser. — Our analysis begins with perhaps
the most obvious claim: an action against a corporate ﬁduciary who
engages in misconduct himself or herself. The Weinstein case is the most
widely publicized (and among the most egregious) examples of the corporate ﬁduciary as harasser, but Weinstein is not alone in this regard.412
The cases of Mark Hurd at Hewlett-Packard, Dov Charney at American
Apparel, and—more recently—Travis Kalanick at Uber, Roger Ailes at
Fox News, Mark Light at Signet Jewelers, John Hewitt at Liberty Tax, and
Steve Wynn of the Wynn Resorts casino chain all appear to fall within this
ﬁrst category. As we shall see, the corporate-ﬁduciary-as-harasser fact
pattern will be the one in which liability is most likely.
Whether framed as a violation of the duty of care that lies outside
the protections of the business judgment rule or as a violation of the duty
of loyalty, sexual harassment by a corporate officer almost certainly constitutes a breach of ﬁduciary duty. When a ﬁduciary “intentionally acts
with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation,”413 the ﬁduciary’s bad-faith conduct can be the basis for liability. And a CEO or other corporate officer who uses a position of power to
harass, intimidate, or assault employees clearly acts for a purpose other

408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.

See discussion supra notes 316–321 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 325–335 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 309–335 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 366–407 and accompanying text.
See supra section II.A.
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).
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than that of advancing the company’s interests.414 The consequences for
the ﬁrm go well beyond the risk of liability: Sexual harassment in the
workplace potentially damages employee morale, drives talented individuals away from the ﬁrm, and endangers the company’s reputation.415
One daunting obstacle remains, however. As noted above, a shareholder-plaintiff bringing a derivative action must show demand futility or
else must allow the board to decide whether to bring suit.416 When the
allegation is that an officer violated his ﬁduciary duty by committing sexual harassment, the shareholder derivative action challenges the conduct
of the officer rather than a decision of the board, and so Rales rather
than Aronson supplies the applicable framework for evaluating demand
futility.417 Under Rales, demand will be excused if shareholders can show
that a majority of the board is not disinterested and independent or if it
can show that board members face a substantial likelihood of personal
liability (for example, on account of Caremark violations arising from a
failure to monitor a sexual-harasser CEO).418 The pension-fund plaintiff
in the Twenty-First Century Fox case pursued both approaches,419 and
the plaintiffs in the Liberty Tax and Wynn lawsuits are following the same
two-pronged strategy.420 Insofar as plaintiffs seek to show lack of independence, the outcome of the demand-excusal inquiry will depend on company- and director-speciﬁc factors that are no different in the sexual harassment context than in any other. Insofar as plaintiffs seek to show a
substantial likelihood of director liability, then the question of demand
excusal in corporate-ﬁduciary-as-harasser cases will overlap with the questions of director liability in the corporate-ﬁduciary-as-monitor and corporate-ﬁduciary-as-enabler contexts. We turn ﬁrst to the failure-to-monitor
line of argument and then consider when and whether corporate ﬁduciaries might be held liable for enabling harassment to occur at their
companies.

414. While we know of no Delaware precedent precisely on point, a state appellate
court in Massachusetts has concluded that an officer’s sexual harassment of an employee
can constitute a breach of ﬁduciary duty. See Prozinski v. Ne. Real Estate Servs., 797 N.E.2d
415, 423–24 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that when an officer “allegedly embarked on a
course of sexual harassment of [a] receptionist,” his “placement of his own interests above
those of the company he served could be found by a fact ﬁnder to constitute an act of
disloyalty”).
415. Eliza Anyangwe, Sexual Harassment: The Hidden Costs for Employers, Fin. Times
(Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/af64eea0-207f-11e8-8d6c-a1920d9e946f (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); see also Barry S. Roberts & Richard A. Mann, Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace: A Primer, 29 Akron L. Rev. 269, 271–72 (1996).
416. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
417. See supra notes 338–341 and accompanying text.
418. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993).
419. Murdoch Complaint, supra note 18, at 52–65.
420. Liberty Tax Complaint, supra note 20, at 22–25; Wynn Complaint, supra note 21, at
23–33.
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2. Corporate Fiduciary as (Failed) Monitor. — Under some circumstances, shareholders may be able to hold directors liable under a
Caremark theory for failing to monitor sexual harassment at their ﬁrms.
Since Caremark claims now sound in the duty of loyalty, exculpation
clauses enacted pursuant to section 102(b)(7) would not immunize
directors, making the Caremark line of argument especially appealing for
plaintiffs.421 Moreover, a substantial likelihood of Caremark liability will
render a director conﬂicted for purposes of evaluating demand futility.
Thus, Caremark claims against directors can enable shareholders to pursue derivative actions against CEOs or other officers who engage in harassment themselves.
While Caremark claims rarely succeed, the Weinstein Company directors’ conduct is one of the few situations in which Caremark liability
would be likely if shareholders were to sue. In October 2017, eighty-seven
women—all of whom were employees or potential employees of the
Weinstein Company—came forward with allegations of sexual misconduct against Weinstein, the Company’s CEO.422 The alleged incidents
extended as far back as 1984, and many came after Weinstein and his
brother Bob broke away from Miramax Films in 2005 and founded the
Weinstein Company.423 Several of the accusations resulted in legal settlements in which Weinstein’s accusers agreed to conﬁdentiality clauses that
barred them from speaking about their experiences.424 Immediately after
the allegations came to light, the board professed ignorance, saying that
the allegations came as an “utter surprise.”425
Delaware courts have said that Caremark liability may arise when “red
ﬂags . . . are either waved in one’s face or displayed so that they are visible to the careful observer.”426 For the Weinstein Company board, red
ﬂags ﬂew all around. Harvey Weinstein’s unwanted sexual advances had
become such an “open secret” in the entertainment industry that the
television show 30 Rock joked about Weinstein’s misconduct in a 2012
episode427 and the comedian Seth MacFarlane alluded to Weinstein’s

421. See supra notes 331–335 and accompanying text.
422. Lila Thulin, A Complete List of Sexual Assault and Harassment Allegations Against
Harvey Weinstein, Slate (Oct. 31, 2017), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2017/10/
10/a_list_of_sexual_assault_and_harassment_allegations_against_harvey_weinstein.html
[https://perma.cc/H2EK-45JL].
423. See Daniel Hemel & Dorothy Lund, It May Not Matter What the Weinstein
Company Knew, Atlantic (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2017/10/harvey-weinstein-company-legal-consequences/542838 [https://perma.cc/2BLECZRY].
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 19827, 2003 WL 21384599, at *2 (Del.
Ch. June 5, 2003), aff’d sub nom. Rabinovitz v. Shapiro, 839 A.2d 666 (Del. 2003).
427. See Jacob Stolworthy, 30 Rock Joke Referenced Harvey Weinstein Allegations in
2012, Independent (Oct. 11, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/
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behavior at the Oscars the following year.428 A female executive
circulated a memo in 2015 that, according to the New York Times,
informed directors that Weinstein had created a “toxic environment for
women” at the company.429 Board members also reportedly approved a
contract with Weinstein in 2015 that expressly contemplated the
possibility of further claims against the producer and protected him from
termination—all without dipping into his personnel ﬁle themselves.430 In
other words, the board’s statement professing ignorance in the face of
serious red ﬂags only strengthens a potential Caremark claim, as it
indicates that the board failed for years to respond to warning signs
indicating that Weinstein posed a serious risk to employees and the
company.
Why has a shareholder suit not come, in spite of the strength of the
facts supporting the Caremark claim? The likely answer is that the
Weinstein Company is a Delaware LLC, which means that the company
can waive ﬁduciary duties for officers and directors in the operating
agreement.431 Because these documents need not be made public, we
cannot be sure whether the Weinstein Company has adopted a waiver,
nor can we know exactly how often LLCs choose to waive such duties.
What we can say is that the rise in LLCs and other “uncorporations” may
affect the availability of the shareholder suit as a tool for redress following harassment allegations.432
For Delaware corporations like Twenty-First Century Fox, however,
the duty of loyalty is unwaivable. And the allegations in the Fox News
complaint, if substantiated, strongly indicate that shareholders would
prevail in their Caremark claim on the grounds that the board failed to
respond to red ﬂags indicating that a toxic work environment existed at
the news network. These red ﬂags include a 2004 sexual harassment lawnews/harvey-weinstein-sexual-assault-allegations-30-rock-reference-tina-fey-jenna-entourageoscars-a7995091.html [https://perma.cc/JHV6-4SYR].
428. Maya Oppenheim, Seth MacFarlane Made Joke About Harvey Weinstein and
Women at 2013 Oscars, Independent (Oct. 11, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/
arts-entertainment/ﬁlms/news/seth-macfarlane-harvey-weinstein-joke-oscars-2013-womensexual-harassment-allegations-a7994506.html [https://perma.cc/4DTK-SNES].
429. Jodi Kantor & Meghan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment
Accusers for Decades, N.Y. Times (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/
05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
430. See Harvey Weinstein’s Contract Allowed for Sexual Harassment, supra note 138.
431. See supra note 316.
432. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation 1 (2010) (using
the term “uncorporation” to refer to forms of business other than corporations, principally general or limited partnerships and LLCs, and considering the importance of their
increasing popularity); Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An
Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the
United States Between 2004–2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002–2006, 15
Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 459, 459–60 (2010) (reviewing the number of LLCs formed
each year between 2004 and 2007 and concluding that the LLC “is now undeniably the
most popular form of new business entity in the United States”).
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suit by a Fox News producer against anchor Bill O’Reilly;433 a 2006 settlement of an EEOC lawsuit against a Fox vice president;434 a 2011 settlement of a sexual harassment lawsuit against Ailes by a former
employee;435 and a 2014 biography of Ailes, The Loudest Voice in the Room,
which included multiple accounts of sexual harassment perpetrated by
Ailes.436 But despite these and other red ﬂags, there is no evidence that
the board investigated or responded to sexual harassment issues at the
company until former anchor Gretchen Carlson sued Ailes in July
2016.437 Although the settlement of the shareholder derivative action
prevented the court from resolving loyalty claims against Fox ﬁduciaries,
the board’s failure to monitor its CEO and employees in its most
important business units, implement sexual harassment prevention protocols, and investigate red ﬂags might well have been sufficient for liability under Caremark.438
To be sure, not every case of sexual harassment by a corporate
officer will lead to Caremark liability for directors. While the plaintiff in
White v. Panic chose not to pursue a Caremark theory,439 the Chancery
Court nonetheless noted that a Caremark claim would not have been possible because the board had indeed responded to the CEO’s harassment.440 Among other steps, the board formed a special committee in
1995 to review sexual harassment claims against the CEO and hired out-

433. Emily Steel & Michael S. Schmidt, Bill O’Reilly Thrives at Fox News, Even as Harassment Settlements Add Up, N.Y. Times (Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
04/01/business/media/bill-oreilly-sexual-harassment-fox-news.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). The company also protected O’Reilly from termination because of
sexual harassment, specifying that termination for harassment was “expressly limited to a
ﬁnal, non-appealable judgment by a court of law ﬁnding that Performer sexually harassed
an employee of Fox.” This contractual protection meant that when O’Reilly was ﬁnally
ﬁred, he was entitled to a $25 million severance payment. See Murdoch Complaint, supra
note 18, at 31, 44.
434. Fox News Agrees to Settlement of Sex Discrimination Suit, Wash. Post (Aug. 1, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/31/AR2006073101122.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
435. Emily Jane Fox, Report: Fox News Allegedly Paid $13.5 Million Settlement to
Woman Claiming Roger Ailes Sexually Harassed Her, Vanity Fair (July 29, 2016), https://
www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/07/fox-news-allegedly-paid-dollar315-million-to-womanroger-ailes-sexually-harassed-her [https://perma.cc/E75Z-6M62].
436. See Emily Crockett, Here Are the Women Who Have Publicly Accused Roger Ailes
of Sexual Harassment, Vox (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/8/15/12416662/
roger-ailes-fox-sexual-harassment-women-list [https://perma.cc/2C43-MGXH].
437. See Murdoch Complaint, supra note 18, at 5.
438. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 362 (Del.
2006); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 654–55 (Del. Ch. 2008).
439. See Panic II, 783 A.2d 543, 551–52 (Del. 2001) (“Although the derivative complaint includes allegations that seem designed to support a ‘failure to supervise’ claim, the
plaintiff has elected not to pursue such a claim in the Court of Chancery or in this Court.”
(footnote omitted)).
440. See Panic I, 793 A.2d 356, 371 (Del. Ch. 2000), aff’d, 783 A.2d 543 (Del. 2001).
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side counsel to investigate the allegations.441 Whether or not those steps
were adequate, they amount to more than the “utter failure” of oversight
that characterizes a Caremark violation.442
Even more troubling from a potential plaintiff’s perspective is the
rejection of Caremark liability in the American Apparel case. Recall that
CEO Dov Charney’s sexual misconduct was well documented many years
before the EEOC’s 2010 ﬁnding against the company.443 Charney’s masturbation in front of a female journalist had been reported in the New
York Times as early as 2006.444 But the district court in the American Apparel
case concluded that “the bare allegation that Charney’s sexual proclivities were widely known [was] insufficient to support a lack of oversight
claim.”445 The fact that these allegations were supported by “multiple
sources”—including articles in reputable newspapers—apparently left
the court unmoved.446
Only six years have elapsed since American Apparel, so it is difficult to
dismiss the case as an artifact of a bygone era. The judge in that case,
Margaret Morrow, a Clinton appointee, was the ﬁrst female president of
the State Bar of California,447 and it would be presumptuous to claim that
she was insensitive to the plight of women in the workplace. Even so, societal attitudes toward allegations of sexual harassment have changed dramatically in the short time since that case was decided.448 We expect that
a court confronted with the same facts today would consider the reports
of Charney’s masturbation in front of a female journalist as well as the
series of sexual harassment claims against him and the company to be
just the sort of “red ﬂags” that require a board to investigate further. The
fact that Twenty-First Century Fox chose not to contest the claims against
its board members—and that Twenty-First Century Fox’s insurer agreed
to pay out on these claims—arguably indicates that sophisticated actors
share our impression of the viability of Caremark claims in a postWeinstein world.
3. Corporate Fiduciary as Enabler. — Aside from arguing that board
members have breached their ﬁduciary duties by failing to monitor sexu441. Id. at 368.
442. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
443. See supra notes 205–209 and accompanying text.
444. See Holson, supra note 207.
445. In re Am. Apparel Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. CV 10-06576 MMM (RCx),
2012 WL 9506072, at *29 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012).
446. See id. at *28–34.
447. See Henry Weinstein, 2 Lawyers Urged for Federal Bench, L.A. Times (Sept. 23,
1995), http://articles.latimes.com/1995-09-23/local/me-48941_1_los-angeles-lawyers [https://
perma.cc/SZV6-Q2F2].
448. See Chris Jackson, Ipsos, American Attitudes on Sexual Assault 1 (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2017-12/npr_sexual_
harassment_topline_12_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8MG-MHZM] (finding that “[t]hree
quarters of Americans (74%) say that ﬁve years ago, a woman who reported being sexually
harassed was risking her career, but only 44% agree that is the case now”).
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al misconduct, shareholders may also attack the board for enabling harassment to continue. We can foresee at least two scenarios in which such
claims might arise: when the board approves contract terms that protect
a CEO or corporate officer from the consequences of sexual misconduct
and when the board approves the use of corporate funds to settle sexual
harassment claims or to indemnify the perpetrator.
Start with the scenario in which board members approve provisions
in the contracts of CEOs and corporate officers that shield those individuals from the consequences of sexual misconduct. Such provisions arguably existed in the extension of Harvey Weinstein’s contract, which was
approved by the Weinstein Company’s board in 2015. According to a
complaint ﬁled by the New York State Attorney General in an effort to
block the Weinstein Company’s sale, the contract extension permitted
the board to terminate Weinstein for violating the company’s code of
conduct only if the violation was “willful” and both a majority of the
board and Weinstein’s brother and co-CEO, Bob Weinstein, determined
that the misconduct had “caused serious harm to the company.”449 The
contract extension also imposed escalating penalties on Weinstein that
would apply if the company had to make a payment arising from his
misconduct, but no such penalties if Weinstein bore the cost of such a
claim himself.450 According to the New York State Attorney General, the
contract extension effectively allowed Weinstein to “continue engaging
in sexual harassment and misconduct with impunity, provided that he
paid the costs of any settlements” (and provided that he complied with
certain conﬁdentiality provisions in the agreement).451
Could a shareholder successfully argue that the board’s approval of
such a contract constitutes a breach of ﬁduciary duty? Recall that duty of
care claims against directors will likely be subject to exculpation under
section 102(b)(7).452 In most cases, therefore, shareholder-plaintiffs will
be better off pursuing a duty of loyalty claim. We can imagine two paths
that a shareholder-plaintiff might take in this scenario. The ﬁrst—and
least promising—is to argue that by approving the contract, the board
449. Petition at 30, People v. Weinstein Co., No. 450293/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. ﬁled Feb.
11, 2018), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/weinstein_company.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YGH2-DCJV].
450. Id. at 31.
451. Id. In a surprising coda to the Weinstein case, New York State Attorney General
Eric Schneiderman, who brought the lawsuit seeking to stop the Weinstein Company’s
sale, was himself accused of sexual assault by four women in May 2018 and resigned hours
later. See Danny Hakim & Vivian Wang, Eric Schneiderman Resigns as New York
Attorney General amid Assault Claims by 4 Women, N.Y. Times (May 7, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/05/07/nyregion/new-york-attorney-general-eric-schneidermanabuse.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Jane Mayer & Ronan Farrow, Four
Women Accuse New York’s Attorney General of Physical Abuse, New Yorker (May 7, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/four-women-accuse-new-yorks-attorneygeneral-of-physical-abuse (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
452. See supra notes 312–315 and accompanying text.
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consciously caused the company to violate the law.453 Remember that
under the alter ego doctrine, sexual harassment by a corporate officer is
imputed to the employer;454 thus, Weinstein’s sexual harassment caused
the company to be in violation of Title VII. The challenge would be to
show that the board—by approving the contractual provision described
in the New York State Attorney General’s complaint—consciously caused
Weinstein to commit sexual harassment. This may stretch the bounds of
the concept of causation too far. However, a shareholder-plaintiff may be
able prevail nonetheless by showing that the directors’ business strategy
purposefully skirted the law. If the board made the determination that a
top executive was harassing employees but that the best course of action
for the company was to deliver contractual protections that would allow
the harasser to continue his or her illegal behavior, that conduct would
almost certainly constitute the kind of conscious violation of Title VII
necessary to sustain a Caremark claim.455
The second and related line of argument returns to the Caremark
standard but this time focuses on the ﬁrst prong: that “the directors
utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls.”456 For example, the Weinstein Company board effectively ceded its
ability to control Weinstein’s conduct to the producer’s brother, who had
veto power over any decision to ﬁre the producer for misconduct. To be
sure, the strict formalist might argue that the board did not fail to implement any controls, as control by the producer’s brother—himself a board
member—still amounted to some control. But while it does not ﬁt neatly
into the typical Caremark fact pattern, the Weinstein case might well constitute the sort of utter failure of oversight that Caremark covers.
A second scenario in which shareholders might seek to hold board
members liable for enabling sexual misconduct arises when the board
approves the use of corporate funds to settle sexual harassment claims
against a CEO or other officers without demanding that the officer reimburse the ﬁrm. For example, ICN allegedly paid $3.5 million to settle
eight sexual harassment lawsuits against CEO Milan Panic and guaranteed a bank loan to Panic so that he could settle a paternity suit brought
by a former employee.457 American Apparel reportedly paid more than
$3 million to settle claims involving CEO Dov Charney.458 Twenty-First

453. See supra notes 320–321.
454. See supra notes 111–116 and accompanying text.
455. See In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *20 (Del. Ch.
May 31, 2011) (“Delaware law does not charter law breakers. . . . [A] fiduciary of a
Delaware corporation cannot be loyal to a Delaware corporation by knowingly causing it to
seek proﬁt by violating the law.”).
456. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
457. Panic II, 783 A.2d 543, 548 & n.7 (Del. 2001).
458. See Lauren Weber, American Apparel Ordered to Pay Over $3 Million in
Arbitration, Wall St. J. ( June 9, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/american-apparel-
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Century Fox allegedly paid more than $55 million to settle sexual harassment and discrimination claims against Roger Ailes and other Fox
News executives.459 The board of online lender SoFi appears to have
approved a $75,000 settlement paid to a departing female employee who
received sexually explicit text messages from Mike Cagney, but the board
kept Cagney as CEO for roughly ﬁve more years.460 In cases such as those,
shareholders might argue that board members breached their ﬁduciary
duty of care by allowing the CEO—in effect—to expend corporate funds
in pursuit of personal gratiﬁcation.
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in White v. Panic, however,
casts doubt on the viability of such claims. There, the court said that “the
plaintiff has not pleaded facts indicating that the challenged settlements
were anything other than routine business decisions in the interest of the
corporation.”461 Instead, “the alleged settlements, in which neither Panic
nor ICN admitted wrongdoing, are consistent with a desire to be rid of
strike suits and to avoid the cost of protracted litigation.”462 Accordingly,
the court concluded that the plaintiff in White had failed to rebut the
business judgment presumption applicable to his duty of care claims
against ICN’s directors (and thus could not get beyond the demand
requirement in order to bring a claim against Panic).463 That decision is
particularly ominous for shareholder-plaintiffs in cases in which corporate directors are shielded from duty of care liability by section 102(b)(7)
exculpation elections.
Nonetheless, there are at least two ways in which board approval of
sexual harassment settlements might advance a shareholder-plaintiff’s
cause. First, when it appears that the board has essentially written a blank
check to a CEO that allows him to engage in sexual harassment and
charge the costs to the corporation, then the argument that the directors
are not disinterested and independent may seem stronger. While it seems
unlikely that approval of settlements, standing alone, would disqualify a
board at the demand-excusal stage, this is one fact that may weigh in
favor of allowing a derivative action to proceed over the board’s objection. Second, when a board approves the settlement of sexual harassment
claims against a CEO without undertaking a thorough investigation of
ordered-to-pay-over-3-million-in-arbitration-1433891690 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
459. See Murdoch Complaint, supra note 18, at 5, 25.
460. See James Rufus Koren, CEO Resignation, Sexual Harassment Suit Could Delay
SoFi’s Bank Plans, L.A. Times (Sept. 12, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-ﬁcagney-soﬁ-20170911-story.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Nathaniel Popper
& Katie Benner, ‘It Was a Frat House’: Inside the Sex Scandal that Toppled SoFi’s C.E.O.,
N.Y. Times (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/technology/sofi-chiefexecutive-toxic-workplace.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
461. Panic II, 783 A.2d at 553.
462. Id.
463. Id.
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those allegations, then the case for Caremark liability gains steam. It is
hard to imagine a more obvious “red ﬂag” than the fact that an officer’s
alleged misconduct has begun to cost the company ﬁnancially.
To sum up: Any case against corporate ﬁduciaries as enablers of sexual harassment is likely to encounter several obstacles, the most signiﬁcant of which is that exculpatory provisions generally require shareholder-plaintiffs to go beyond showing that a director breached the duty
of care. Even so, boards that approve contract provisions that protect
CEOs or other corporate officers from the consequences of harassment
or that approve the use of corporate funds to settle sexual harassment
claims expose themselves to the possibility of Caremark liability in some
cases. Such approvals may also strengthen the plaintiff’s hand at the
demand-excusal stage.
Finally, it is worth noting that the best legal strategy for board members in cases of CEO sexual harassment might be in tension with the optimal public relations approach. If the board avers that it was aware of sexual harassment claims against the CEO but made a business judgment to
address the matter internally, then shareholder-plaintiffs will face difficulty in proving that the decision was not just a violation of the duty of
care but also a duty of loyalty breach. In many circumstances, however,
we expect that board members will respond as the Weinstein Company
board did—by contending that the allegations came as an “utter surprise.”464 The problem with this defense, however, is that it tees up a
Caremark claim quite nicely: If the board remained unaware of repeated
sexual harassment allegations against a CEO, then that raises questions
about the adequacy of its internal monitoring system and suggests that it
may have consciously ignored red ﬂags. Professing ignorance may seem
like an attractive response for board members seeking to absolve themselves in the eyes of the public, but it also may place them on the wrong
side of Delaware law.
4. Material Misstatements and Omissions. — So far our analysis of
potential liability has focused on state corporate law—and in particular,
the law of Delaware. A fourth and ﬁnal category of potential liability
arises under federal securities law. We focus here on two ways in which
publicly traded companies might run afoul of federal securities law: when
the failure to reveal sexual harassment amounts to a breach of an affirmative duty to disclose and when the company makes misleading statements connected to sexual misconduct.
We begin with the possibility of an affirmative duty to disclose sexual
harassment. Only in rare circumstances will such a duty arise under Item
103 of Regulation S-K, which addresses disclosure of material legal proceedings. As noted above, in very few cases will damages claims alleging
464. See Mike Fleming Jr., Weinstein Company Board Declares: We Had No Idea,
Deadline Hollywood (Oct. 10, 2017), http://deadline.com/2017/10/weinstein-companyboard-we-had-no-idea-1202186015 [https://perma.cc/M3KX-6XM8].
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sexual harassment—alone or in combination—exceed 10% of corporate
assets and thus need to be disclosed under Item 103.465 Of course, a
company may voluntarily disclose legal proceedings under Item 103, but
such disclosures should be crafted carefully. In one instance, the EEOC
found “reasonable cause” to believe that an employer violated Title VII
when its annual 10-K ﬁling revealed the name of a former employee with
a pending sexual harassment claim against the company and characterized the claim as “meritless.”466 The Seventh Circuit agreed that the disclosure “constituted a materially adverse employment action” because it
“might be negatively viewed by future employers” and dismissed the
employer’s contention that the disclosure was necessary to comply with
SEC regulations.467 In other words, the argument that Item 103 mandates
disclosure of sexual harassment claims is—as the Seventh Circuit seemed
to recognize—questionable at best.
Item 303 of Regulation S-K, which in relevant part requires public
companies to disclose “known trends or uncertainties that . . . the company reasonably expects will have a material . . . unfavorable impact
on . . . income from continuing operations,”468 is an uncertain foundation for liability as well. Recall that the federal courts of appeals are split
as to whether a company or its officers can ever be held liable to shareholders for Item 303 noncompliance, and that the Second Circuit is
friendlier toward Item 303 claims than several of its sister circuits.469
In the CTPartners case, a federal district court in the Southern
District of New York nonetheless rejected shareholders’ Item 303-based
claims against the company and its top executives. According to the
court:
Plaintiff’s thesis that the executives’ boorish behavior would ultimately impact the bottom line . . . requires one to have foreseen, essentially, that this behavior would be scandalously
revealed, as it was in the New York Post, and provoke such executive suite turbulence so as to impair the Company’s ﬁnancial
condition or operational results. Except with the beneﬁt of
hindsight, that scenario was speculative and conjectural.
....
. . . Indeed, plaintiff himself alleges that [the CEO’s]
“naked romps” and other forms of employment discrimination
were a “long-standing” practice and implicitly concedes that,
prior to the Post’s exposé, they had had no impact on the
Company’s operation.470
465. See supra notes 380–381 and accompanying text.
466. Greengrass v. Int’l Monetary Sys., Ltd., 776 F.3d 481, 485, 487 (7th Cir. 2015).
467. Id. at 485–87.
468. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2018).
469. See supra notes 372–387 and accompanying text.
470. Lopez v. CTPartners Exec. Search, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 12, 34–35 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(citations omitted).
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The district court’s analysis appears to rest on two premises: ﬁrst, that
executives of CTPartners reasonably could have believed that allegedly
rampant sexual misconduct at the company would remain under wraps,
or if it were disclosed, would not materially affect the ﬁrm’s bottom line;
and second, that sexual misconduct at the ﬁrm had no impact on the
bottom line in the absence of disclosure.
In the wake of the Weinstein revelations and the rise of #MeToo,
both premises are questionable. As more and more companies see their
reputations tarnished and their stock prices plummet in the wake of sexual harassment revelations, the proposition that a company can keep
these problems private—or avoid long-term consequences if sexual misconduct becomes public—grows ever less likely. And the idea that sexual
harassment affects a ﬁrm’s bottom line only if it is publicly exposed seems
dubious today. A growing body of research shows that—aside from the
direct costs of litigation and liability—sexual harassment results in higher
rates of absenteeism and employee turnover as well as lower productivity.471 This is especially likely to be true at a professional services ﬁrm
such as CTPartners, whose principal asset was its store of human capital.
Note as well that the CTPartners decision is not binding on other district
courts (or even in other cases within the Southern District of New
York472), and there are a number of reasons why other district courts
might choose not to follow CTPartners in a future case.
A last line of attack against a company that fails to disclose facts
related to corporate sexual misconduct would be that insofar as the
company has paid to settle sexual harassment claims against a CEO, CFO,
or any of its other three highest paid employees, such a payment qualiﬁes
as a “perquisite” that must be disclosed under Item 402.473 According to
SEC guidance, “an item is a perquisite if it confers a direct or indirect
beneﬁt that has a personal aspect,” unless it “is integrally and directly
related to the performance of the executive’s duties” or is “generally

471. See Robert H. Faley et al., Estimating the Organizational Costs of Sexual
Harassment: The Case of the U.S. Army, 13 J. Bus. & Psychol. 461, 462–64, 474–76 (1999)
(reviewing literature and using data from the U.S. Army to shed further light on productivity- and transfer-related costs); Heather McLaughlin et al., The Economic and Career
Effects of Sexual Harassment of Working Women, 31 Gender & Soc’y 333, 351–53 (2017)
(documenting productivity and turnover costs); Colleen Ammerman & Boris Groysberg,
Why Sexual Harassment Persists and What Organizations Can Do to Stop It, Harv. Bus.
Rev. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/12/why-sexual-harassment-persists-and-whatorganizations-can-do-to-stop-it (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (reviewing the literature and concluding that “[s]exual harassment is not a women’s problem but a threat to
companies’ health”).
472. See, e.g., ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 547 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir.
2008) (“District court decisions, unlike the decisions of States’ highest courts and federal
courts of appeals, are not precedential in the technical sense . . . .”).
473. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402; supra notes 388–395 and accompanying text.
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available on a non-discriminatory basis to all employees.”474 Assuming
that a company does not indemnify all of its employees against sexual
harassment claims, would a payment to shield a CEO or other top officer
from personal liability qualify as a “perquisite” under Item 402? Certainly, if a company paid $10,000 or more to provide sexual gratiﬁcation
to its CEO through other means, that payment would need to be disclosed under SEC regulations.475 Arguably the outcome should be no
different if the company—in effect—allows its CEO to seek sexual pleasure through the harassment of employees and then pays to clean up the
resulting legal mess. But there is no precedent precisely on point, and so
the SEC or a federal court that adopted this theory of liability would be
breaking new ground. Recall, too, that while the SEC can enforce
Regulation S-K on its own, a shareholder-plaintiff would still have to show
that the failure to disclose such a payment on a Form 10-K renders the
company’s ﬁlings actionably misleading under Rule 10b-5.476
A more promising path from the perspective of a potential shareholder-plaintiff is to attack speciﬁc statements that a publicly traded
company makes with regard to sexual harassment on the grounds that
those statements are inaccurate or misleading. On this point, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Hewlett-Packard provides helpful guidance. There,
the court held that Hewlett-Packard’s standards of business conduct—
which committed the company to “high ethical standards”—were “aspirational” and therefore not capable of being “objectively false.”477 According
to the court, “The promotion of ethical conduct at HP did not reasonably suggest that there would be no violations of the [standards of
business conduct] by the CEO or anyone else.”478 But the court also
added that “[t]he analysis would likely be different” if the company
“continued the conduct that gave rise to the [initial] scandal while claiming it had learned a valuable lesson in ethics.”479 Put another way, one
incident of misconduct does not render a company’s code of ethics misleading, but a company that continues to trumpet its ethical leadership
despite knowledge of rampant misbehavior might subject itself to liability
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
The district court decision in CTPartners discussed above480 is consistent with this view. There, the court held that statements in a company’s code of conduct are “quintessentially the sort of puffery about
‘corporate reputation, integrity, and compliance with ethical norms’ that
474. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158,
53,176 (Sept. 8, 2006).
475. See id.
476. See supra notes 372–376 and accompanying text.
477. Retail Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union Local 338 Ret. Fund v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 845 F.3d 1268, 1275–77 (9th Cir. 2017).
478. Id. at 1278.
479. See id.
480. See supra notes 222–234 and accompanying text.
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deﬁne the category.”481 But again, this holding does not imply that companies have carte blanche to hide known sexual harassment allegations
behind positive statements about the company. What it does mean is that
shareholder-plaintiffs (or the SEC, in an enforcement action) will have to
identify a speciﬁc statement that is more than merely aspirational and
that rises to the level of being materially false or misleading.
Signet Jewelers provides an example of a company that may well face
liability under Rule 10b-5 for misrepresentations of material facts related
to corporate sexual misconduct. Probably the strongest securities fraud
claims in the Signet lawsuit relate to the company’s statements regarding
ongoing arbitration in an employment discrimination lawsuit. Even after
the exposure of hundreds of sworn employee declarations alleging sexual misconduct in an EEOC suit, the company continues to say in its
quarterly and annual ﬁlings that the claims allege “that [the company’s]
U.S. store-level employment practices are discriminatory as to compensation and promotional activities with respect to gender.”482 That is literally
true as a description of the initial claims, but since March 2008, the
plaintiffs’ allegations have expanded far beyond “store-level employment
practices.”483 As the arbitrator overseeing the class action said in her
opinion certifying the class, the plaintiffs now allege “a corporate culture
of gender bias at [Signet], based upon evidence of numerous instances
of inappropriate sexual conduct demeaning to women by executives and
managers from the CEO down.”484 Once the company learned of the
extent of the allegations, it was surely misleading to continue to characterize them as related to “store-level employment practices.” And given
the sharp decline in Signet’s stock price following disclosure of these allegations,485 it will be difficult for Signet to convince a court or jury that the
omitted facts fall short of the materiality threshold.
In sum, the viability of securities law claims against companies that
fail to disclose the extent of corporate sexual misconduct will be case
speciﬁc. The SEC, which can bring an enforcement action based on a
bare Regulation S-K violation,486 is likely to have more success than private plaintiffs, who must prove that the company’s statements or omissions rise to the Rule 10b-5 level.487 Moreover, aspirational statements
about corporate ethics are less likely to lead to liability than inaccurate
481. Lopez v. CTPartners Exec. Search, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 12, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(quoting City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 183
(2d Cir. 2014)).
482. See, e.g., Signet Jewelers Ltd., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 27 (June 12, 2018).
483. See Signet Jewelers Complaint, supra note 16, at 61–99.
484. See Class Determination Award at 3, Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Case No. 11-200800-0655, (Am. Arb. Ass’n 2015), https://www.cohenmilstein.com/sites/default/files/
media.5300.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX4X-CURD].
485. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
486. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
487. See supra notes 373–374 and accompanying text.
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speciﬁc statements about ongoing litigation; similarly, even misleading or
false statements may not qualify as material if they pertain to a tiny percentage of the ﬁrm’s total assets or leave the company’s stock price
unchanged.488 Certainly not every instance of corporate sexual misconduct will lead to liability under federal securities law, but the pending
Signet Jewelers case underscores the fact that securities law may provide a
means for shareholders to win redress in some cases.
5. Damages. — So far, we have argued that corporations and their
officers and directors will—under certain circumstances—be held liable
for engaging in, enabling, and concealing sexual misconduct. But of
course, the amount of damages matters as well as the fact of liability. We
anticipate at least ﬁve ways in which plaintiffs can show that sexual misconduct has caused ﬁnancial harm to the ﬁrms in which they hold
shares.
First, and most obviously, plaintiffs can point to the direct costs of litigation related to sexual harassment, including judgments and settlements paid with corporate funds as well as associated attorneys’ fees. In
some cases, the CEO or other corporate officer will be required to
reimburse the company for these costs,489 but in other instances, liability
and litigation expenses will hit the ﬁrm’s bottom line. As noted above,
Fox paid $20 million to settle anchor Gretchen Carlson’s lawsuit against
former CEO Roger Ailes,490 and the company allegedly has paid more
than $55 million in total to settle harassment claims.491 These large sums
(larger still when fees are factored in) help to explain the $90 million
ﬁgure for which Fox settled the shareholder derivative action against it in
November 2017.492
Second, sexual harassment is a significant cause of employee turnover.
One survey of female law ﬁrm associates found that if a woman reported
that she had “[e]xperienced or observed sexual harassment” from male
supervisors or colleagues, it “increase[d] the likelihood that the respondent reported an intention to quit her current workplace within two years
by over 25%.”493 Higher turnover rates result in direct outlays (for recruiting, hiring, training, and integrating new employees) as well as indirect
488. For an overview of what is generally considered material in the securities fraud context, see Amanda Rose, The “Reasonable Investor” of Federal Securities Law, Harv. L. Sch.
F. on Corp. Gov’t and Fin. Reg. (Oct. 13, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/10/
13/the-reasonable-investor-of-federal-securities-law/ [https://perma.cc/JF6W-J38J]; see also
supra notes 380, 477 and accompanying text.
489. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 425 (noting that Harvey Weinstein’s contract
required him to reimburse the Weinstein company for any sexual harassment related settlements).
490. See Grynbaum & Koblin, supra note 159.
491. See Murdoch Complaint, supra note 18, at 5.
492. See Murdoch Settlement, supra note 19, at 21, 27–28.
493. David N. Laband & Bernard F. Lentz, The Effects of Sexual Harassment on Job
Satisfaction, Earnings, and Turnover Among Female Lawyers, 51 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev.
594, 604 (1998).
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costs (including interruptions in production and—potentially—a decline
in morale among remaining employees).494 Plaintiffs can rely on an
extensive literature in the ﬁelds of management and organizational
behavior to estimate the effects of increased turnover on ﬁnancial
performance.495
Third, revelations of sexual misconduct can lead to regulatory consequences for ﬁrms. For example, the Wall Street Journal report documenting Wynn Resorts CEO Steve Wynn’s decades-long pattern of sexual
misconduct triggered regulatory investigations in three different jurisdictions: Macau, Massachusetts, and Nevada.496 Of particular concern is the
probe in Massachusetts, where Wynn Resorts is building a $2.4 billion
property on Boston Harbor.497 Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker has
stated that he does not believe that Wynn Resorts would meet the state
Gaming Commission’s suitability standard if the allegations against Wynn
are true.498 And while the Gaming Commission, not the governor, is the
ﬁnal decisionmaker regarding suitability, the commission has said it will
continue to investigate Wynn Resorts even after its founder’s resignation
from the ﬁrm.499 If corporate sexual misconduct leads to the loss of an
identiﬁable business opportunity as a result of regulatory action, then the
associated costs might be added to the award against a liable ﬁduciary.
Fourth, corporate sexual misconduct often will have reputational
ramiﬁcations for companies. The extent of the damage will depend upon
the nature of the business. As noted above, Signet Jewelers acknowledges
that trust is essential to the company’s business model,500 and the reputational consequences of sexual harassment may be particularly acute for a
company with a primarily female customer base. The reputational consequences of harassment also may lead current or potential business partners to disassociate themselves from a ﬁrm: For example, after revela-

494. See Aharon Tziner & Assa Birati, Assessing Employee Turnover Costs: A Revised
Approach, 6 Hum. Resource Mgmt. Rev. 113, 116 (1996).
495. For an overview, see generally Julie I. Hancock et al., Meta-Analytic Review of
Employee Turnover as a Predictor of Firm Performance, 39 J. Mgmt. 573 (2013).
496. Wynn Complaint, supra note 21, at 19–20.
497. Id. at 21.
498. See Tori Bedford, Baker: ‘I’m Not the Decision-Maker’ on Casino Mogul Steve
Wynn, WGBH News (Jan. 29, 2018), https://news.wgbh.org/2018/01/29/boston-publicradio-podcast/baker-im-not-decision-maker-casino-mogul-steve-wynn [https://perma.cc/
3FQG-WE9U] (noting that when asked whether Wynn would meet the commission’s
standard if the allegations proved true, Baker responded: “God, no”).
499. Mark Arsenault, Despite Wynn’s Ouster, State Gaming Panel’s Probe Will Go On,
Bos. Globe (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/02/07/gamingcommission-investigation-continue-despite-wynn-ouster/15OXc4MSFTXtShpvgLlGtI/
story.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
500. Facets of 2017: Annual Report, Signet Jewelers (Mar. 16, 2017), https://
s2.q4cdn.com/912924347/files/2017ar/index2.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting that “trust is the most important factor in why people buy jewelry where
they do”).
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tions of sexual misconduct by Harvey Weinstein emerged, Amazon
Studios called off a $160 million project to coproduce a series starring
Robert DeNiro and Julianne Moore with the Weinstein Company; Apple
canceled a series on Elvis Presley that it had planned to purchase from
the ﬁrm; and the publisher Hachette ended an arrangement with the
Weinstein Company’s book publishing unit.501 Again, damages will be
easier for plaintiffs and courts to quantify when sexual harassment leads
to the loss of identiﬁable business opportunities.
Fifth, and ﬁnally, sexual harassment has undeniable but difficult-toquantify effects on productivity at a ﬁrm. The most obvious productivity
consequences are for victims, who often become less motivated and more
likely to miss work or take sick leave.502 But the productivity losses associated with sexual harassment are not limited to the victim: Several studies
have found “ambient effects” on others in the same workgroup, with
harassment leading to lower morale and lower output across the
board.503 This may be the most difficult component of damages for plaintiffs to quantify, though data on absenteeism rates and comparisons to
other teams at the same ﬁrm may shed some light on the magnitude of
productivity harms.
Often, plaintiffs will be able to look to market reactions in order to
estimate the effect of sexual harassment on ﬁrm value. A sharp decline in
stock price on the day that evidence of sexual misconduct becomes public is an indication—albeit an imperfect one—of the effect of misconduct
on ﬁrm value.504 This measure is especially common in securities fraud
litigation, though the methodology is vulnerable to misinterpretation if
applied without care. The key point for present purposes is that stock
price drops at CTPartners,505 Signet Jewelers,506 Liberty Tax,507 and Wynn
Resorts508 in the wake of sexual harassment revelations—along with
501. Meg James, Amazon Studios Cuts Ties with Weinstein Co. Following Harvey
Weinstein Sex Scandal, L.A. Times (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/
hollywood/la-fi-ct-amazon-cuts-ties-weinstein-co-20171013-story.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
502. See Chelsea R. Willness, Piers Steel & Kibeom Lee, A Meta-Analysis of the
Antecedents and Consequences of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 60 Personnel Psychol.
127, 137 (2007) (collecting studies).
503. See id. at 149 (reporting results of meta-analysis); see also Theresa M. Glomb et
al., Ambient Sexual Harassment: An Integrated Model of Antecedents and Consequences,
71 Organizational Behav. Hum. Decision Processes 309, 323 (1997) (noting that “just
being exposed to ambient sexual harassment in their work group results in negative outcomes,” even for employees that did not experience harassment themselves).
504. See Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A
Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 7, 9 (1994) (describing the traditional method for calculating damages in securities fraud litigation).
505. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
506. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
507. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
508. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
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scholarly research regarding the effects of sexual misconduct on workplaces—point toward the conclusion that the costs of sexual harassment
extend far beyond direct liability and litigation-related expenses. While
the measure of damages will vary from case to case, we anticipate that
awards may be quite substantial in certain circumstances.
D. What Boards Can Do
Our analysis up to this point has approached the problem of corporate sexual misconduct from the perspective of potential plaintiffs. Here,
we switch sides and consider the problem from the perspective of corporate board members. What can boards do to reduce the risk of sexual
harassment at their ﬁrms and to contain the fallout if and when harassment does occur?
Potential interventions fall into two general categories: ex ante and
ex post. By “ex ante,” we refer to steps that boards can take before an
incident of sexual harassment comes to their attention. By “ex post,” we
refer to ways in which boards can and should respond to harassment
once it happens. Our hope is that proactive ex ante steps will obviate the
need for ex post responses. Realistically, though, we recognize that even a
ﬁrm that implements the very best practices might not be able to eradicate harassment from its ranks.
Within the category of ex ante measures, the ﬁrst step is arguably the
most obvious: Talk about it. Surprisingly, very few corporate boards have
done even that. A 2017 survey of private and public company directors
found that 77% of boards “had not discussed accusations of sexually
inappropriate behavior and/or sexism in the workplace.”509 Acknowledging that sexual harassment is a potential business risk marks the beginning of the process of putting a prevention strategy in place.
Second, boards should take stock of their companies’ past responses
to sexual harassment claims. Beth Boland, a litigator at the law ﬁrm Foley
& Lardner LLP, has suggested that boards should “ask for a report of all
sexual harassment complaints and outcomes, with a particular eye toward
identifying any repeat offenders within the company’s ranks—and if
those offenders are still with the company, demand a detailed explanation why.”510 This strikes us as a sensible approach for corporate boards.
According to research by Dr. Michael Housman and Professor Dylan
Minor, who examined data on more than 50,000 workers across eleven
509. theBoardlist, Corporate Boards Aren’t Preparing for Sexual Harassment and
Gender Discrimination Issues, Medium (Oct. 24, 2017), https://medium.com/
@theBoardlist/corporate-boards-arent-preparing-for-sexual-harassment-and-genderdiscrimination-issues-24ba425d6497 [https://perma.cc/QX3T-BU2F].
510. Beth I.Z. Boland, How Corporate Boards Can Curtail Sexual Harassment, Bos.
Globe (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/11/21/how-corporateboards-can-curtail-sexual-harassment/3PbCNjKYZCsJiMhahOGRxN/story.html (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review).
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ﬁrms to assess the effects of sexual harassment, workplace violence, and
other “egregious” violations of company policies, so-called toxic
workers—the ones who engaged in these behaviors—tended to be more
productive than the average employee but generated negative effects on
proﬁtability that far exceeded their contributions.511 In other words,
keeping toxic workers on board tends to be a poor business decision
even when those workers themselves are top performers, and boards
should ask tough questions of managers that choose to retain repeat
offenders.
Third, boards should demand that management implement mandatory sexual harassment training for workers at all levels. A 2017 survey by
the Association for Talent Development found that 71% of employers
“offered” sexual harassment prevention training.512 It is not clear that
“offered” means “required,” and in any event, that ﬁgure suggests that a
substantial minority of employers provide no sexual harassment prevention training at all. While there is of course a nontrivial opportunity cost
of mandatory training that takes workers away from their tasks for several
hours, the potential beneﬁts for organizations are substantial. Training
appears to affect attitudes (though this of course depends on the content
of the training program): For example, one study of federal employees
found that male employees who undergo training are signiﬁcantly more
likely to identify gestures, remarks, and touching as sexual harassment
than their untrained colleagues.513 Moreover, courts have recognized the
existence of a training program as a factor affecting whether an employer
will be held liable for harassment.514 Training thus serves the dual purposes of prevention and loss mitigation.
Boards should also consider how best to enhance the effectiveness of
their training programs, such as by emphasizing bystander intervention,
511. See Michael Housman & Dylan Minor, Toxic Workers 3 (Harvard Bus. Sch.
Working Paper No. 16-057, 2015), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/16057_d45c0b4f-fa19-49de-8f1b-4b12fe054fea.pdf (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
512. Megan Cole, 71 Percent of Organizations Offer Sexual Harassment Prevention
Training, Ass’n for Talent Dev. (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.td.org/insights/71-percent-oforganizations-offer-sexual-harassment-prevention-training [https://perma.cc/8RXA-9U7K].
513. See Heather Antecol & Deborah Cobb-Clark, Does Sexual Harassment Training
Change Attitudes? A View from the Federal Level, 84 Soc. Sci. Q. 826, 833 (2003). For a
review of other studies generally ﬁnding that training increases awareness of and sensitivity
to harassment, see Zachary T. Kalinoski et al., A Meta-Analytic Evaluation of Diversity
Training Outcomes, 34 J. Organizational Behav. 1076, 1090–93 (2013).
514. Michael T. Zugelder, Paul J. Champagne & Steven D. Maurer, An Affirmative
Defense to Sexual Harassment by Managers and Supervisors: Analyzing Employer Liability
and Protecting Employee Rights in the United States, 18 Emp. Resps. & Rts. J. 111, 117
(2006); see also Setser v. Idaho Home Health & Hospice/LHC Grp., No. 4:12-CV-00444EJL-REB, 2014 WL 970041, at *8 (D. Idaho Mar. 12, 2014) (considering employee training
as a factor affecting whether an employer satisﬁes the ﬁrst prong of the Farragher–Ellerth
test); Sackett v. ITC Deltacom, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 602, 612–13 (E.D. Tenn. 2005) (considering employee training as a factor affecting availability of punitive damages for Title
VII violations).
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which teaches employees how to intervene when they witness harassment.515 To further instill the message that sexual harassment training
should be taken seriously, boards can require that managers from the
CEO on down actively participate in these trainings.
Fourth, boards should review their companies’ procedures for handling complaints. One clear lesson that has emerged from the scandals of
the past several months is that “hotlines” are not enough: Simply establishing a telephone number that employees can call to report harassment
does not ensure that the hotline will be used or that complaints will be
addressed. For example, Twenty-First Century Fox said after allegations
against Bill O’Reilly emerged in 2017 that no employee had ever lodged
a hotline complaint against the host.516 But according to former employees of the company, Fox made no efforts to publicize the existence of the
hotline, which was staffed by third-party operators who had no
knowledge of company culture.517 A more promising strategy is to
appoint an organizational ombudsperson who receives anonymous and
nonanonymous complaints, works with supervisors to address those
complaints, and has the authority to report directly to the board in the
event that complaints involve corporate officers or that management
responses appear inadequate.518 By ensuring that serious allegations of
sexual misconduct are quickly brought to their attention, board members can reduce their own exposure to the risk of Caremark liability.
Fifth, boards should ensure that company policies specify meaningful consequences for employees who engage in harassment, perhaps even
specifying these consequences in contracts with top executives. For example, companies could use “morals clauses” that clearly give the board the
right to unilaterally terminate an executive who engages in sexual harassment or other misconduct.
However, “zero tolerance” policies that promise the termination of
all harassers are not a panacea: As some commentators have suggested,
these policies sometimes may deter victims from reporting low-level harassment (such as a single crude joke) that might seem like it should fall

515. EEOC, Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace: Report of
Co-Chairs Chai R. Feldblum & Victoria A. Lipnic 57–58 (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/task_force/harassment/upload/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HZU-8RXY].
516. Noam Scheiber, Anonymous Harassment Hotlines Are Hard to Find and Harder
to Trust, N.Y. Times (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/business/
media/fox-sexual-harassment-hotline-bill-oreilly.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
517. Id.
518. On the potential utility of an organizational ombudsperson in responding to
sexual harassment complaints, see Sarah Kessler, Corporate Sexual Harassment Hotlines
Don’t Work. They’re Not Designed to, Quartz at Work (May 2, 2017), https://work.qz.com/
971112/corporate-sexual-harassment-hotlines-dont-work-theyre-not-designed-to [https://
perma.cc/9QP2-5V8F].
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short of a ﬁreable offense.519 Boards should instead empower managers
to impose a range of sanctions—from reprimands to bonus reductions to
outright termination—with rapidly escalating penalties for repeat
offenders. Boards also should ensure that employment contracts with
CEOs and other corporate officers do not provide blanket indemniﬁcation for sexual harassment claims.520 One reasonable approach is to state
that if a corporate officer is accused of sexual harassment, the officer will
have to pay any judgment or settlement and associated litigation
expenses out of pocket unless the board speciﬁcally votes to indemnify.
Finally, we think that proactive boards should prioritize gender
diversity when selecting new members and choosing a CEO, perhaps
implementing a version of the “Mansﬁeld Rule,” which requires that at
least 30% of the candidates considered for leadership and governance
roles are women or people of color.521 (The rule—adopted by dozens of
law ﬁrms and corporate legal departments since its emergence in 2017—
is named for Arabella Mansﬁeld, the ﬁrst woman admitted to practice law
in the United States.522) Boards should encourage management to make
gender diversity a priority in selecting lower-level supervisors as well. Several studies have found that female employees with male supervisors are
more likely to report harassment than female employees with female
supervisors.523 And beyond any claim about the direct effect of gender
diversity on harassment, we think that an increasing awareness of the
prevalence of harassment should affect the meritocratic assessment of
candidates for executive and board positions. Indeed, even if one rejects
all claims about the intrinsic or instrumental value of gender diversity,
the #MeToo movement still should inform hiring decisions insofar as it
sheds light on the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in the workplace
and thus reveals the hurdles that female candidates for executive and
board positions have likely had to overcome.524
519. See Olivia Goldhill, “Zero Tolerance” Sexual Harassment Policies Are Terrible for
Women, Quartz (Nov. 10, 2017), https://qz.com/1125385/zero-tolerance-sexual-harassmentpolicies-are-terrible-for-women [https://perma.cc/6ESC-ZM3G].
520. On the prevalence of indemniﬁcation clauses in CEO contracts, see Stewart J.
Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What
Do Top Executives Bargain for?, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 231, 254 n.36 (2006).
521. See Ellen McGirt, How Lawyers Are Working to Change Their Industry’s Diversity
Problem, Fortune (Aug. 30, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/30/the-mansﬁeld-rulelawyers-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/UC8Y-SMCE].
522. Id.
523. See Myrtle P. Bell, Mary E. McLaughlin & Jennifer M. Sequeira, Discrimination,
Harassment, and the Glass Ceiling: Women Executives as Change Agents, 37 J. Bus. Ethics
65, 69 (2002) (collecting studies).
524. For analogous arguments in the context of race-based affirmative action, see Jerry
Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative
Action,” 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1063, 1098–101 (2006); Daniel Hemel, An Exam-Grading
Hypothetical for Affirmative Action’s Supreme Court Test, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Faculty
Blog (Dec. 8, 2015), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2015/12/an-exam-gradinghypothetical-for-affirmative-actions-supreme-court-test.html [https://perma.cc/3XUS-X359].
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These measures, of course, will not reduce the incidence of sexual
harassment to zero at any organization of sufficient size. Yet even ex post
(in other words, after a harassment allegation comes before a corporate
board), directors can still take meaningful steps to avoid liability. Five
measures in particular deserve mention.
First, if confronted with allegations that corporate officers engaged
in sexual harassment or that harassment at the company is widespread,
boards should hire outside counsel to conduct a thorough investigation
of the claims. Recall that the fact that the ICN board had conducted such
an investigation contributed to the Chancery Court’s conclusion in Panic
that the directors had lived up to their Caremark duties.525 In general,
board members will face liability under Caremark only when they take an
ostrich-like approach to misconduct allegations, and hiring outside
counsel to conduct an internal investigation is one obvious way for
directors to extricate their heads from the sand.
Second, when corporate officers are sued for sexual harassment,
boards should approve the use of corporate funds to pay liability- and
litigation-related expenses only when an internal investigation concludes
that those claims are unfounded. Otherwise, the charge that the board
allowed for corporate funds to be used to facilitate the officer’s harassment gains considerable force. This is one area in which ex ante and ex
post measures intersect: The board will, of course, need to ensure that
the company has not agreed to a blanket indemniﬁcation policy in its
contract with the CEO or any other corporate officer.
Third, even when the target of misconduct allegations is a CEO who
founded the company and is intimately associated with the ﬁrm’s brand,
board members should think seriously about whether the misconduct
allegations rise to the level of a ﬁreable offense—and should terminate
the CEO if they do. In the case of Wynn Resorts, the company’s stock
price rose by over 6% immediately after the board announced that it had
accepted CEO Steve Wynn’s resignation526—dispelling the myth that
investors considered Wynn to be an indispensable component of the
ﬁrm. The damage to a ﬁrm’s value from losing an iconic CEO may be far
less than the reputational consequences of a high-proﬁle sexual harassment scandal.
Fourth, board members should think carefully about whether to
appoint a special litigation committee to evaluate actual or potential
shareholder derivative actions. As noted above,527 Delaware courts will

525. See supra note 440 and accompanying text.
526. See Kimberly Chin, Wynn Resorts Surges After Billionaire Casino Mogul
Steve Wynn Resigns (WYNN), Bus. Insider: Markets Insider (Feb. 7, 2018), http://
markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/wynn-resorts-stock-price-surges-after-billionairecasino-mogul-steve-wynn-resigns-from-the-company-2018-2-1015049099 [https://perma.cc/
P2AU-7RM9].
527. See supra notes 360–365 and accompanying text.
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hold SLCs to a higher standard for disinterestedness and independence
than they will apply to full boards, and courts will review decisions to
reject demand with less deference. Boards should therefore weigh the
viability of a plaintiff’s argument for demand excusal against the additional vulnerability that comes with the formation of an SLC. To be sure,
a board that would ﬂunk the Aronson or Rales test itself will generally
want to appoint an SLC rather than allow a shareholder-plaintiff to proceed with a lawsuit. But when the board starts from a strong position,
utilizing an SLC can actually weaken its hand.
While the analysis in the previous section suggests that public companies generally do not have an affirmative duty to disclose sexual misconduct allegations, boards should consider whether statements in their
SEC ﬁlings might be misleading if sexual misconduct claims emerge.
One strategy is to incorporate this factor into any internal investigation:
Outside counsel could be asked not only to evaluate the merits of harassment claims but also to assess whether any of the company’s public
statements require correction or updating on account of the facts that
the investigation reveals. While we would caution against disclosing the
names of victims or any facts that would make those victims easily identiﬁable,528 we think that companies would be well advised to disclose facts
beyond the bare legal minimum so as to reduce the risk of strike suits as
well as potentially meritorious claims.
E.

What (Else) Shareholders Can Do

Finally, if boards do not act, shareholders potentially can. In the past
few decades, shareholders have been ﬂexing their muscles not just in litigation but also in behind-the-scenes engagement, proxy contests, and
shareholder proposals.529 And because the shareholder base has grown
increasingly concentrated in the hands of institutional investors, shareholder inﬂuence has reached an unprecedented level.530 In the recent
past, shareholders had primarily used their growing power to press for
changes in corporate governance and business strategy, but shareholders
are increasingly setting their sights on a broader range of issues. For
example, the 2017 proxy season broke the record for the number of environmental and social (E&S) proposals put to a vote.531 Although these

528. See supra note 466–467 and accompanying text.
529. See Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. Corp. L.
493, 500–02 (2018).
530. See Paul H. Edelman et al., Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary
Capitalism, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1359, 1383–84 (2014); Lund, supra note 529, at 500–02;
William W. Bratton & Simone M. Sepe, Shareholder Power in Incomplete Markets 26–28
(Nov. 1, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.iast.fr/sites/default/files/IAST/
conf/law/bratton.pdf [http://perma.cc/45RE-6EX9].
531. Thomas Singer & Ramsha Khursheed, Environmental and Social Proposals in the
2017 Proxy Season, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Oct. 26, 2017),
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proposals received average support of only 21.4% of votes cast, this level
of support continues an upward trend. For instance, in 2016, environmental and social proposals received average support of 19.7% of votes
cast.532 The number of E&S proposals that have won majority support has
also increased over the last few years: Six proposals passed in 2017, compared to four in 2016 and four in 2013.533 These numbers are hardly
impressive, but they nevertheless represent an uptick over time.
The rise in successful environmental and social proposals can largely
be attributed to a shift in the voting policies of traditionally passive institutional investors. In 2018, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, which
manages over $6 trillion in investments in 14,000 companies, issued an
open letter to other CEOs stating that “[c]ompanies must beneﬁt all of
their stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers, and
the communities in which they operate.”534 He also indicated that companies that failed to demonstrate how they “make[] a positive contribution to society” would risk losing the support of BlackRock, one of the
largest shareholders of every company in the S&P 500.535 Other inﬂuential institutional investors, including Vanguard and State Street, have
also begun to support E&S shareholder proposals, including those that
ask companies to disclose business risks related to climate change or
enhance employee diversity.536 In doing so, they join forces with pension
funds that invest on behalf of public employees and labor union members, which were using their power to pursue environmental and social
aims long before Fink emerged as the E&S movement’s most prominent
voice.537
And this newfound interest in social proposals is not limited to large
passive institutional investors and pension funds; activist hedge funds,
too, are taking an interest in E&S issues. For example, in early 2018, the
activist hedge fund Jana Partners joined with the California State Teachers’
Retirement System in pushing Apple’s board to address the growing concern that the iPhone is addictive and that overuse could cause negative

https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/26/environmental-and-social-proposals-in-the2017-proxy-season/ [https://perma.cc/7S6S-9UUS].
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Larry Fink, A Sense of Purpose, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg.
(Jan. 17, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/17/a-sense-of-purpose/ [https://
perma.cc/WLU8-97JH].
535. Id.
536. Janet Geldzahler & Glen Schleyer, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Lessons from the
2017 Proxy Season: S&C Client Webinar 24 (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.sullcrom.com/
ﬁles/upload/Webinar_Lessons_Proxy_Season_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LTK-68DQ];
see also Singer & Khursheed, supra note 531.
537. On the history of pension fund activism, see generally David Webber, The Rise of
the Working-Class Shareholder: Labor’s Last Best Weapon (2018).
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long-term consequences for children.538 Engagement of this type is, as
noted above, not unusual for pension funds, but it marks a shift for activist
hedge funds, which tend to focus on more traditional questions of corporate governance. The growth of socially motivated activist hedge funds
reveals the growing sense among investors of all types that environmental
and social factors are value-relevant for companies.539
Sexual harassment policies and procedures are likely to be the next
frontier. In January 2018, shareholders from Arjuna Capital and the New
York State Common Retirement Fund announced that they had coﬁled
shareholder resolutions asking Facebook and Twitter to produce a detailed
report on the scope of sexual harassment on their platforms and the
remedies either in place or already contemplated for the future.540 The
California Public Employees’ Retirement system is currently weighing a
policy that would urge companies to disclose settlement payments made
to victims of sexual harassment on the behalf of executives and
directors.541 These appear to be the ﬁrst investor proposals to address
corporate sexual harassment, but Arjuna Capital was also behind a
shareholder proposal submitted at six of the largest U.S. ﬁnancial institutions that asked for detailed reports on the percentage pay gap between
male and female employees.542 Although all of the proposals were unsuccessful in 2017, Citigroup recently changed its position and agreed to
disclose internal data on gender pay.543 Amazon, for its part, announced
in May 2018 that it would adopt a version of the Mansﬁeld Rule for
Board of Directors candidates—a move it made after union-affiliated

538. Letter from Barry Rosenstein, Managing Partner, JANA Partners LLC, & Anne
Sheehan, Dir. of Corp. Governance, The Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., to Apple Inc. (Jan.
6, 2018), https://thinkdifferentlyaboutkids.com/letter/?acc=1 [https://perma.cc/43MEPKR9].
539. Robert G. Eccles, Why an Activist Hedge Fund Cares Whether Apple’s Devices
Are Bad for Kids, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Jan. 16, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/why-anactivist-hedge-fund-cares-whether-apples-devices-are-bad-for-kids (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review).
540. Arjuna Capital: Twitter and Facebook Face First-Ever Shareholder Resolutions
Targeting Online Sexual Harassment, Hate Speech and Fake News, PRNewswire (Jan. 11,
2018), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/arjuna-capital-twitter-and-facebook-faceﬁrst-ever-shareholder-resolutions-targeting-online-sexual-harassment-hate-speech-and-fakenews-300581656.html [https://perma.cc/VQ73-AFJ3].
541. John Gittelsohn, CalPERS Weighs Push for Sexual-Harassment Corporate
Disclosure, Bloomberg L. (Apr. 11, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employeebeneﬁts/calpers-weighs-push-for-sexual-harassment-corporate-disclosure (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
542. Arjuna Capital, Shareholder Proposal for Gender Pay Equity (2017), https://
arjuna-capital.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/C-Shareholder-Proposal_Gender-PayEquity-11132018.pdf [https://perma.cc/MWB7-K5JS].
543. Laura Noonan & Ben McLannahan, Citigroup Bows to Activist and Discloses
Gender Pay Data, Fin. Times (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/591b0900-f9f911e7-9b32-d7d59aace167 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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pension funds submitted a shareholder proposal seeking to compel the
company to adopt such a policy.544
While shareholder activism surrounding issues of sexual harassment
and diversity can be understood as part of a broader E&S trend, it is also
important not to draw too sharp a distinction between these efforts and
more traditional shareholder activity aimed at inﬂuencing corporate
governance or business strategy. The argument that boards should bolster corporate anti–sexual harassment efforts is not solely an argument
about social responsibility; it is also an argument about business strategy
and the bottom line. It is, ultimately, a claim that corporations cannot
maximize shareholder value if they squander human and ﬁnancial capital by allowing sexual harassment to persist within their ranks.545
* * *
These examples demonstrate the ways in which shareholders can use
corporate law to hold boards and management accountable for sexual
harassment. Unlike suits under Title VII, shareholder suits are not subject to Title VII’s limitations. Shareholders do not face damage caps or an
unusually truncated statute of limitations period. They are also better
positioned to utilize the class action vehicle, and they are less likely to
have their claims subjected to arbitration.
Shareholder litigation also offers other important beneﬁts. Although
shareholder suits will not make harassment victims whole, the most
important result may be the message they send to other corporate leaders. For example, the case against the Fox News board may serve to
underscore the fact that if corporate directors ignore allegations of sexual harassment at their companies, they will be subject to consequences:
litigation, the risk of individual liability (and higher insurance premiums), and at the very least, severe reputational harm. Those consequences, in aggregate, may be large enough to deter those and other
companies from failing to address toxic corporate cultures and discipline
harassers. Another advantage of shareholder litigation may be in securing wide-ranging compliance reforms along the lines of what Twenty-First
Century Fox agreed to in its settlement with shareholders.546 Although it
544. See Jason Del Rey, Amazon Will Adopt a ‘Rooney Rule’ to Increase Board
Diversity After Its Initial Opposition Sparked Employee Outrage, Recode (May 14, 2018),
https://www.recode.net/2018/5/14/17353626/amazon-rooney-rule-board-diversity-reversalshareholder-proposal [https://perma.cc/ZA83-CSJ3]. The so-called Rooney Rule—named
for Dan Rooney, the former owner of the National Football League’s Pittsburgh Steelers,
who spearheaded the adoption of the rule for high-level NFL coaching positions—
requires employers to include members of underrepresented minority groups (and in
Amazon’s case, women as well) among the list of candidates for open positions. See
McGirt, supra note 521. Unlike the Mansﬁeld Rule, it does not specify that a particular
percentage of candidates in the pool must be minority or female. Id.
545. We return to this point in section III.A, infra.
546. See Murdoch Settlement Exhibit A, supra note 261, at 2–14. The settlement established a “Workplace Professionalism and Inclusion Council” tasked with strengthening
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is debatable whether such reforms go beyond cosmetic compliance,547
the implementation of a workplace council devoted to improving corporate culture and recruiting women and minorities is certainly a step in
the right direction.
In addition, the increased risk of securities liability could encourage
companies to more regularly disclose sexual harassment allegations, as
well as payments made to settle such claims, in their public ﬁlings. Those
disclosures would likely beneﬁt current and potential employees as they
consider future employment decisions by arming them with information
on how an employer treats sexual harassment allegations. Most importantly, heightened disclosure obligations might encourage companies to
do more to prevent workplace sexual harassment to avoid having to make
such disclosures in the ﬁrst place.548 But there is also the risk that
companies will respond by implementing measures designed to keep
allegations from coming to their attention (though such action could render them vulnerable to a Caremark claim). Moreover, although employers
are required to keep the victim’s name conﬁdential when reporting the
allegations, the prospect of public disclosure could chill employee
reporting if the employee hopes to avoid attention or discussion of the
event that triggered the disclosure. The next Part addresses additional
normative and strategic considerations for shareholders hoping to use
litigation as a force for change.
III. NORMATIVE AND STRATEGIC CONCERNS
We have so far sought to show that corporations and their directors
and officers can be held liable to shareholders for committing, allowing,
or concealing sexual harassment under existing law. But of course, “can”
does not imply “ought.”549 In this Part, we approach the issue of corporate law liability for sexual harassment from normative and strategic perspectives. We consider several possible objections to the use of corporate
law as a mechanism to regulate and remedy workplace-based sexual harreporting, bolstering sexual harassment–related training, and helping to recruit and promote the advancement of women and minorities. Id.
547. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 2075, 2093–95 (2016) (“The creation of even well-designed policies and procedures, however, is not sufficient in itself. . . . [C]ompliance must be housed somewhere
in the organization, where a responsible agent has speciﬁc authority over it along with
sufficient staff to perform necessary compliance-related tasks.”).
548. Cf. Hans B. Christensen et al., The Real Effects of Mandated Information on
Social Responsibility in Financial Reports: Evidence from Mine-Safety Records, 64 J. Acct.
& Econ. 284, 287, 299 (2017) (examining the effect of the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirement
that companies disclose mine-safety information and concluding that such required disclosures improved safety performance by shaming managers and because of shareholder
distaste for socially irresponsible companies).
549. The converse may be true, at least as a matter of analytic philosophy. See, e.g.,
Gideon Yaffe, ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, 59 Analysis
218, 219–21 (1999).
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assment. While we take these objections seriously, we ultimately conclude
that corporate law has a socially productive role to play in this domain.
A.

Stretching Corporate Law Beyond Its Limits

One argument against the use of corporate law to regulate and remedy sexual harassment arises from the premise that corporate law should
remain focused on its principal objectives—maximizing shareholder
value, protecting investors, and promoting the efficient allocation of capital—and that involving corporate law in questions of workplace-based
sexual misconduct would divert it from its core mission.550 (We will refer
to this as the “diversion” argument.)
David Lynn, formerly the chief counsel of the SEC’s Division of
Corporate Finance,551 makes a similar claim in his critique of the DoddFrank Act’s disclosure requirements regarding the use of “conﬂict minerals” from the Democratic Republic of the Congo,552 payments to governments for resource extraction rights,553 and violations of mine health
and safety rules.554 Lynn notes that these rules “were borne out of discrete public policy concerns” and not “in accordance with the mission of
the SEC to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets,
and facilitate capital formation.”555 We can anticipate an analogous argument in the sexual harassment context: Corporate law should be focused
on maximizing shareholder value and protecting investors and markets—
not on protecting employees from workplace-based sexual misconduct.
The latter objective, while certainly a worthy one, is better addressed
through alternative mechanisms.
There are (at least) three potential rebuttals to the diversion argument. One is to challenge the claim that the core objectives of corporate
law are (or should be) maximizing shareholder value, protecting investors, and promoting the efficient allocation of capital. A second line of
attack assumes, arguendo, that the above-listed aims are and should be
the principal purposes of corporate law but posits that corporate law can
nonetheless pursue secondary goals without running off the rails. A third
approach is to argue that regulating and remedying sexual misconduct
by corporate executives is entirely consistent with the traditional goals of
corporate law.

550. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Framing a Purpose for Corporate Law, 39 J. Corp.
L. 713, 723–24 (2014) (arguing that “corporate law should facilitate corporate attempts to
maximize productive output” and that “social welfare enhancement, while desirable, lies
outside the limited sphere occupied by corporate law”).
551. People: David M. Lynn, Morrison & Foerster LLP, https://www.mofo.com/people/
david-lynn.html [https://perma.cc/6NRL-6568] (last visited July 27, 2018).
552. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012).
553. Id. § 78m(q).
554. Id. § 78m-2.
555. Lynn, supra note 41, at 330–31.
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The ﬁrst line of attack centers on one of the most fundamental
debates in corporate law—whether the principal goal of corporate law is
(or should be) to maximize shareholder welfare. While Professors Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman observed in 2001 that “[t]here is no
longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value,”556 other views have
become increasingly prevalent.557 For example, the late Professor Lynn
Stout advanced the view that while proﬁt maximization (and thus,
shareholder wealth maximization) is necessary for the ﬁrm’s long-term
survival, it is not the only corporate objective.558 In her view, once
proﬁtability is achieved, the ﬁrm should relax its focus on shareholder
wealth and commit instead to satisfying other goals, such as managing
risk and taking care of investors, employees, customers, and society at
large.559
But even if the shareholder primacy premise is accepted, there is a
growing awareness that shareholders desire something more than wealth
and that shareholder “value” therefore encompasses more than pure
wealth maximization. Economists Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales have
recently argued that managers should pursue a broad agenda that
556. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 34, at 439. The view that the corporate purpose should be to maximize shareholder wealth emerged in 1932, when Adolph Berle
collaborated with Gardiner Means to write The Modern Corporation and Private Policy. See
William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Considered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. Corp. L. 737,
737, 760 (2001). However, a 1970 New York Times op-ed by Milton Friedman championing
shareholder primacy kicked off the modern view that shareholder wealth maximization
should be the norm. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Proﬁts, N.Y. Times (Sept. 13, 1970), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/
pdf/business/miltonfriedman1970.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VUC-SZHZ] (arguing that corporate executives have a “responsibility . . . to conduct the business in accordance with their
desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the
basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom”).
557. See generally, e.g., Kent Greenﬁeld, The Failure of Corporate Law: Fundamental
Flaws and Progressive Possibilities (2006) (arguing that the law of corporations would be
better evaluated as a branch of public, rather than private law); Lynn Stout, The
Shareholder Value Myth (2012) (arguing that the view that public corporations existing
only to maximize shareholder value is a managerial choice that is not grounded in law);
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment,
158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 653 (2010) (arguing that risk-averse managers should be empowered to
make more corporate policy decisions because the shareholder-based agency model of
corporate governance and shareholder wealth maximization led to the ﬁnancial crisis of
2008); Einer Elhauge, Sacriﬁcing Corporate Proﬁts in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
733 (2005) (arguing that corporate law should support sacriﬁcing some shareholder proﬁt
in order to avoid social and moral sanctions).
558. Stout, supra note 557, at 31.
559. Id. at vi (“[Conventional shareholder-value thinking] threatens the welfare of
consumers, employees, communities, and investors alike.”). But see Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 235, 235–36
(2014) (calling some scholars, including Stout, “a tad naïve and tiring” for “admonish[ing] the directors and top executives of American public corporations to ‘do the right
thing’”).
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encompasses shareholders’ prosocial aims.560 They also contend that
shareholders should use their voting rights to signal their prosocial
desires to management.561 Derivative and securities actions against corporate directors and officers who commit, allow, or conceal sexual harassment could serve as one way for shareholders to signal their prosocial
objectives and to hold management accountable for antisocial behavior.
Moreover, even if shareholder wealth maximization is accepted as
the principal goal of corporate law, an area of law can have a primary
purpose while still advancing a number of secondary aims. Indeed, even
Milton Friedman, who posited that a corporation’s responsibility is to
make as much money for shareholders as possible, also believed that a
corporation should adhere to ethical standards when maximizing shareholder wealth.562 And hybrid purposes are not unique to corporate law.
For example, the primary purpose of federal income tax law is—
uncontroversially—to raise revenue for the United States government,
and yet federal income tax law is also used to advance a wide variety of
objectives aside from revenue-raising (for example, promoting homeownership,563 charitable contributions,564 retirement saving,565 and the
development of orphan drugs566). Likewise, the primary purpose of evidence law is—at least arguably—to promote the accurate determination
of facts at trial, but no one would dispute that evidence law also seeks to
advance and protect a number of other interests (such as promoting
trust among attorneys and clients, as well as among doctors and
patients).567 The notion that corporate law can pursue only one or a
small set of objectives stands in tension with the reality that many areas of
law serve plural purposes while still more or less achieving their principal
goals.
Yet one need not reject the premise that corporate law should
remain focused on a small set of core objectives in order to embrace the
normative claim that corporate law should be used to regulate and rem560. Hart & Zingales, supra note 43.
561. Id.
562. Friedman, supra note 556 (recognizing that corporate executives should conform
to the “basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom” even as they are conducting their businesses to maximize shareholder welfare).
563. See 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (2012) (deduction for home mortgage interest).
564. See id. § 170 (charitable contribution deduction).
565. See id. § 401(k) (allowing employers to establish deﬁned contribution plans, with
contributions and accretions excluded from employee income until distribution); id.
§ 402A (allowing for Roth 401(k) plans); id. § 408 (IRAs); id. § 408A (Roth IRAs).
566. See id. § 45C (providing a 50% credit for clinical testing expenses for drugs to
treat or cure rare diseases or conditions).
567. For one perspective on the purposes of evidence law, see Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1477, 1485 (1999) (noting
that “the law of evidence has multiple goals rather than just the goal of accuracy in factﬁnding” but that these noneconomic concerns “can be accommodated within a framework of economic analysis”).
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edy workplace-based sexual misconduct. This is the nub of the third
rebuttal to the diversion argument: Workplace-based sexual misconduct
does reduce shareholder value, harm investors, and interfere with the
efficient allocation of capital. It reduces shareholder value most directly
when corporate funds are used to pay judgments, settlements, and attorneys’ fees in employment discrimination cases, but that is only one
among a number of ways in which sexual misconduct by a corporation’s
executives and employees harms the corporation’s investors. Avoiding
these results—or penalizing corporate ﬁduciaries for allowing these
results to transpire—is entirely within corporate law’s central ambit.
B.

Discursive Harms

Apart from any worry as to the overextension of corporate law, the
prospect of corporate law liability in cases of sexual harassment raises a
separate concern regarding the discursive consequences of framing sexual harassment in terms of the injury to shareholders. Even if one
believes that sexual harassment results in the misallocation of human
capital and the misuse of corporate resources, these harms are most certainly secondary to the victim’s injury. Overemphasizing the harm to
shareholders and to markets runs the risk of equating the negative economic externalities of sexual harassment with the human tragedy that
victims endure. Relatedly, framing sexual harassment in terms of harm to
shareholders might be criticized as commodifying the employees who
bear the brunt of sexual harassment’s costs.
A historical analogy to the tort law treatment of sexual assault in the
nineteenth century illustrates the potential dignitary harms that stem
from characterizing a sexual attack on one person as an economic injury
to another. As Reva Siegel notes, “At common law, sexual assault gave rise
to an action for damages insofar as it inﬂicted an injury on a man’s property interest in the woman who was assaulted.”568 For example, the rape of a
slave might give rise to a trespass claim by the master; impregnation
might give rise to a seduction claim by the pregnant woman’s father. The
abolitionist and women’s rights activist Lydia Maria Child wrote that the
“miserable legal ﬁction” requiring a woman to “acknowledge herself the
servant of somebody” in order to visit common law consequences on her
attacker was a “standing insult to woman kind.”569
We can anticipate a somewhat similar critique of efforts to use corporate law liability to regulate and remedy workplace-based sexual harassment. Just as the rhetoric surrounding common law actions for seduction and trespass suggested that fathers, husbands, and masters were the
ones harmed by sexual assault, shareholder derivative actions arising
568. Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in Directions
in Sexual Harassment Law 1, 5–6 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).
569. Lydia Maria Child, Letter from New York, No. V, Bos. Courier, Feb. 6, 1844, at 2
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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from sexual harassment might be seen as suggesting that investors—
rather than the employees who suffer through sexual harassment
ﬁrsthand—are the only victims whose injuries require redress. Moreover,
the claim that workplace-based sexual harassment damages shareholders
through the misallocation of human capital might be interpreted to
imply that the female employees of publicly traded corporations are
themselves corporate assets.
A commitment to discursive purity would, however, implicate much
more than the use of corporate law to regulate and remedy sexual harassment—it would cast doubt on Title VII itself. The Supreme Court held
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 lay within Congress’s constitutional
authority because of discrimination’s “direct and adverse effect on the
free ﬂow of interstate commerce.”570 This holding has attracted criticism
from some scholars who argue that discrimination should be actionable
regardless of whether it affects commerce, but federal employment discrimination law continues to be grounded in the rationale that discrimination is bad for business.571 If the use of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
address sexual harassment can survive the commodiﬁcation critique,
then presumably the use of corporate law can too.
The fact that the social meaning of corporate legal liability in cases
of sexual harassment is potentially plastic further lessens concerns about
discursive harm. By this we mean that the imposition of corporate law
liability can be interpreted in multiple ways and that various actors will
have opportunities to inﬂuence the direction that such interpretation
takes. From one vantage point, liability would reinforce the view that successful companies are ones that make it possible for all of their employees—regardless of gender—to thrive, and that directors and officers who
allow sexual harassment to occur at their ﬁrms have failed in a fundamental respect. By that same token, the imposition of liability on individuals other than the harasser may communicate that harassment is the
product of a systemic failure, with systemic consequences,572 and that
responsibility can be attributed to groups of individuals rather than a
single harasser. The social meaning of corporate law liability is not ﬁxed
in stone, and attorneys, judges, journalists, and shareholders will shape
that social meaning through the language that they deploy.
We acknowledge the uncomfortable reality that shareholders will
sometimes recover damages arising out of harassment scandals while the
victims will be left emptyhanded. However, this is not a reason to abandon corporate law but a reminder that corporate law will always be a
570. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964).
571. See George Rutherglen, The Thirteenth Amendment, the Power of Congress,
and the Shifting Source of Civil Rights Law, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1551, 1559 (2012)
(“Congress and the Supreme Court found a new avenue for civil rights legislation under
the Commerce Clause.”).
572. For a discussion of other third-party effects that result from sexual harassment,
see generally Nancy Leong, Them Too, 96 Wash. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019).
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complement to, rather than a substitute for, legal protections designed to
compensate victims. In sum, concerns about the discursive consequences
of corporate law liability ought not to deter lawyers, shareholders, and
activists from pursuing this course, but it is important that practitioners
remain cognizant of the messages that liability might send. Reliance on
corporate law runs the risk of diverting attention away from victims and
contributing to commodiﬁcation of female employees, but that is a reason to think carefully about the words we use to articulate corporate law
claims—not a compelling reason to call off the enterprise altogether.
C.

Distributional Considerations

A separate worry regarding the use of corporate law to regulate and
remedy workplace-based sexual harassment is that this approach privileges certain classes of employees above others. Insofar as top executives
at publicly traded companies engage in sexual harassment, the victims
will often (though not always573) be other relatively well-compensated
professionals rather than the rank-and-ﬁle.574 Sexual harassment is
endemic in blue-collar work environments as well as white-collar ones.575
Corporate law liability might not have much to offer employees of
smaller businesses, or even lower-level employees of publicly traded
companies whose own experiences of sexual harassment are so far
removed from the company’s top executives that it would be difficult to
demonstrate the enterprise-wide harm necessary to hold the latter liable.
Our response to this concern is threefold. First, we can imagine circumstances in which a company’s failure to address sexual harassment
among lower-level employees would give rise to liability under ﬁduciary
duty or securities laws. As discussed, Signet Jewelers provides one example.576 The recently revealed pattern of sexual harassment at Ford Motor
Company plants in Chicago may be another case in point.577 Second,
573. Allegations that Wynn Resorts CEO Steve Wynn harassed a massage therapist and
manicurist at his company remind us that not all victims of sexual harassment by top executives will be other executives or highly compensated employees. See Berzon et al., supra
note 21.
574. Cf. Clare Malone, Will Women in Low-Wage Jobs Get Their #MeToo Moment?,
FiveThirtyEight (Dec. 14, 2017), https://ﬁvethirtyeight.com/features/the-metoo-momenthasnt-reached-women-in-low-wage-jobs-will-it/ [https://perma.cc/H6UT-8BYG] (describing how the harassment of “pink-collar” service professionals like hotel maids and bartenders is primarily perpetrated by customers, not corporate agents or ﬁduciaries).
575. See, e.g., id.; Amanda Helm Wright, Note, From the Factory to the Firm:
Clarifying Standards for Blue-Collar and White-Collar Sexual Harassment Claims Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1085, 1090 (examining standards for sexual harassment across blue-collar and white-collar work environments).
576. See supra section II.A.5.
577. See Susan Chira & Catrin Einhorn, How Tough Is It to Change a Culture of
Harassment? Ask Women at Ford, N.Y. Times (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2017/12/19/us/ford-chicago-sexual-harassment.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).

1674

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:1583

norms at the top of the corporate hierarchy likely inﬂuence behavior
several rungs below. Research on management and organizational behavior identiﬁes similar “trickle down” effects in related contexts.578 Third,
even if reliance on corporate law liability does have differential effects at
higher and lower rungs of the corporate hierarchy, that in itself is not
necessarily a reason to reject the approach. Rather, it is a reason to
explore alternative mechanisms (discussed in section III.E) to supplement the deterrent effects of corporate law liability at lower levels.
D. Backﬁre
A further concern—which arises any time that penalties for sexual
harassment are ratcheted upward—is that male employers will respond
in ways that redound to the detriment of female employees. (We frame
this concern in heteronormative terms because we think it is particularly
likely to manifest itself when potential perpetrators and victims occupy
traditional gender roles, though we also emphasize that sexual harassment is not an exclusively male-against-female phenomenon.) Male executives may be more reluctant to hire female employees—or may be more
reluctant to play a mentor role with respect to female employees—if they
are worried about potential harassment allegations, and those worries
may become even more salient if the existing employment discrimination
penalties for sexual harassment are supplemented by other forms of liability. This “Mike Pence effect”—so named on account of the Vice
President’s reported refusal to dine alone with any woman other than his
wife—is arguably the most serious potential unintended consequence of
the #MeToo movement’s successes.579
Yet even as the law potentially gives rise to this response, the legal
system has responses of its own to this concern. For one, systematically
excluding female employees from positions of proximity to top executives is itself a violation of employment discrimination law.580 Along those
lines, some of the same theories that might support director and officer
liability in cases of sexual harassment would also support liability if it
came to light that the company had shut the C-suite door to female
employees in order to manage the risk of sexual harassment allega-

578. See, e.g., David M. Mayer et al., How Low Does Ethical Leadership Flow? Test of a
Trickle-Down Model, 108 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 1, 7 (2009);
Bennett J. Tepper & Edward C. Taylor, Relationships Among Supervisors’ and
Subordinates’ Procedural Justice Perceptions and Organizational Citizenship Behaviors,
46 Acad. Mgmt. J. 97, 100–03 (2003).
579. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 39; Katherine Tarbox, Is #MeToo Backlash Hurting
Women’s Opportunities in Finance?, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Mar. 12, 2018), https://hbr.org/
2018/03/is-metoo-backlash-hurting-womens-opportunities-in-finance [http://perma.cc/
GHG4-8ZAF].
580. See Prohibited Employment Policies/Practices, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/
laws/practices/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/R9W5-HP4N] (last visited July 27, 2018).
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tions.581 The argument that we should refrain from penalizing executives
for behaving illegally because they might respond by behaving illegally is,
we think, a weak one.
To be sure, Title VII might not encompass more subtle forms of discrimination, such as a failure to mentor, which may result from an
increased risk of corporate liability.582 But there are several responses to
this concern. First, that risk is present with respect to all employment discrimination protections, and if the risk is not a sufficient basis to ratchet
down protections under Title VII and similar statutes, then it is difficult
to see why it would be a reason to back away from the use of corporate
law to regulate and remedy sexual harassment. Second, to the extent that
backﬁre results because employees are worried about mistakenly or
falsely being accused of harassment, the success and visibility of the
#MeToo movement may reduce this risk by clarifying the standards of
acceptable workplace behavior.583 Finally, the “market for mentorship” is
not one-sided; mentees seek out mentors, too. A legal regime that penalizes inappropriate behavior and empowers junior employees to bring
harassment claims might actually make those junior employees more
likely to seek out senior male mentors and enhance mentorship opportunities for them.584 This is not to dismiss the backﬁre concern out of
hand; it is to say that the beneﬁts of increased legal protection almost
certainly outweigh the costs.
E.

Alternative Mechanisms

Even if one accepts that regulating and remedying workplace-based
sexual misconduct through corporate law could have positive consequences, one still might question whether corporate law is the best tool
to achieve these ends. Why not focus instead on alternative mechanisms,
such as federal and state employment discrimination law? Surely reforms

581. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[O]ne cannot
act loyally as a corporate director by causing the corporation to violate the positive laws it
is obliged to obey.”).
582. See Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael Gely, Through the Looking Glass: Can Title VII
Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 1517, 1524–25
(1995) (“[W]omen and minorities are often excluded from developmental programs,
training, relocation opportunities, and key assignments, and they are often without mentors or sponsors within the organization.”).
583. See Kevin B. Leblang et al., The Rise of the Me Too Movement: An Opportunity,
Not an Obligation, Kramer Levin (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.kramerlevin.com/en/
perspectives-search/the-rise-of-the-metoo-movement-an-opportunity-not-an-obligation.html
[https://perma.cc/X4BH-6WT9] (recommending that companies broaden the conduct
covered by employee handbooks to clarify acceptable workplace behavior).
584. See Lynn M. Morgan & Marilyn J. Davidson, Sexual Dynamics in Mentoring
Relationships—A Critical Review, 19 Brit. J. Mgmt. S120, S122–25 (2008) (describing the
negative effects of sexual relationships in heterosexual cross-gender mentoring but noting
the beneﬁts to both parties when there are clear boundaries in place).
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to these areas of law would address the problem of workplace-based sexual misconduct more directly than corporate law liability would.
We readily acknowledge that corporate law ought not to be the only—
nor the primary—mechanism for addressing the problem of workplacebased sexual misconduct. Moreover, nothing in this Article should be
read to suggest that corporate law is the most effective means of regulating or remedying sexual harassment. While a comprehensive analysis
of Title VII reform options lies well beyond our present scope, the analysis above suggests a number of ways in which the federal employment
discrimination regime might be revised to better achieve its aims. For
example, the 180-day period for ﬁling a charge with the EEOC could be
extended in sexual harassment cases to reflect the reality that victims often
are reluctant to come forward on their own.585 Moreover, Title VII’s caps
on compensatory and punitive damages could be raised—or, at least,
adjusted for inﬂation.586 In the absence of congressional action, state
legislators could take the lead by passing laws providing for longer limitations periods and higher or unlimited damages.
More creative solutions might involve the use of what scholars Ian
Ayres and Cait Unkovic have termed “information escrow” arrangements,587 now being implemented on some college campuses for sexual
assault cases through the Callisto app.588 Callisto allows victims to report
their experiences of sexual assault and to keep those reports conﬁdential
until another victim lodges a report with respect to the same perpetrator.
When two victims have reported assaults by the same perpetrator, the
institution receives the contact information of each victim, and the victims are themselves told that there has been a match.589 One might imagine a state-level equivalent that applies to workplace-based sexual mis585. For a recent commentary, see, e.g., Danny Cevallos, Sex Misconduct Cases Spur
Rethinking of Statute of Limitations, NBC News (Dec. 26, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/
storyline/sexual-misconduct/sex-misconduct-cases-spur-rethinking-statute-limitations-n822286
[https://perma.cc/YF28-L2RD] (describing the modern legislative trend of expanding or
removing statutes of limitations for lawsuits arising from sexual misconduct). For a more
detailed articulation of the reasons victims may not report sexual harassment within the
statute of limitations, see Michael B. Reuben & Isaac M. Zucker, Remedying Sexual
Harassment: A Primer, Litig., Winter 1995, at 43, 45–46.
586. The $300,000 cap for large employers in November 1991 is equivalent to more
than $548,000 in June 2018 based on the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers.
See CPI Inflation Calculator, Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_
calculator.htm (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Aug. 18, 2018); cf. Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072–73 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981a (2012)) (capping damages at $300,000).
587. Ian Ayres & Cait Unkovic, Information Escrows, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 145, 145 (2012).
588. Laura Bassett, How a New Technology Could Help Find the Next Harvey Weinstein,
HuffPost (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/callisto-rape-reportingapp_us_59df86c7e4b0eb18af06d54e [https://perma.cc/2SN4-TFH4] (last updated Nov. 7,
2017).
589. What We Do, Callisto, https://www.projectcallisto.org/what-we-do [https://
perma.cc/T5EV-T5LV] (last visited July 27, 2017).
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conduct: Victims could lodge conﬁdential complaints with the state
human rights agency, and once multiple victims have reported instances
of harassment or assaults by the same perpetrator, each victim would be
informed, and a new limitations period would run from that date.
Beyond federal and state employment discrimination and civil rights
law, tort law and tax law might have a role to play in regulating and remedying sexual harassment. Victims of sexual harassment have had some
(limited) success bringing tort law claims for intentional inﬂiction of
emotional distress,590 assault, and battery.591 Some authors have argued
for a more expansive freestanding tort for sexual harassment.592 The
#MeToo movement might give new momentum to the push for such a
tort to be recognized. Tax law, meanwhile, is already being used to discourage conﬁdential settlements of sexual misconduct claims, which
potentially allow perpetrators to escape public exposure.593 Speciﬁcally,
the Republican-backed tax legislation signed into law by President
Trump in December 2017 includes a provision that denies a deduction
for amounts paid to settle sexual harassment and abuse claims if such
settlement is subject to a nondisclosure agreement.594 And aside from tax
590. Stender & Steele, supra note 165, at 2–3 (“Most courts recognize that ordinary
employment suits involving sexual discrimination will not establish a cause of action for
intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress. . . . However, some courts have held that egregious sexual harassment may rise to the level of intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress.”); see also supra note 164 (describing the ﬁnding of intentional inﬂiction of
emotional distress in Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606 (5th
Cir. 1999)).
591. Stender & Steele, supra note 165, at 8–9; see also, e.g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash,
Inc., 158 F.3d 1371, 1377 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming in part and reversing in part a judgment against an employer under a theory of vicarious liability for alleged hostile work
environment sexual harassment); Rudas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 96-5987, 1997
WL 11302, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1997) (granting in part and denying in part a motion to
dismiss a complaint alleging intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress, assault, and
battery).
592. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 Harv. L. Rev.
445, 450–51, 526 (1997); Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49
Stan. L. Rev. 691, 769–70 & n.407 (1997); Paul, supra note 63, at 359–65 (1990); Krista J.
Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace,
134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1461, 1463 (1986). Catharine MacKinnon has argued that treating sexual harassment as a tort is “inadequate” because it fails to recognize the inherent element
of economic coercion. MacKinnon, supra note 58, at 173.
593. On conﬁdentiality clauses in settlements of sexual misconduct cases, see generally
Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Conﬁdential Settlements in Civil, Criminal, and Sexual
Assault Cases, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 311 (2018).
594. An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the
Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13307,
131 Stat. 2054, 2129 (2017) (to be codiﬁed at 26 U.S.C. § 162(q)). On some of the ambiguities in that provision, see Leandra Lederman, Are Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs’
Attorneys’ Fees Inadvertently Disallowed by the Tax Cuts Bill?, Surly Subgroup (Dec. 19,
2017), https://surlysubgroup.com/2017/12/19/are-sexual-harassment-plaintiffs-attorneysfees-inadvertently-disallowed-by-the-tax-cuts-bill [https://perma.cc/YL4H-L67W]. For a
proposal to deny a tax deduction for conﬁdential sexual misconduct settlements that pre-
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law, several other policy levers remain available for addressing the specific
problem of confidential sexual harassment settlements. As Professors Saul
Levmore and Frank Fagan have suggested, attorneys could be required
under professional responsibility rules to report such nondisclosure agreements to authorities or vulnerable third parties, courts could refuse to
enforce such agreements, or jurisdictions could impose mandatory disclosure requirements as to some or all information concerning these
settlements.595
Importantly, however, the availability of alternative mechanisms for
addressing problems related to workplace sexual misconduct does not
make corporate law an irrelevant—or undesirable—tool in the ﬁght
against sexual harassment. First, the problem of sexual harassment
appears to be so prevalent and pervasive that multiple policy tools will be
needed in the effort to eradicate sexual misconduct from the workplace
(and even then, “eradication” is almost certainly an unrealistic goal).
Second, these various tools may be complements rather than substitutes.
For example, if securities law forces publicly traded companies to disclose large sexual harassment settlements or allegations against executives, those revelations—insofar as they supply further evidence of the
problem’s prevalence—may add further fuel to the push for legal reform.
Third, whereas most other policy responses to sexual misconduct in
the workplace would require legislative action, corporate law can be used
to address the problem without any change to existing statutes. As we
argue in Part II, corporate directors and officers who commit, allow, or
conceal workplace-based sexual misconduct can be held liable under the
ﬁduciary duty laws of Delaware and other states, and publicly traded
companies can be held liable under federal securities law for misleading
investors about workplace sexual misconduct in certain circumstances.
Convincing federal and state court judges of those propositions is probably a lighter lift than persuading federal and state lawmakers to enact
new statutes. And convincing one or a handful of the approximately
3,700 publicly listed companies in the United States596 to adopt a shareholder resolution requiring disclosure of sexual harassment settlements
may be a more plausible short-term objective than nationwide legislative
change.597
ceded the emergence of the Weinstein allegations and the Republican tax plan, see
Levmore & Fagan, supra note 593, at 343–45.
595. See Levmore & Fagan, supra note 593, at 342–43.
596. Why the Decline in the Number of Listed American Firms Matters, Economist:
Schumpeter (Apr. 22, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/business/21721153company-founders-are-reluctant-go-public-and-takeovers-are-soaring-why-decline [https://
perma.cc/Z2LT-YR2U] (reporting that the number of listed companies in the United
States is 3,671).
597. See Elana Schor & Heather Caygle, Congress Dawdles as #MeToo Scandals Rage
On, Politico (Aug. 11, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/11/congresssexual-harassment-metoo-scandals-773309 [https://perma.cc/VG8Z-Y6SR].
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CONCLUSION
Our focus in this Article has been on the role of corporate law in
regulating and remedying workplace-based sexual misconduct. We have
argued that corporate ﬁduciaries who engage in, enable, or ignore sexual
harassment at their companies will be liable to shareholders under speciﬁc circumstances. We also have highlighted the ways in which publicly
traded companies contending with sexual harassment scandals can—if
not careful—run afoul of federal securities laws. And we have argued that
corporate law, while certainly not the only legal tool for addressing the
widespread problem of workplace sexual misconduct, can play a positive
role in advancing the #MeToo movement’s objectives, though we also
caution that advocates for liability should be aware of and attentive to the
discursive and distributional consequences of their efforts.
Not only does corporate law have important implications for the
ﬁght against sexual harassment, but the #MeToo movement also—we
think—has important implications for corporate law. Perhaps the “history”
of corporate law is over, as Hansmann and Kraakman provocatively
proclaimed in 2001, and maybe the claim that corporate law “should
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value” has won the
day.598 But even if that is so (and we are far from sure that it is599), the
question of how to maximize long-term shareholder value will still be
contested, and corporate law will continue to provide a forum in which
that contest is waged. Social movements inﬂuence the evolution of ideas
about investment and management, and now, we are seeing that evolution
in real time.
Ultimately, the impact of shareholder suits arising out of corporate
sexual misconduct will not be measurable in terms of dollars recovered.
Indeed, one can be skeptical in general about derivative actions and
securities fraud lawsuits as mechanisms for compensation and speciﬁc
deterrence while also retaining hope that litigation will serve a useful
role here.600 For one, shareholder lawsuits against corporate ﬁduciaries
who commit, enable, ignore, or conceal sexual harassment chip away at a
public–private divide that places the sexual behavior of executives
entirely—and in our view, incorrectly—on the private side. What a CEO
does behind closed doors is the board’s business, at least when the CEO
exploits employees (as in, for example, the Wynn case), when the CEO’s
romantic interests cause him to favor some employees over others (as
allegedly occurred at Liberty Tax), or when a CEO’s behavior generates
legal risk for the company. So, too, shareholder suits can emphasize that
598. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 34, at 439.
599. See supra notes 557–559 and accompanying text.
600. For classic (and empirically grounded) statements of such skepticism, see Janet
Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497, 500 (1991); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit:
Litigation Without Foundation?, J.L. Econ. & Org., Spring 1991, at 55, 55.
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executives’ behavior toward lower-level employees matters not only for
civility but also for ﬁrm productivity. Even if indemniﬁcation and insurance shield most defendants from personal liability, shareholder actions
can serve to redeﬁne the responsibilities of corporate ﬁduciaries and
clarify that the prevention of sexual harassment is a critical component
of good governance.
There are, concededly, costs to using corporate law for these purposes. Aside from the direct costs of litigation (which in the end may be
borne by shareholders), there is—as we acknowledge—a potentially serious cost in recasting shareholders as sexual harassment’s victims when of
course the direct impact on the harassee is orders of magnitude more
severe. We are nonetheless optimistic that a changing litigation environment will make individuals in positions of power more attentive to the
lived experiences and long-lasting injuries of harassment’s foremost victims—and more committed toward preventing it from happening again.
That, more than any settlement or verdict, will be the ﬁnal and most signiﬁcant metric of success.

